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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network analysis is widely used to explicitly model connections between entities
in a complex environment. It enables to think about complex processes along
theoretical guidelines of network analysis and can be used to explore direct and
indirect relationships between different objects. However, the modeling decisions
influence the interpretability of the results. Considering the network representa-
tion in conjunction with the underlying processes is important as discussed in the
book Network analysis literacy: a practical approach to the analysis of networks
by Katharina Zweig (2016).
Since 1998, social network analysis has seen a surge of interest: coming from
statistical physics, Duncan Watts, Albert-László Barabási, Uri Alon and others
have transferred their methods and viewpoints to the analysis and modelling of
complex systems as networks. Since the perspective is not only on social networks
but also on biological, communication and other types of networks, it is better
described as complex network analysis.
One of the foci in complex network analysis is the comparison with random net-
works, in order to determine those structures which are ‘out of equilibrium’ and
where additional forces are needed to explain them (Watts and Strogatz 1998;
1
2Barabási and Albert 1999; Shen-Orr, Milo, Mangan, et al. 2002; Milo, Shen-Orr,
Itzkovitz, et al. 2004). For example a strong clusteredness of edges is in some
cases non-expected and needs to be explained. The motivation behind this is
an intuition well-known in physics: structure is costly and if there is no energy
keeping it up, the structure deteriorates. This rule is stated as the second law of
thermodynamics: in case of no external energy fed to the system (i.e. an isolated
system), the entropy can never decrease (e.g. Clausius (1851) and Atkins (1984)).
Entropy in this sense means that the system, given some structural constraints,
will be totally randomized in all other aspects. For example, if a small volume of
0.1 litre full of gas is injected into a larger volume, say 1 litre, the initially high
density of gas at the injection point is going to dissolve until the gas has the
same density everywhere in the larger volume. While it is possible that all gas
particles will one day meet again in one corner of the larger volume, it is very
unlikely. But what if we actually find a higher density of gas in one corner of
the larger volume? We will then assume that there is an additional external force
which makes the atoms concentrate there for example the larger volume could be
swirled around, creating a centrifugal force that causes the higher density at one
end of the volume. A similar thought is behind the use of random graph models :
if there is a quantifiable structure whose value is very far away from that found in
a suitable random graph model, this finding hints at aspects of the network which
are not yet taken into account. In physics, such a yet unexplained structure is
especially interesting, if it shows up in very different contexts. The goal is then
to find a universal force, a hitherto overlooked constraint, or a new type of law by
which networks from very different complex systems are generated to explain the
newly found structure. A typical line of research is to first quantify the special
structure or behaviour of complex networks and how they differ from a reasonable
random network. Those parts of the structure which are not yet explained by
the random network model are analysed. These structures could be explained by
a new model: the classic small-world article by Watts and Strogatz (Watts and
3Strogatz 1998) and the article by Barabási and Albert which introduced scale-free
networks (Barabási and Albert 1999). Another strain of research argues that if
structures emerge far from equilibrium, represented by the random network the
real-world network is compared with, then these substructures are likely to carry
function for the complex system and are thus kept up against the pull of entropy.
This is the underlying motivation for measures like the modularity proposed by
Girvan and Newman (Girvan and Newman 2002; Newman and Girvan 2004), an
algorithm for the one-mode projection of bipartite graphs by Zweig and Kaufmann
(Zweig 2010; Zweig and Kaufmann 2011), network motifs as introduced by Alon et
al. (Shen-Orr, Milo, Mangan, et al. 2002; Milo, Shen-Orr, Itzkovitz, et al. 2004),
or the higher vulnerability of real-world networks compared to random networks
(Albert, Jeong, and Barabási 2000).
The models and the general algorithms to detect non-random, statistically sig-
nificant structures are basically context-free since the underlying motivation is to
find universal laws and universal structures. In these endeavors, networks are
only rarely associated with further, context-dependent features of the nodes or
relationships between the nodes. The networks are rather based on a radical sim-
plification of the exact circumstances. This radicalness has been very successful in
identifying system-spanning processes of network construction and the structures
they generate. The main goal of complex network analysis is to study real world
networks and find underlying universal laws, explaining the evolution of such a
network.
In general, social network analysis considers the social embeddedness and complex
social relationship between people (e.g. Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman (2005)
and Wasserman and Faust (1994)). For example, Wenger, Dykstra, Melkas, et al.
(2007) analyses the association of marriage and fertility and the support networks
for different countries. Social embeddedness is considered from different perspec-
tives. Indirect measures of social embeddedness are attendance of religious service
4and active membership in voluntary associations. It can be interpreted as an in-
dicator for the integration in specific social groups. Another indirect measure of
social embeddedness in informal networks is the frequency of contact with relatives,
friends and neighbors. Additionally, a more direct approach is used to analyse the
social support network beyond the involvement in separate social groups. They
identify social network types, as described in Wenger (1991), which differ by their
configuration of relationships, their size and their supportiveness.
Classical social network analysis is settled in a given context and often correlates
the position of an individual with other parameters. The network process is then
defined by the sets of paths actually used and the type of goods transported
by the process (Borgatti 2005). There is ample literature on how data needs
to be sampled to provide a reliable basis for such kind of analysis (i.e. how to
transform raw data into a network representation, which actually represents the
real network’s structure in the given context) and how network analytic measures
can be chosen to be suitable for the task at hand (Borgatti 2005; Butts 2009).
The content of the following three chapters concern different fields of application.
However, the underlying driver is, in the respective context, the interconnection
of data generating process, network and network analytic method to investigate
the complex network of interest. These interconnections are described in Chapter
2.1 in more detail. We combine the work of Butts (2009) and Borgatti (2005) and
discuss in context of an air transportation network the trilemma of network anal-
ysis1: The choice of the network representation, the network process of interest
and the network analytic method are interdependent. The choice of any two di-
mensions influences the choice of the third. Given a network representation and a
network process, a suitable path-based network analytic measure has to be chosen
in order to quantify process-related aspects of the nodes in the network. Given
1Chapter 2 is a reprint of Isadora Dorn, Andreas Lindenblatt, and Katharina A. Zweig (2012).
“The trilemma of network analysis”. In: 2012 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances
in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, pp. 9–14.
5a network analytic measure which is suitable for a given network representation,
the result is only predictive for the subset of those network processes which follow
the path set. This is implicitly used by the network measure. Finally, given a
network analytic measure and a network process in a complex system, only the
network representation to which the method can be applied and which contains
all the necessary information on the paths used by the process, can be used (Dorn,
Lindenblatt, and Zweig 2012).
In Chapter 2 we analyse the passengers journeys within the framework of complex
network analysis. Since the early 1970s the U.S. air transportation market had
to undergo many reforms. The Airline Deregulation Act (1978) allows airlines
to choose the routes and time schedules as well as set the fares freely. Airlines
formed hub-and-spoke systems and thereby transformed the air transportation
network. Cooperation agreements and anti-trust immunity between airlines on
certain routes allowed them to spread their network further and lower prices on
inter-airline flights. (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer 2011). Mergers and liquidations
of airlines further changed and are still changing the structure of these provided
networks. Within the field of complex network analysis, air transportation is an
active area of research. Due to this multifaceted evolution of the air transporta-
tion network and the availability of data diverse strands emerged in the economic
literature. The strategies of the airlines and the results of competition have been
extensively analysed, for a survey see Levine (1987) and Borenstein (1992). Sev-
eral articles looked at the emergence of airline alliances and codesharing as well
as the entrance of low cost carriers, which led to reduced ticket prices and a rise
in consumer welfare (Brueckner, Lee, and Singer 2011; Gayle 2008). From a pas-
senger’s perspective the deregulation and the technological developments provide
the opportunity for airlines to offer more frequent flights and more routes, either
via a hub or direct. Direct flights from city A to city C and flights via a hub B
6(A-B-C) are considered to be competing with each other in the same market (A-
C) (Hüschelrath and Müller 2013). Also, air transportation networks have been
analyzed by complex network analysis methods (Amaral, Scala, Barthélémy, et al.
2000; Barrat, Barthélemy, Pastor-Satorras, et al. 2004; Dall’Asta, Barrat, and
Barthélemy 2006; Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005).
We first characterize the U.S. air transportation network from a network theo-
retical perspective. We then discuss the underlying assumption of two centrality
measures and propose a measure which takes passenger journeys into account. The
"anomaly" of some cities identified by classical centrality measures can partially be
explained when observed journeys are considered. Furthermore, we incorporated
the passenger’s demand in the analysis of the robustness of an air transportation
network which makes it seem even more vulnerable. However, it does not neces-
sarily imply that the network is at high risk and we discuss possible interpretation
of the result. Our aim is to point out what caveats but also what advantages
complex network theory might bring with it.
In Chapter 3, we focus on social support networks of people in old age and the
association with well-being and mental health.2. We rely on a large sample of
respondents aged 50 and older from 16 European countries and make use of detailed
social network data. We construct measures to reflect the characteristics of social
support networks like size, relationships, geographical proximity, and closeness and
analyze the association with well-being and mental health.
In Chapter 4, we discuss the association between religion and moral behavior and
attitudes.3 We use data from a survey on religious beliefs of a representative
sample of the Dutch population. In the survey there are no direct data about
2Chapter 3 is a reprint of Christoph Becker, Isadora Kirchmaier, and Trautmann Stefan T.
(2019). “Marriage, parenthood and social network: subjective well-being and mental health in
old age”. In: PLOS ONE 14.7, pp. 1–20
3Chapter 4 is a reprint of Isadora Kirchmaier, Jens Prüfer, and Stefan T. Trautmann (2018).
“Religion, moral attitudes and economic behavior”. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Orga-
nization 148, pp. 282–300.
7the social support network itself but indirect measures about social embeddedness
like participation in the religous community and membership in organizations.
We also use data of participants’ parents’ church membership and frequency of
church attendance, when the participant was aged 15, to study intergenerational
transmission of the religious belief and the observed association.

Chapter 2
The Trilemma of Network Analysis
The recent interest in network analysis is caused by the unprecedented accessibility
to large datasets: there are huge, publicly available databases on protein-protein-
interactions, air transportation, and street maps which easily lend themselves to a
network representation. Once a network is created, all types of path-based network
analytic measures can be easily applied: typical examples are centrality measures,
but also some clustering algorithms and robustness analysis rely on path-based
measures. Borgatti (2005) has claimed that centrality measures basically simulate
dissemination processes of goods which use a certain subset of paths on the given
network; they can thus only be used to describe processes which rely on the same
type of good and the same subset of paths. Later, Butts (2009) pointed out that
the results of a chosen network analytic method strongly vary with modeling deci-
sions taken when turning raw data into networks. In this article we combine these
two insights to the trilemma of network analysis which states that the network
process of interest, the network representation, and the network analytic method
cannot be chosen independently. We discuss on two real-world examples in the
realm of air transportation networks how to choose a distance based measure with
respect to the context of the data, re-computing similar analyses by Guimerá,
Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005) and Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy (2006). In
9
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both cases, the path-based measures matching the network process of interest
change the interpretation of the previous findings, which shows the potential in
regarding the trilemma of network analysis1.
2.1 Introduction
The new statistical view on complex networks is often rather data driven than
theory driven: when a new data set is explored, the first step is to transform
the data into some network and characterise it by various structural measures,
especially centrality measures (Koschützki, Lehmann, Peeters, et al. 2005) or clus-
tering algorithms (Newman 2010; Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Carrington, Scott,
and Wasserman 2005). One of the interesting perspectives of a network represen-
tation is that indirect effects can be quantified: the influence of a person on the
friend of a friend (Christakis 2011), the power of a person based on its position
in the network (Bonacich 1987), but also the likelihood of a word to become cru-
cial in solving a word-game puzzle (Iyengar, Zweig, Natarajan, et al. 2011), or
the probability that an old computer virus becomes viral again (Pastor-Satorras
and Vespignani 2001). Interest in an indirect effect already implies that the anal-
ysis focuses on something that is disseminated along the edges of the network.
Based on Borgatti’s seminal paper on the connection between network flows and
centrality measures (Borgatti 2005), we will call such a dissemination a network
process which is in a first approximation determined by the following characteris-
tics: the type of good which is disseminated and the set of paths it uses, possibly
1The content of Chapter 2 has been published as Isadora Dorn, Andreas Lindenblatt, and
Katharina A. Zweig (2012). “The trilemma of network analysis”. In: 2012 IEEE/ACM Inter-
national Conference on Advances in Social Networks Analysis and Mining, pp. 9–14. Copyright
c©2012 IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Dorn, Lindenblatt, and Zweig (2012). In refer-
ence to IEEE copyrighted material which is used with permission in this thesis, the IEEE does
not endorse any of Heidelberg University’s products or services. Internal or personal use of this
material is permitted. If interested in reprinting/republishing IEEE copyrighted material for
advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribu-
tion, please go to https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/rights-link.html to learn
how to obtain a License from RightsLink.
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weighted by a probability with which a given path is used. Borgatti differentiates
the type of good by how it moves through the network: is it indivisible like a
book, can it be copied along the way like a virus or a meme, or can it be split
up like money (Borgatti 2005)? Based on these features, the centrality of a node
can be defined as the (expected) fraction of time the good will use the node on
its way around the network (Borgatti and Everett 2006). This implies that each
network process requires a centrality measure adapted to the type of good and the
probability with which it uses a given path. Similarly, a centrality measure based
on shortest paths can only produce meaningful results for a process that really
uses shortest paths. Already small deviations from this pattern will lead to wrong
results: Holme (2003) has shown that if a process mainly uses shortest paths but
not at all times, betweenness centrality is no longer able to identify the most heav-
ily used nodes. In this light, a path-based centrality measure like the closeness,
betweenness, or stress centrality quantifies the centrality of nodes in a network
process which uses shortest paths and uses all of them with the same probability.
Its predictive value for processes with another usage of paths is in the best case
unclear and in the worst case misleading. Similarly, clustering algorithms based
on centralities, e.g., the one by Girvan and Newman based on betweenness central-
ity (Girvan and Newman 2002; Newman and Girvan 2004) or robustness analyses
of networks where the most central nodes are iteratively removed (Albert, Jeong,
and Barabási 2000), make certain assumptions about why a given node is central,
although these assumptions are implicit by the choice of the centrality measure.
We conclude that Borgatti’s work, which is specific to centrality measures, can
be generalized to stating a non-trivial dependency between path-based network
analytic measures and the network process of interest.
In his paper “Revisiting the foundations of social network analysis”, Butts (2009)
has made a connection between a chosen network analytic measure like the cen-
tralization of a network and parameters governing the transformation of raw data
12
Figure 2.1: Trilemma of network analysis.
into a network representation: e.g., if connections are only used for some time in
a larger time interval, the type of aggregation of these connections into one single
network will strongly influence its structural appearance (Butts 2009). Finally,
there is a comparably trivial connection between a network representation and
the network analytic methods that can be applied to it: While most methods
are designed for unipartite, unweighted, and undirected networks, all other rep-
resentations require methods which can deal with multipartite, weighted, and/or
directed networks (Brandes 2005). In summary, given a network representation
and a network process, only one path-based network analytic measure is suitable
to quantify the centrality (or other process-related aspects) of the nodes in the
network. Given a network analytic measure which is suitable for a given network
representation, the result is only predictive for the subset of those network pro-
cesses which follow the path set which is implicitly used by the network measure.
And finally, given a network analytic measure and a process in a complex sys-
tem, only the network representation to which the method can be applied and
which contains all the necessary information on the paths used by the process, can
be used. We call the interdependence of these three dimensions the trilemma of
network analysis since the choice of any two massively restricts the choice of the
third. Fig. 2.1 schematically represents the interdependence between the choice of
the network representation, the network process of interest, and a path-dependent
network analytic measure.
Now that the stage is set, the rest of the article will show on two examples from the
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area of air transportation how the interpretation of network analytic results can
change if the trilemma of network analysis is regarded by matching the network
process of interest with an appropriate network analytic method.
The article is organised as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the necessary graph
definitions, Section 2.3 presents previous results, the air traffic data we used,
and our network representation of it. In Section 2.4 we discuss journey-based
betweenness and stress centralities. In Section 2.5 we discuss the journey-based
robustness of the network. We summarize the results in Section 2.6 and conclude
with a discussion of the results in Section 2.7.
2.2 Definitions
LetG = (V,E,Ω) be a tuple consisting of a set of nodes V , a set of edges E ⊆ V×V
and Ω : E → R a weighting function on the edges. Two nodes v, w connected by
an edge are said to be neighbors, and the degree deg(v) of a node v is defined as
the number of neighbors it has. The strength s(x) of a node x is defined as the
sum of weights of all edges to its neighbors.
A path P (v, w) = (e0, e1, · · · , ek) is an ordered subset of edges in E such that
e0 = (v, v1), ek = (vk, w) and for all 1 ≤ i < k ei = (vi, vi+1), i.e., a series of edges
such that one can traverse from v to w. If no such path exists, the two nodes
are disconnected. A connected component C ⊆ V is a maximal set of nodes which
are all pairwise connected with its size |C|. The biggest connected component
(bcc) is the component containing the most nodes. The length l(v, w) of a path
P (v, w) is given by the sum of the weights of its edges. The distance d(v, w) of any
two connected nodes is defined as the minimal path length of all paths between
them and a path with this length is called a shortest path. Let σvw denote the
number of all shortest paths between v and w, and let σvw(x) denote the number
14
of all shortest paths in which x is contained but not as an endpoint. Then, the
betweenness centrality CB(x) is defined as:
CB(x) =
∑
v∈V,w∈V
σvw(x)
σvw
(2.1)
The stress centrality CS(x) counts the number of shortest paths containing x (not
as an endpoint):
CS(x) =
∑
v∈V,w∈V
σvw(x) (2.2)
2.3 Previous Results and the Data
One of the datasets that is often analysed is air traffic data. Some of the data
sources provide information on the capacity of scheduled flights, others provide
information on the number of tickets sold.2 A common network representation of
this data, called the air transportation network (ATN), connects one airport or
city to another if there is a flight from one to the other (Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi,
et al. 2005). We will re-evaluate two previous findings by regarding the trilemma
of network analysis, namely one result on so-called anomalous cities and one on
the robustness of the network.
2.3.1 Anomalous Cities
Given an ATN, the ranking of each city imposed by its degree and its between-
ness centrality can be compared. The network models proposed at that time
2There are two types of air traffic data: scheduled-based air traffic data and journey-based
air traffic data. Scheduled-based air traffic data provide information about the direct flights
scheduled and their capacity (number of seats available). Journey-based air traffic data contain
information about the actual direct flights conducted as well as the actual routes travelled by pas-
sengers, the journeys. Database provider of the first type of air traffic data are for example OAG
and IATA (International air transportation association). Journey-based air traffic data within
the US are provided for free by the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics and international
data can be bought from Amadeus, the provider of a worldwide air travel booking system.
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predicted that a node that has a high degree will also have a high betweenness
centrality (Goh, Oh, Kahng, et al. 2003). However, the ATNs analysed so far
contain some so-called anomalous cities which have a low degree but a high be-
tweenness centrality (Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005; Dall’Asta, Barrat,
and Barthélemy 2006). Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005) noticed that these
anomalous centralities call for a new network model. They argue that the anoma-
lous centralities arise as a result of a multicommunity structure in the ATN and
that they can only be explained by geopolitical reasons:
“Interestingly, besides these cities with relatively large degree, there
are others, such as Anchorage (AK) and Port Moresby (Papua New
Guinea), that, despite having small degrees, are among the most cen-
tral in the network. [...] We hypothesize that the origin of such a
behavior is the multicommunity structure of the network. We find the
communities in the network and demonstrate that their structure can
only be understood in terms of both geographical and political consid-
erations (Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005, p.7796,p.7799).”
2.3.2 Robustness of ATNs
Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy (2006) analysed the robustness of different
ATNs. Robustness analysis of networks was introduced by Albert, Jeong, and
Barabási (2000). The basic idea is to rank nodes by some measure and delete
the highest ranked nodes recursively, simulating the result of an intentional at-
tack on the most important nodes of the network. Albert, Jeong, and Barabási
(2000) measured the robustness of the network by the number of remaining nodes
in the biggest connected component. Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy (2006)
introduced weighted robustness measures for ATNs. The robustness is measured
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for example by the highest sum of available seats carried by any connected com-
ponent. While Albert, Jeong, and Barabási (2000) showed that networks with a
right-skewed degree distribution are in general not very robust against intentional
attacks, Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy (2006) showed that ATNs are even
less robust when weights such as capacity and distance are taken into account.
2.3.3 The Data
We used the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data set from the year
2010, provided by the US Department of Transportation (DOT 2018), as our raw
data for an ATN. On a quarterly basis large3 US airlines report information on
10% of their sold tickets for inner US flights. This database includes the exact
sequence of the journeys (origin, stop-over airports, destination). We aggregate
the data of all reporting airlines. For the analysis of the anomalies in Section
2.3.4 we combine airports with the same city ID as done by Guimerá, Mossa,
Turtschi, et al. (2005) and supported by economic considerations (Brueckner, Lee,
and Singer 2014; Bonnefoy and Hansman 2007).
2.3.4 ATN Representations
Although the literature generally refers to the ATN as a generic term, the air traffic
data can essentially be modeled by different networks, depending on the interpreta-
tion of the nodes and edges: Nodes can either represent airports (Dall’Asta, Barrat,
and Barthélemy 2006) or city areas with possibly more than one airport (Guimerá,
Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005). Two of these nodes can be connected by edges rep-
resenting the mere existence of a flight (Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005) or
be assigned weights representing the number of flights (Bonnefoy and Hansman
3Airlines are considered as large if they own an air plane with a capacity of more than 60
passengers or offer flights to non-US airports.
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2007), the total capacity of the planes, or other more involved measures (Dall’Asta,
Barrat, and Barthélemy 2006).
In this article, the nodes of the ATN represent city areas where two city areas
are connected if there is a flight from one of the corresponding cities to the other.
Basically, we are interested in journeys as seen from a passenger’s perspective.
If someone flies from A to B, possibly with stop-overs in various other cities, we
consider this as a demanded journey. This process of interest is described by the set
of journeys J(A,B), a multiset of paths for all observed origin-destination pairs. A
typical element j ∈ J describes the journey of a passenger as an ordered sequence
of cities (airports), i.e. the specific path used. For example, j = (eAB, eBC) =
((A,B), (B,C)) represents a journey from city A to city C via city B.
2.4 Anomalous Cities
It was shown that some cities in a given ATN have a comparably low degree but
high betweenness centrality and vice versa (Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005;
Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy 2006). Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005)
find that some of the 25 most central cities (ranked by CB(v)) are not among the 25
most connected cities (ranked by deg(v)) when using worldwide schedule-based air
traffic data. These are for example Singapore, Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea)
and Hong Kong. Within the US, these are the cities Anchorage, Seattle, Honolulu
and Miami.
As discussed above, using the classical betweenness centrality already imposes the
following assumptions on journeys: that there is demand to fly from every city
to every other city, that this demand is equally distributed, and that shortest
paths are being used. However, in the DB1B data set, only 40% of all possible
18
origin-destination pairs are actually demanded and the demand is far from uni-
form. Concerning the usage of shortest paths we note that if there are at least
3, 700 tickets contained in the DB1B data set for a given origin-destination pair,
then there always exists a direct flight (aggregated over one year). However, the
path used by a passenger is not always the shortest path available. We conclude
that CB(v) does not match the network process of interest, the transportation of
passengers in planes along routes demanded within one year.
2.4.1 Journey-based Centrality Measures
In order to characterise the centrality of cities according to the observed journeys
we introduce the journey-based stress centrality. While the classic betweenness and
stress centralities quantify the importance of a city in a network process where only
shortest paths are used, we define the journey-based stress centrality CJS (x) as the
number of observed journeys in which x is a stop-over (cf. Dolev, Elovici, and
Puzis (2010)):
CJS (x) =
∑
v∈V
∑
w∈V
δJ(v, w, x) (2.3)
where δJ(v, w, x) denotes the number of journeys containing x as a stop-over4. The
journey-based betweenness centrality CJB(x) is analogously defined by normalizing
each term with δJ(v, w), the total number of journeys between v and w.
Fig. 2.2(a) visualizes the difference between the classical centrality measures and
the journey-based centrality measures. From the example, it can be seen that the
ranking can be completely reversed, depending on the observed journeys. Note
that the journey-based betweenness centrality yields a different value for the nodes
B and D and only the journey-based stress centrality ranks B and D the same.
4Derudder, Devriendt, and Witlox (2007) used this measure to analyse the role of hubs from
a geographic perspective.
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(a) Undirected Network
A B C D E
CB 0 3 1 0 1
CJB 0 1 0 0.5 0
CS 0 4 2 0 2
CJS 0 1 0 1 0
(b) Centrality Measures
Figure 2.2: Example of a network in which the ranking of the centrality
measures and the journey-based centrality measures differ. The journey set is
J = {((A,B), (B,C)) , (E,C) , ((E,D), (D,C)) , (E,B)}. Different line styles
are used to visualize the different journeys.
2.4.2 Results
From an economic point of view it can be expected that a node with a high journey-
based centrality should have a high degree. For reasons such as economies of scale,
airlines tend to organise their network in a star-shaped manner in order to lower
their costs5. Therefore, a city which serves as a stop-over for many different routes
should rather be one with direct connections to many other cities (Button 2002;
Shaw 1993). Suppose that the number of a city’s direct connections (degree) was
relatively low compared to the number of passengers using the city as a stop-over
(journey-based centrality). This implies that there were pairs of neighbors of this
city which have a high demand. In a competitive market where the demand for a
pair is high enough to profitably offer a direct flight, airlines will start to do so and
the number of passengers using the city as a hub will decrease accordingly. If the
5Economies of scale refer to falling average (per unit) cost if an enterprise increases production.
Under such circumstances it is more profitable for an airline to operate all flights from one airport
than from several ones, as for example overhead costs can be saved.
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demand does not allow for a direct flight, the airline will move the indirect flights
to its hub and again the journey-based centrality will decrease. We thus agree
with Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005) that cities for which a low degree
and a high (journey-based) stress centrality are observed, are potential anomalies
and need to be explained.
Using the DB1B dataset (445 cities and 10, 190 unique edges) and the classic CB we
also found anomalies with low degree but relatively high centrality: these are three
Alaskan cities such as Anchorage (ANC) (Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. 2005;
Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy 2006), King Salmon (AKN) and Fairbanks
(FAI), as well as Albuquerque (ABQ) and Portland (PDX)6. The results for the
most central ones according to the stress centrality are similar (see Fig. 2.3). Only
AKN is not an anomaly according to the classic stress centrality.
When using the new journey-based stress centrality CJS , the first result is that the
anomalies are in general much less pronounced, i.e., their deviation from the curve
is smaller (see Fig. 2.4 and compare with Fig. 2.3).
Interestingly, none of the previously identified anomalies regarding CB are still
anomalous (see Table 2.5) but there are newly identified ones regarding the CJS :
1) Cincinnati (CVG), which had been a hub for Delta Air Lines until 2008, when
the latter merged with Northwest Airlines and cancelled half of all their direct
flights from Cincinnati. 2) Honolulu (HNL), the hub of Hawaiian Airlines. Out of
all observed stop-overs in HNL, 91% of these journeys started or ended on one of
the smaller Hawaiian islands. I.e., Honolulu distributes incoming tourists to the
islands and collects them back to send them home in larger airplanes, which are
in general more cost-efficient. Finally, 3) Mitchell International Airport (MKE),
is anomalous as defined by Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005), but its rank
difference is only two - rank 24 according to CJS and 26 according to deg.
6There were also cities which rank among the 25 most connected ones but not among the 25
most central ones. The absolute ranking difference is between 2 and 25. While these results are
also interesting, we restrict the discussion to the cities in the upper left quadrant.
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Figure 2.3: Degree versus centrality - stress centrality. A city is anomalous
(denoted by a star) as defined by Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005) if
its degree rank is higher than 25 (vertical line) but its betweenness (or stress)
centrality rank is lower than 25 (horizontal line). It compares deg and CS . A
diamond symbol in Fig. 2.3 indicates an anomaly from Fig. 2.4 and vice versa.
In summary, most of the anomalies seem to be the result of a model which is
not suitable to characterise the demand of passenger journeys. When using be-
tweenness or stress centrality it is implicitly assumed that every pair of airports
shows the same demand and passengers always travel on shortest paths. Using a
journey-based centrality measure, i.e., taking only observed paths into account, the
anomalies are in general less pronounced, and the set of anomalous cities changes
completely. Those that are still found to be anomalous, can be explained with
economic reasoning.
22
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 1.00 2.00 5.00
Normalized degree, deg av(deg)
N
or
m
a
liz
e
d 
jou
rne
y−
ba
se
d 
st
re
ss
 c
en
tra
lit
y, 
 
 
 
C SJ
av
(C
SJ )
10
−
4
10
−
2
10
0
10
2
ABQANC
CVG
FAI
HNL
MKE
PDX
CS
J
CS
Figure 2.4: Degree versus centrality - journey-based stress centrality. A city
is anomalous (denoted by a star) as defined by Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al.
(2005) if its degree rank is higher than 25 (vertical line) but its betweenness (or
stress) centrality rank is lower than 25 (horizontal line). It compares deg and
CJS . A diamond symbol in Fig. 2.3 indicates an anomaly from Fig. 2.4 and vice
versa.
In our second example, we show that also other network analytic measures like a
robustness analysis can be influenced by the paths used in the network process of
interest.
2.5 Robustness of the ATN
Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy (2006) analysed the vulnerability of the world-
wide ATN using schedule-based data. They connected two airports with an edge if
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City deg s CB CS CJS
ANC 68 52 1 1 32
ABQ 35 43 11 14 34
FAI 103 114 14 23 117
PDX 27 24 17 13 26
AKN 130 306 20 41 277
CVG 33 39 73 63 19
HNL 79 23 42 43 22
MKE 26 31 27 31 24
Figure 2.5: Degree versus centrality - the ranks of the cities. A city is anoma-
lous (denoted by a star) as defined by Guimerá, Mossa, Turtschi, et al. (2005) if
its degree rank is higher than 25 but its betweenness (or stress) centrality rank
is lower than 25. It shows the ranks of the anomalous cities according to CB
(first five) and to CJS (last three). Rank 1 means that the city had the highest
measure, while rank 445 represents the lowest measure compared to all other
cities; cities with a tie share the same rank.
there were scheduled flights and assigned the capacities of the flights as a weight.
They quantified the network’s integrity along two dimensions: 1) Which centrality
measure is best used to determine the next target (attack strategy)? and 2) How
vulnerable is the network with regard to different integrity measures?.
The process is simulated in the following way: In each round, the nodes with
highest degree are computed and deleted together with their direct connections
(Recalculated attack-strategy (RAS)). The topological integrity IN after removing g
nodes is then defined as the fraction of nodes in the biggest connected component.
Additionally, Dall’Asta, Barrat, and Barthélemy (2006) measured the integrity
IS of the network, defined as the strength of the connected component with the
maximal strength. They found that the weighted ATN is even more vulnerable
than the topological integrity would suggest. After deleting the 2% most important
nodes according to their degree, the topological integrity IN is still about 80% of
the initial size, while IS already dropped to about 20%.
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2.5.1 Journey-based Modeling of an Attack
The above model reflects the direct damage of an attack on ATNs. We will now
refine the model by taking into account the damage on journeys that were us-
ing the attacked airport. We construct the ATN by connecting airports when a
direct flight is observed and weight the edges by the total number of passengers
using that connection. In the case of a simulated attack on an airport, we not
only remove the airport (node) and thereby all its edges from the ATN. We also
subtract the number of passengers that used this airport as a stop-over from all
edge weights on the edges contained in their journeys. Thus, if there is a journey
j = ((A,B), (B,C), (C,D)) with 100 passengers and C is deleted, the edge weight
on (A,B) will also be decreased by 100. We measure the integrity of the network
after removing g nodes by the percentage of remaining strength in the resulting
network7:
ITS(g) =
∑
v∈Vg
s(v)∑
v∈V
s(v)
(2.4)
We call this model of the damage of an attack the recalculated attack strategy +
journey deletion (RAS+J).
Under the RAS, the network disintegrates after the removal of 337 airports within
97 rounds. When modeling the attacks based on RAS+J, the network already
disintegrates after the deletion of 199 airports within only 77 rounds. As shown in
Fig. 2.6 the two models generate a different evolution of network disintegration.
In Fig. 2.7 and 2.8 we show that the topological integrity of the ATN is much
faster destroyed when modeling the damage on journeys and that—to a lesser
extent—also its strength is declining faster than in the first model.
7IS and ITS differ with respect to the numerator. While IS takes only the strength of the
connected component with the maximal strength into account ITS uses the total strength of
the remaining network. However, for the ATN based on inner US flights there is hardly any
difference.
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Figure 2.6: Vulnerability of the weighted ATN - maximal degree. The maxi-
mal degree in each round is depicted, when using RAS or RAS+J, respectively.
In summary, additionally modeling the damage of attacks based on journeys hints
at an even higher vulnerability of ATNs than the first approximation which does
not reflect the paths actually used by the network process of interest.
2.6 Summary
We showed on two examples how network representation, process of interest, and
network analytic measure can be matched and that this approach changes network
analytic findings based on them. The seemingly “anomalous” cities found when us-
ing degree and classic betweenness centrality are no longer anomalous when using
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Figure 2.7: Vulnerability of the weighted ATN - topological integrity. The
topological integrity IN is shown for both strategies RAS or RAS+J. The solid
line marks the loss of 50% of the integrity.
a journey-based centrality measure. Especially for some Alaskan cities, the differ-
ence in their ranks according to the number of direct connections and their ranks
according to the number of observed stop-overs at the city is strongly reduced.
However, other cities emerge as potential “anomalies”, which can be explained by
economic, demand-based reasons, e.g., the implementation of a home-base which
leads to a star-shaped hub structure of the airline’s ATN. The second result is that
the ATN is even more fragile with respect to the network’s topological integrity
and also partly to its strength, when additionally taking the damage on journeys
into account.
We have focused on one aspect of the network representation, namely the inclusion
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Figure 2.8: Vulnerability of the weighted ATN - integrity wrt. strength. The
strength integrity ITS is shown for both strategies RAS or RAS+J. The solid
line marks the loss of 50% of the integrity. In the inset the integrity measures
for the first 20% of removed nodes are shown.
of journey-based information. Another important aspect of network representa-
tion is aggregation over time and space (Butts 2009): the analysis presented here
assumes that the aggregation of passenger journeys over one year is a reasonable
model for the network process of interest. Using real-time data on passenger jour-
neys might allow to additionally relate journeys with a temporal dimension, e.g.,
to analyse seasonal demand patterns.
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2.7 Discussion
This article is not about introducing yet another centrality measure but advo-
cates for a close matching of path-based network analytic measures, the network
representation they are applied to, and the network process of interest. The two
seminal papers on which the idea of a trilemma of network analysis is based on are
both from sociologists which refer to examples from social network analysis (Bor-
gatti 2005; Butts 2009). We have no doubts that, although our examples discuss
a transportation network, the analysis can be valuable to all kind of social and
complex networks. However, it seems that most social network analysts are aware
of the epistemological discussion of what type of method can be applied to what
type of network. The problem seems to be of a more recent nature, in which data
miners and modelers of complex systems became interested in describing the struc-
ture of these systems in terms of networks (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, et al. 2009;
Carrington, Scott, and Wasserman 2005). In complex network analysis methods
from sociology are used to explore large and very diverse networks in order to
find universal laws and structures (Watts and Strogatz 1998; Barabási and Albert
1999; Newman 2010). It seems that problems mainly arise, when an exploratory
network analysis turns into an explanatory one. We hope that the introduction
of the trilemma of network analysis helps to avoid these problems by illustrating
the interdependence of network representation, path-dependent network measure,
and the network process of interest.
Chapter 3
Marriage, Parenthood and Social
Network: Subjective Well-Being and
Mental Health in Old Age
Parenthood, marital status and social networks have been shown to relate to the
well-being and mental health of older people. Using a large sample of respondents
aged 50 and older from 16 European countries, we identify the associations of
well-being and mental health with family status. Making use of detailed social
network data of the respondents, we also identify how different social support
networks correlate with the well-being and health indicators. We observe positive
associations for all network types, over and beyond any direct associations of family
status with well-being. Results suggest that non-residential children are important
providers of social support for their parents at older age. 1
1The content of Chapter 3 has been published as Christoph Becker, Isadora Kirchmaier,
and Trautmann Stefan T. (2019). “Marriage, parenthood and social network: subjective well-
being and mental health in old age”. In: PLOS ONE 14.7, pp. 1–20. We thank Luisa Kling
for excellent research assistance, and Christian König-Kersting and Martin Vollmann for help-
ful comments on the paper. This paper uses data from SHARE Waves 1, 2, and 4, (DOIs:
10.6103/SHARE.w1.600, 10.6103/SHARE.w2.600, 10.6103/SHARE.w4.600), see Börsch-Supan,
Brandt, Hunkler, et al. (2013) for methodological details. The SHARE data collection has
been primarily funded by the European Commission through FP5 (QLK6-CT-2001-00360), FP6
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3.1 Introduction
The link between family status (marital status and parenthood), well-being, and
mental health is widely discussed in academic and popular discourses. Evidence
suggests that being married or living with a partner can have a positive effect on
life satisfaction (Mastekaasa 1994) and is associated with higher well-being, better
mental health and fewer depressive symptoms in old age (Bures, Koropeckyj-Cox,
and Loree 2009; Gibney, Delaney, Codd, et al. 2017; Buber and Engelhardt 2008).
Parenthood, on the other hand, does not appear to be associated with enhanced
mental health (Evenson and Simon 2005; Hansen, Slagsvold, and Moum 2009;
Hansen 2012). The risk of depression is especially pronounced for women with
parenting stress and poor physical health, but less pronounced for those being
supported by the partner (Manuel, Martinson, Bledsoe-Mansori, et al. 2012). Re-
peated cross-sectional data on US parents and non-parents shows a gap in subjec-
tive well-being between these two groups, which, however, becomes smaller over
the period 1973 through 2008 due to decreased happiness of non-parents (Herbst
and Ifcher 2016). A cross-country comparison finds only weak associations be-
tween life satisfaction and having children, with unclear direction (Mastekaasa
1994). However, there is also evidence that the relationship between children
and well-being becomes more positive for older respondents (Mastekaasa 1994;
Margolis and Myrskylä 2011). Depending on the life-cycle stage, the aspects of
parenthood may thus differ, suggesting that the positive aspects of parenthood
(SHARE-I3: RII-CT-2006-062193, COMPARE: CIT5-CT-2005-028857, SHARELIFE: CIT4-
CT-2006-028812) and FP7 (SHARE-PREP: N◦ 211909, SHARE-LEAP: N◦ 227822, SHARE
M4: N◦ 261982). Additional funding from the German Ministry of Education and Research,
the Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science, the U.S. National Institute on Aging
(U01_AG09740-13S2, P01_AG005842, P01_AG08291, P30_AG12815, R21_AG025169, Y1-
AG-4553-01, IAG_BSR06-11, OGHA_04-064, HHSN271201300071C) and from various national
funding sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-project.org).
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dominate when getting older. Amongst others, the role of children as a form of so-
cial support may become important in the later stages of a person’s life (Margolis
and Myrskylä 2011).
According to the U.S. National Cancer Institute, social support is
“a network of family, friends, neighbors, and community members that
is available in times of need to give psychological, physical, and finan-
cial help” (NCI 2018).
There is evidence that such social support networks are related to less loneliness
and more happiness (Litwin and Shiovitz-Ezra 2011; Litwin and Stoeckel 2014).
While results on parenthood might be controversial and depend on the age of the
studied population, there is widespread agreement that social support is associated
with higher life satisfaction, and that social networks are an important factor for
well-being (Pinquart and Sörensen 2000). Bringing these two branches of the
literature together, we aim to shed light on the link between a person’s family
status, the resulting characteristics of their social networks, and their well-being
and mental health, using a large sample of 55.000 middle-aged and older adults
from 16 European countries. This sample was taken from the Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE, Börsch-Supan, Brandt, Hunkler, et
al. (2013), Börsch-Supan, Brandt, Litwin, et al. (2015), and Malter and Börsch-
Supan (2013)). In the first wave of the data set, there is some evidence that
the number of residential children is associated with more depressive symptoms
for people aged 60 and older (Litwin 2010). We aim to expand and generalize
these findings using recently collected, detailed network data, across European
countries. Parenthood, marital status and different types of social networks might
help to sustain well-being and mental health in old age. Thus, our objective in the
current study is to analyze the relationship of people’s social networks with their
well-being and mental health, over and beyond associations captured by family
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status. We expand the range of outcome measures previously considered for this
data set, and include four distinct measures of well-being and mental health that
are often used in economics and psychology. These are the CASP-12 scale for
quality of life, the EURO-D scale for depressive symptoms, and two single item
measures life satisfaction and social support network satisfaction.
We use the full range of the SHARE data set, which includes people aged 50 and
older; at this point in the life cycle, parents may have resident children, children
living away from home, and grandchildren. We use network composition measures
in order to determine network types (i.e., the relative relevance of spouses, children,
friends and others), and control for network size and relational dynamics (contact
frequency, closeness, and proximity) separately. Additionally, we calculate the
network types for each country separately, taking cultural differences in network
compositions into account.
Based on the current literature we test the following three hypotheses for the well-
being and mental health of people aged 50 and older: i) A positive association
with being married, ii) a positive association with the number of children and
grandchildren not living at home, and iii) a positive association with having a
strong social network, controlling for family structure.
We proceed as follows: Section 3.2 describes the data used and our methods to
measure well-being, mental health and the characteristics of social support net-
works in detail. In Section 3.3 we present the results of our analysis. We first
analyze the association of family status with well-being and mental health mea-
sures without taking the social network into account. We then take the network
composition as criterion variables and use hierarchical clustering to determine so-
cial network types which differ mainly in their main source of social support. We
then assess the relationship between the resulting social support network types
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and outcome measures, controlling for family status, network size, and relational
dynamics. Section 3.4 discusses our findings and provides concluding remarks.
3.2 Data and Methodology
3.2.1 Respondents
We use data from the cross-national panel database Survey of Health, Ageing and
Retirement in Europe (SHARE), release 6.0.0., managed by the Munich Center
for the Economics of Aging, Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy
(Börsch-Supan, Brandt, Hunkler, et al. 2013; Börsch-Supan, Brandt, Litwin, et al.
2015; Malter and Börsch-Supan 2013). The cross-national panel database provides
extensive data on health and socio-economic status. The target population is
people of age 50 or older having their regular domicile in the respective country.
Current partners are interviewed regardless of their age. We make use of SHARE
wave 4 (Börsch-Supan 2017c) that was administered between 2010 and 2012 in 16
European countries, and includes a module on social network. We update missing
constants with data from waves 1 (Börsch-Supan 2017a) and wave 2 (Börsch-Supan
2017b). We include respondents age 50 and older not living in a nursing home.
The number of respondents differs by country. Over all countries, there are about
55.000 observations available. For an overview of the waves used, the modules and
variables, and the total number of observations of each country, see Tables 3.11
and 3.12 in Section 3.5.
3.2.2 Demographic Factors
The SHARE dataset contains detailed data on demographics. Summary statistics
of all demographic variables used in the analyses can be found in Table 3.13. The
34
demographic factor of interest is the family status, which we measure by the mar-
ital status, total number of children, children living at home, and grandchildren.
Over all countries 70% of the respondents are married and 91% have children.
The marital status of each respondent is classified into the categories (1) married
and living together with spouse, (2) registered partnership, (3) married and living
separated from spouse, (4) never married, (5) divorced, (6) widowed. For the
regression analysis we construct the dummy variables married which takes the
value of one if the respondent is married or in a registered partnership, the dummy
variable divorced, which takes the value of one if the respondent is divorced or living
separated from spouse, and a dummy variable widowed. We include respondents
living separately from their spouse in the dummy divorced, as living separately is
often a preceding step to a divorce.
Parenthood is measured by the number of children alive and the number of resident
children, including fostered, adopted and stepchildren. We define the four-category
measure children with categories no children, one child, two children, and three or
more children, and create the respective dummy variables for each category. We
further construct the variables resident children and grandchildren which report
for each respondent the number of children living with the family and the number
of grandchildren.
Further demographics are used as controls. The set Controls A consist of gender,
age (of the respondent at the time of the interview), age squared, and a dummy
variable indicating the country of residence of the respondent to control for cul-
tural differences. The set Controls B additionally includes dummies for being di-
vorced, widowed, urban character of residence, being employed, self-employment,
level of education according to the international classification of education ISCED-
97 (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Wolf 2003) and an indicator for the average monthly
household income. In SHARE wave 4, each household respondent is asked to state
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the overall after-tax income of the entire household in an average month of last
year. If a respondent refuses to answer, the interviewer asks whether the respon-
dent earns more, less or approximately the amount in certain bracketed values,
which represent country-specific 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the reported
household incomes from SHARE wave 2. We use the information from the stated
household income and the unfolding brackets and define four categories for the av-
erage monthly household income: (1) Low income [0 to 25th percentile], (2) Middle
income [25th to 50th percentile], (3) Upper middle income [50th percentile to 75th
percentile], and (4) High income [75th percentile and higher]. The boundaries of
the intervals are the country-specific bracket values of SHARE wave 4 (details and
summary statistics in Table 3.12 in Section 3.5).
In order to control for health, we include a measure of self-assessed physical health
(Would you say your health is: (1) poor, (2) fair, (3) good, (4) very good, and
(5) excellent), and whether drugs for sleeping problems, anxiety or depression are
taken.
3.2.3 Well-being and mental health indicators
Well-being can be defined as the psychological balance point between individually
available resources and challenges (Dodge, Daly, Huyton, et al. 2012) and may be
linked to many different aspects of life. In order to develop national well-being
measures, the Office for National Statistics in the UK ran a public debate on the
question through various platforms (Matheson 2011). The three most frequent
answers to the question “What things matter most in your life? What is Well-
being?” were “Health” , “Having good connections with friends and relatives” , and
“Job satisfaction (and economic security)” (Evans 2011). Many empirical studies
report a link between socioeconomic status, quality and quantity of social contacts,
and well-being (Pinquart and Sörensen 2000). In our study, we use a broad set of
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measures to map respondents’ well-being: a simple single-item question regarding
life satisfaction; the CASP-12 multi-item quality of life scale; a single-item question
on social support network satisfaction; and the EURO-D depressive symptoms
scale. We also use measures of health, education, and financial status as controls
in our analyses (Diener and Suh 1997; Knesebeck, Wahrendorf, Hyde, et al. 2007).
In the following, we will discuss the three measures in more detail. Survey ques-
tions for each measure are shown in Table 3.1.
The first measure concerns a general feeling about the quality of life, the stated
Life satisfaction. It is extracted by a single-item question in which respondents
indicate on a scale from 0 (low satisfaction) to 10 (high satisfaction) how satisfied
they are with their life. This scale has acceptable reliability and validity (Pavot
and Diener 1993; Beckie and Hayduk 1997).
The second measure is the CASP-12, quality of life scale, which is designed to
capture quality of life in old age (Hyde, Wiggins, Higgs, et al. 2003). Participants
indicate for twelve statements whether they apply on a scale from 1 (often) to 4
(never). The twelve questions concern four dimensions of quality of life, control,
autonomy, pleasure and self-realization, resulting in an aggregate index ranging
from 12 (low quality of life) to 48 (high quality of life). We normalize it such that
it ranges from 0 (low quality of life) to 10 (high quality of life).
The third measure concerns the stated Network satisfaction. Respondents indicate
on a scale from 0 (low satisfaction) to 10 (high satisfaction) how satisfied they are
with their social network. If respondents indicated that there is no person with
whom they discuss matters or there is no one who is important to them, they were
asked how satisfied they were with this fact.
The fourth measure is the EURO-D depression score (Prince, Reischies, Beekman,
et al. 1999; Prince, Beekman, Deeg, et al. 1999). It is an indicator for depres-
sive symptoms and captures aspects of mental health in late life. It has been
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Table 3.1: Survey questions for well-being and mental health measures.
Measure Question 
Life 
satisfaction On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied, how satisfied are you with your life? 
CASP-12a How often, if at all, have you experienced the following feelings and thoughts over the past four weeks:  
Control How often do you think your age prevents you from doing the things you would like to do? 
How often do you feel that what happens to you is out of your control? 
How often do you feel left out of things? 
Autonomy How often do you think that you can do the things that you want to do? 
How often do you think that family responsibilities prevent you from doing what you want to do? 
How often do you think that shortage of money stops you from doing the things you want to do? 
Pleasure How often do you look forward to each day? 
How often do you feel that your life has meaning? 
How often, on balance, do you look back on your life with a sense of well-being? 
Self-Realization How often do you feel full of energy these days? 
How often do you feel that life is full of opportunities? 
How often do you feel that the future looks good for you? 
Network  
satisfaction 
Overall, how satisfied are you with the relationship that you have with the persons we have just talked about? Please answer on a scale from 0 
to 10 where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied. 
You indicated that there is no one with whom you discuss matters and no one who is important to you for some other reason. How satisfied are 
you with this on a scale of 0-10, where 0 means completely dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied? 
EURO-Db 
Depression 
Pessimism 
Suicidality 
Guilt 
Sleep 
Interest 
Irritability 
Appetite 
Fatigue 
Concentration 
Enjoyment 
Tearfulness 
Earlier we talked about your physical health. Another measure of health is your emotional health or well-being that is, how you feel about 
things that happen around you. 
In the last month, have you been sad or depressed? 
What are your hopes for the future? 
In the last month, have you felt that you would rather be dead? 
Do you tend to blame yourself or feel guilty about anything? c 
Have you had trouble sleeping recently? 
In the last month, what is your interest in things? d 
Have you been irritable recently? 
What has your appetite been like? e 
In the last month, have you had too little energy to do the things you wanted to do? 
How is your concentration? For example, can you concentrate on a television program, film or radio program? 
Can you concentrate on something you read? 
What have you enjoyed doing recently? 
a Index generated from questions on 4 different dimensions. The total score
ranges from 12 (low quality of life) to 48 (high quality of life). The response
options for each item are: 1.Often, 2. Sometimes, 3. Rarely, and 4. Never.
b Index generated from questions on 12 different dimensions. The total score
ranges from 0 (not depressed) to 12 (very depressed). The responses are coded
as: 0. No indication and 1. There is indication of the respective dimension.
c If the answer is unclear the follow-up question is: So, for what do you blame
yourself?
d If the answer is unclear the follow-up question is: So, do you keep up your
interests?
e If the answer is unclear the follow-up question is: So, have you been eating
more or less than usual?
demonstrated to provide a valid comparison of depressive symptoms across Eu-
ropean countries (Castro-Costa, Dewey, Stewart, et al. 2008; Prince, Beekman,
Deeg, et al. 1999). The EURO-D depression score is generated from questions on
12 dimensions: Depression, pessimism, suicidality, guilt, sleep, interest, irritabil-
ity, appetite, fatigue, concentration, enjoyment, and tearfulness. Respondents are
asked whether there is an indication for each of these dimensions. It results in
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an aggregate index ranging from 0 (not depressed) to 12 (very depressed). We
normalize it such that it ranges from 0 (very depressed) to 10 (not depressed) and
call it Lack of depressive symptoms.
Table 3.2 presents the means of the well-being measures for different subgroups of
the sample.
Table 3.2: Well-being and mental health measures.
 
  
Life satisfaction 
 
Quality of life (CASP-12) 
 
Network satisfaction 
 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
(1) All 7.57 6.97 8.84 7.86 
(2) Male 7.66 7.10 8.77 8.27 
(3) Female 7.50 6.87 8.89 7.54 
(4) # obs. 52248 50512 52513 51941 
 Rows (1)-(3) report the means of the well-being and mental health measures for
all respondents and by gender. Row (4) reports the number of observations for
all respondents.
Fig. 3.1 presents the average of the well-being measures at each age until 91
(see Fig. 3.4 in Section 3.5 for the age distribution). While network satisfaction
and life satisfaction remain relatively stable, the quality of life index and lack
of depressive symptoms index decline beyond age 65. The graphs for male and
female respondents are rather similar, except for the lack of depressive symptoms
index; male respondents have on average a 0.73 points higher index (p < 0.01,
Mann-Whitney-U test; Fig. 3.5 in Section 3.5).
3.2.4 Social support networks
A social support network can be characterized by its size and composition (percent-
age of partner, children, other relatives, and friends in the network) and relational
dynamics. In Wave 4, the SHARE respondents are asked to answer questions
about their social support network along the dimensions (1) size, (2) relationship,
(3) contact frequency, (4) proximity, and (5) closeness. Table 3.3 provides the
survey questions and possible answers and categories.
39
Figure 3.1: Average well-being and mental health measure. Average well-
being and mental health measure for all ages from 50 to 91 years. After age 91
the number of available observations drops to less than 50.
In order to identify the members of their social support network, the respondents
were asked to mention the name of persons with whom they discuss important
matters. The total number of persons in the social support network is its size. It is
possible to mention up to seven persons, however this boundary is only mentioned
if it is reached. Only 3% of the respondents reach this boundary. Most respondents
state one, two or three persons as members of their social support network (28%
, 25% , and 20% of the respondents, respectively; details in Table 3.14 in Section
3.5). Evidence suggests that the number of network members is positively linked
with life satisfaction (Tomini, Tomini, and Groot 2016), but that in old age the
network is reduced to members with close contact (Fung, Carstensen, and Lang
2001).
The composition of a network refers to the relationship type between each member.
A person who has daily contact with two children and a person who has daily
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contact with two friends have a social support network of equal size and contact
frequency, however, they have a different main source of social support. In a
meta-analysis, Pinquart and Sörensen (2000) provide evidence that the quantity
of social contacts with friends is more strongly related with subjective well-being
than the quantity of social contacts with family. They argue that friends are
voluntary relationships, and they are typically members of the same age group or
share similar preferences. Still, especially in older age, spouses and children are
a crucial part of networks. Later in life, parents desire open communication, but
low interference in each other’s lives thereby maintaining independence in old age
and minimizing intergenerational conflicts (Blieszner and Mancini 1987). Brandt,
Haberkern, and Szydlik (2009) analyzed the type of support between older parents,
their children and professional providers. They found that children play a central
role in providing help for their parents in the household and with paperwork. In
Southern Europe, they are more likely to also take over regular medical care. There
can also be differences within family structures. Shanas (1979) provides evidence
that the immediate family (partner and children) is the major social support during
illness, and the extended family (children, siblings, and other relatives) is the tie
to the community.
There are different ways to determine these different types of networks. One way
is to construct network types, in which people are similar along family status
(e.g. marital status, number of children and close relatives) and network mea-
sures (e.g. number of close friends, frequency of contact with family and friends,
and frequency of attending social events). Commonly, there are four to five net-
work types identified which differ in their relationship with well-being and mental
health (Litwin and Shiovitz-Ezra 2011; Fiori, Antonucci, and Cortina 2006; Li and
Zhang 2015; Litwin 1998). Another way to determine network types is to use only
characteristics of the social network as criterion variables and control for family
status separately. Litwin and Stoeckel (2014) use size, composition and relational
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dynamic measures of the network and identify six networks (Spouse, Children,
Spouse and Children, Other Family, Friend, and Other). They show that the net-
work types are related differently to quality of life and that the frequency of the
network types differs across European countries. We will follow a different ap-
proach, by using solely network composition to determine network types (i.e., the
relative relevance of spouses, children, friends and others), allowing us to control
for network size and relational dynamic separately. We calculate network types
for each country separately, taking cultural differences in network compositions
into account.
We classify the possible relationships into five categories: (1) Partner, (2) Children,
(3) Other Relatives, (4) Friends, and (5) Others. Each of these categories comprises
all types of relationships related to the category itself, i.e. the category Partner
also includes the relationship “mother/father in law” (Table 3.3). The relationship
share of each category in the network of a respondent is measured by the sum of
the occurrence of the category divided by the network size. For each respondent,
the relationship shares of all relationship categories sum to one.
We use the relationship share to determine country-specific support network types
according to the main source of social support. The respondents who indicate that
there is no person with whom they discuss important matters are excluded. For
the remaining respondents, we use hierarchical clustering with the Ward method
(Ward 1963) method to determine clusters which are similar with respect to the
relationship shares. We choose to cut at six clusters and label them Partner, Chil-
dren, Other Relatives, Family, Friends, and Diverse network. Using five clusters
would not allow us to distinguish between the friends and the diverse network.
Using more than six clusters does not provide an additional distinct network type
for all countries for the five relationship categories used.
Apart from size and composition, a network is also characterized by relational
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Table 3.3: Survey questions for social support network characteristics.
Network Size 
Looking back over the last 12 months, who are the people with whom you most often discussed important things? 
(1) Please give me the first name of the person with whom you most often discuss things that are important to you. 
(2) Is there anyone (else) who is very important to you for some other reason?a  
Network Relationship 
What is his/her relationship to you? 
Partner Spouse/partner, mother-in-law, father-in-law 
Children Child, step-child/your current partner's child, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandchild 
Other Relatives Mother, Father, Stepmother, Stepfather, Brother, Sister, Grandparent, Aunt, Uncle, Niece, Nephew, other relatives 
Friends Friend 
Others (Ex-)colleague/co-worker, neighbour, ex-spouse/partner, minister, priest, or other clergy, therapist or other professional helper, housekeeper/home health care provider, none of these 
Network Contact 
During the past twelve months, how often did you have contact either personally, by phone or mail? 
(1) Dailyb, (2) Several times a week, (3) About once a week, (4) About every two weeks, (5) About once a month, (6) Less than once a month, and (7) Never 
Network Proximity 
Where does he/she live? 
Less than 1km (1) In the same household (2) In the same building (3) Less than 1 kilometre away  
1km to 5km (4) Between 1 and 5 kilometres away 
5km to 25km (5) Between 5 and 25 kilometres away 
25km to 100km (6) Between 25 and 100 kilometres away 
100km to 500km (7) Between 100 and 500 kilometres away  
More than 500km (8) More than 500 kilometres awayc 
Network Closeness 
How close do you feel to him/her? 
(1) Not very close (2) Somewhat close (3) Very close (4) Extremely close 
 We classify the possible answers for network relationship into five categories
and network proximity into six categories (in italics). For network contact and
network closeness we use the same categories as in the interview.
a The respondent can mention up to seven people. However, this boundary is
not known in advance. Question (2) is repeated until the respondent answered
that there is no one else important to him or he has already mentioned seven
people.
b If the person mentioned is living in the same household, the question about
the amount of contact is not asked. For that person, daily contact is assigned.
c For Belgium also the phrase “Living in another country” is used. We classify
it as more than 500 km.
dynamics such as geographical proximity, contact frequency and interpersonal
closeness. Frequent contact with one’s children appears to be associated with
less depressive symptoms, albeit irrelevant of geographical proximity (Buber and
Engelhardt 2008). Closeness with the support network member affects the quality
of the relationship. The number of close network members with frequent contact
is positively related to less depressive symptoms (Oxman and Hull 1997). Es-
pecially elderly people rely on members of their immediate family (partner and
children) during illness (Shanas 1979). SHARE provides different questions for
these relational dynamics, which we use as controls in our analysis.
For contact frequency, the respondent is asked about the amount of contact with
each person in his social support network over the last 12 months. The possible
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answers are (1) daily, (2) several times a week, (3) about once a week, (4) about
every two weeks, (5) about once a month, (6) less than once a month, and (7)
never. We recode such that the measure ranges from 0 (never) to 6 (daily). As
an overall measure of the amount of network contact of a respondent, we take the
average over the answers for each person in his network and call it contact index.
E.g., if the result is 6 it means that the respondent has daily contact with all
persons in his network. If it is less than 6, he must have less than daily contact
with at least some member of the network. The contact share is defined for each
category (Daily, several times a week, about once a week, about every two weeks,
about once a month, less than once a month, no contact in a year) as the sum of the
occurrence of the category normalized by the network size. For each respondent,
the contact shares of all contact categories sum to one. In Table 3.4 an example
for the calculation of the measure is given.
Table 3.4: Example of network size, contact, and relationship measures.
S7 Table. Example of network size, contact, and relationship measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R1, Respondent 1; R2, Respondent 2, R3, Respondent 3. Network size: number of persons mentioned by the respondent. 
Network contact categories: (0) Never, (1) Less than once a month, (2) About once a month, (3) About every two weeks, (4) 
About once a week, (5) Several times a week, and (6) Daily. Contact index: average over network contact categories. Contact 
share: for each network contact category the sum of occurrence divided by the network size. Network relationship categories: 
Partner, Children, Other relatives, Friends, Other. Relationship share: for each network relationship category the sum of 
occurrence divided by the network size 
Measure R1 R2 R3 
Network size 1 2 3 
Contact index 6 4 3.33 
Contact share    
Daily (D) 1 0.5 0.33 
About once a month (M) 0 0.5 0.66 
Relationship share    
Partner (P) 1 0 0 
Children (C) 0 1 0.33 
Friends (F) 0 0 0.66 
D R1 P 
D 
R2 
C 
M C 
D 
R3 
F 
M 
C 
M F 
R1: Responde t 1; 2: Respondent 2, R : Respondent 3. Network size: num-
ber of persons mentioned by the respondent. Network contact categories: (0)
Never, (1) Less than once a month, (2) About once a month, (3) About every two
weeks, (4) About once a eek, (5) Several times a week, and (6) Daily. Contact
index: average over network contact categories. Contact share: for each network
contact category the sum of occurrence divided by the network size. Network
relationship categories: Partner, Children, Other relatives, Friends, Other. Re-
lationship share: for each network relationship category the sum of occurrence
divided by the network size
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Similar measures are constructed for proximity and closeness. The respondent is
asked how far the person lives and how close he feels to the person. The categories
for closeness are (0) not very close (1) somewhat close (2) very close (3) extremely
close; and for proximity (0) more than 500 km, (1) 100 km to 500 km, (2) 25 km to
100 km, (3) 5 km to 25 km, (4) 1 km to 5 km, and (5) less than 1 km. The average
over the respective answers for each person in the respondent’s network is the
proximity index and closeness index. The proximity share and closeness shares are
defined accordingly over the respective categories. Information on the correlation
of marriage, the number of children, social network dimensions and well-being
measures is given in Table 3.16 in Section 3.5. We observe that the correlations
between features of the family status (e.g., married) and the respective network
is positive but far from perfect. That is, both people with and without children
may indicate that their social support network may predominantly consist of their
partner (and similarly for the other network types).
For each country, a cluster is labelled as Partner network, Children network, Other
Relatives network, Friends network or Diverse network if the mean of the relation-
ship share (averaged over all people in the cluster) of the category Partner, Chil-
dren, Other Relatives, Friends and Other is higher in that cluster than in all other
clusters, respectively. The labeling of the clusters would mostly be unaffected
if it were instead determined by the highest mean relationship share (averaged
over all people in the cluster) within a cluster, i.e., comparing across relationship
type. Additionally, we label a cluster with the highest sum of Partner share plus
Children share plus Other Relatives share (excluding the clusters which are de-
fined as Partner, Children, or Other Relatives network) as Family networks. A
more formal definition for labeling the clusters and the country-specific average
relationship shares is the following:
We have k = 1, . . . , 6 clusters for each country. Let Nk be the set of respondents
associated with cluster k and Ni be the network size of respondent i in cluster k.
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We label each cluster in each country according to the following rules:
1. For each cluster k we calculate the average relationship share of each relation-
ship R, where R ∈ {Partner, Children, Other Relatives, Friends, Others}:
avr (R)k =
1
|Nk|
∑
i∈Nk
#Ri
Ni
2. Then the clusters where avr (Partner)k is highest is labelled as Partner Net-
work type, where avr (Children)k is highest is labelled as Children Network
type, where avr (Other Relatives)k is highest is labelled as Other Relatives
Network type, and where avr (Friends)k is highest is labelled as Friends Net-
work type.
3. The cluster with the property that if excluding the Partner-, Children- and
Other Relatives Cluster, it is the cluster with the highest average family
relationship share. We label the cluster as the Family Network.
1
|Nk|
∑
i∈Nk
#Partneri + #Childreni + #Other Relativesi
Ni
4. The remaining cluster is labeled as the Diverse Network type.
We apply these rules for each country. We receive the same clusters if instead of
finding the maximum over each cluster we find the maximum relationship share
within each cluster and label the cluster accordingly. Exception is country Austria
(AUT), there the Diverse network has the second highest of the Others relationship
share (See Table 3.15). The country-specific average relationship shares are given
in Table 3.15.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Family status, well-being and mental health
We present results first in an aggregated way to illustrate the relevant patterns,
and the robustness of the results with regards to confounding factors. Table 3.5
shows the associations of the three dimensions of well-being and mental health
with family status (number of children, number of resident children, number of
grandchildren and marital status) for all respondents (Panel I), male respondents
(Panel II), and female respondents (Panel III), over all countries including country
fixed effects (further country specific analysis are reported in Table 3.6).
The table shows the raw means for each well-being measure conditional on each
explanatory variable. These simple averages demonstrate the observed patterns in
an accessible way. The comparison of the raw mean values for the well-being mea-
sures gives an impression of the effects sizes of each explanatory variable. However,
we indicate the significance of each comparison based on regression analyses of the
dependent measure on the explanatory variables; the excluded category in the re-
gression analyses is indicated in italics in the table. We show the significance level
of the variable and the direction of the association, for the regressions including
controls A and B, respectively. For each set of analyses, we also indicate the sam-
ple size of the raw means, which varies across analyses because of the variation in
the number of respondents in the different modules of the SHARE surveys. We use
ordinary least squares for all four measures for its ease of interpretation. Detailed
results for each regression are in Tables 3.17 to 3.19 in Section 3.5.
Overall we observe that marriage is consistently positively correlated with well-
being and lack of depressive symptoms. We find that children are positively cor-
related with well-being and lack of depressive symptoms. However, our analyses
show that this overall positive association is due to children after they left home:
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Table 3.5: Regressing well-being and mental health on family status for all
countries.
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
 Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive 
symptoms (EURO-D)  
  N Mean   N Mean   N Mean   N Mean   
Panel I: All respondents 
Marriage             
   Not married 15548 7.14  14902 6.67  15667 8.69  15477 7.50  
   Married 36700 7.75 ***A,B,+ 35610 7.10 ***A,B,+ 36846 8.90 ***A,B,+ 36464 8.01 ***A,+ 
Children             
   No 4746 7.39  4569 6.92  4782 8.53  4731 7.81  
   1 9613 7.37  9261 6.84 *A,+ 9674 8.82 ***A,B,+ 9567 7.70  
   2 21574 7.64 ***A,B,+ 20938 7.05 ***A,B,+ 21676 8.87 ***A,B,+ 21466 7.97 ***A,**B,+ 
   3 or more 16315 7.64 **A,+ 15744 6.96 ***A,+ 16381 8.89 ***A,B,+ 16177 7.82  
Resident children   *A,***B,-   ***A,B,-   *B,-   *B,- Grandchildren   **B,+   ***A,-   ***A,B,+   ***A,- 
Panel II: Male respondents 
Marriage             
   Not married 4576 7.17  4399 6.89  4610 8.42  4556 8.01  
   Married 18271 7.78 ***A,B,+ 17750 7.15 ***A,**B,+ 18352 8.86 ***A,B,+ 18149 8.34 ***A,+ 
Children             
   No 2191 7.37  2114 6.99  2211 8.47  2186 8.15  
   1 3885 7.49  3753 6.97 **A,+ 3902 8.78 ***A,*B,+ 3855 8.18  
   2 9595 7.73 ***A,*B,+ 9341 7.18 ***A,**B,+ 9642 8.81 ***A,*B,+ 9554 8.37 ***A,*B,+ 
   3 or more 7176 7.74 ***A,+ 6941 7.10 ***A,+ 7207 8.81 **A,+ 7110 8.23  
Resident children      ***A.B.-       Grandchildren   **B,+   ***A,-   ***A,B,+   **A,- 
Panel III: Female respondents 
Marriage             
   Not married 10972 7.12  10503 6.58  11057 8.80  10921 7.29  
   Married 18429 7.72 ***A,B,+ 17860 7.04 ***A,B,+ 18494 8.94 ***A,B,+ 18315 7.69 ***A,+ 
Children             
   No 2555 7.40  2455 6.85  2571 8.58  2545 7.53  
   1 5728 7.29  5508 6.75  5772 8.85 ***A,B,+ 5712 7.39 *A,- 
   2 11979 7.57 **A,B,+ 11597 6.95 **A,*B,+ 12034 8.92 ***A,B,+ 11912 7.65 *B,+ 
   3 or more 9139 7.56  8803 6.85  9174 8.95 ***A,B,+ 9067 7.50  
Resident children   **A,***B,-  ***A,B,-       Grandchildren      ***A,-   ***A,B,+   ***A,- 
 ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, +(-) indicates positive (negative) signif-
icant effect with the well-being and mental health measure; (I)-(IV) OLS Re-
gression. Controls A: female, age, age2, country dummy; Controls B: Controls
A, divorced, widowed, education, urban character of residence, employment,
self-employment, health status, medication for depressive symptoms, average
monthly household income dummy for low, middle, upper middle, and high in-
come (based on country-specific 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the average
monthly household income reported in wave 2). Children: Dummy variable for
having no children (excluded category), one child, two children, and three or
more children. Resident children: Number of children living with their par-
ents. If a respondent has no children then the value is set to 0. Grandchildren:
Number of grandchildren. Married: Dummy variable if respondent is married
or in registered partnership. Excluded category: Control A: Married but living
separated from a spouse, never married, divorced, widowed, Control B: never
married since a dummy variable for divorced and widowed is included in Control
B. N indicates number of observations in each category for categorical variables.
we find negative effects for the number of resident children. Grandchildren corre-
late positively with life satisfaction and network satisfaction, but negatively with
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quality of life and lack of depressive symptoms. While there are some differences
in specific correlations, the overall picture is very similar for male and female
respondents.
Social norms and customs concerning marriage, children and social networks in
general might differ from country to country. As this might influence their ef-
fect on well-being and mental health, we control for differences across countries
by conducting independent regressions for each country. Table 3.6 presents the
country-specific results for all respondents using controls A.
Table 3.6: Regressing well-being and mental health on family status for each
country.
Country 
Married 1 child 2 children 3 or more children Resident children Grandchildren 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Austria + + + + (+) (+) + o + (+) + (+) o (+) + o o - o o + (-) (+) o 
Belgium + + + + o o (+) o o o + o o o + o o o o o o o o o 
Czech Rep. + + + + o o o o (+) o o o o o o o o o o o o o + o 
Denmark + + + o o o o o + o o o (+) o o o o o o o o o o o 
Estonia + + + + o (+) + o + + + + + + + + - - o - o o + - 
France + + o + - - + - o o + o o o + o o - o o (-) - o o 
Germany + + + o o o o o o o o o o o o o - o o o - o o - 
Hungary + + + + o o + - o + + o o o + (-) o - o o o - o - 
Italy + + + + o o + - o o o - o (-) o - o - o o o - o - 
Netherlands + + o + o o (+) o + o (+) o + o o o o o o o o o (+) o 
Poland + (+) + o o o o o o o o o o o o o o - o o o o + o 
Portugal + o + o o o o o (+) (+) o o (+) + o o o - o o - - o - 
Slovenia + + (+) + o o + o o o o o o o o o o o o o o (-) + (-) 
Spain + + + + o o + o o + + o o o + o o - o - o - o - 
Sweden + + + o o + + o o + (+) + o + + o o o (+) o o o o o 
Switzerland + + o + o o o o o o + (+) + + + o o o o o o o o o 
 +/ - indicates positive/negative significant effect at 5% significance level; addi-
tionally (+),(-) indicates positive, or negative effect at 10% significance level, and
o indicates that there is no significant effect at 10% level. Dependent Variables:
(I) Life satisfaction, (II) CASP-12, (III) Network satisfaction, (IV) EURO-D. (I)-
(IV) country-specific OLS Regression. Controls A: female, age, age2, country
dummy. Children: A dummy variable for having no children (excluded cate-
gory), one child, two children, and three or more children. Resident children:
Number of children living with their parents. If a respondent has no children
then the value is set to 0. Grandchildren: Number of grandchildren, Married:
Dummy variable if respondent is married or in registered partnership. Excluded
category: Married but living separated from a spouse, never married, divorced,
widowed.
We indicated the sign and the significance of the different dimensions of parent-
hood and marriage for the four dependent measures. We observe that results are
qualitatively consistent across countries, i.e., there are few sign contradictions.
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However, there is clearly heterogeneity in the sense that we observe many null
effects next to those effects replicating the overall effects shown in Table 3.5.
3.3.2 Social support networks
Table 3.7 presents the means of the network size, the composition measures, and
relational dynamic measure of each category. For the distribution of the network
size for each network type see Fig. 3.13. The Partner network is a rather distinct
type. It consists only of the partner, i.e. has a size of one, and on average the
contact share in the category daily has a value of 99% , i.e. the respondents have
mostly daily contact. Respondents which are associated with a partner network
typically feel extremely or very close with their partner.
The share of children in the network is highest for the Children network and the
Family network. In both networks the second main source of support is the partner.
The Children and Family network differ in terms of the means of the relationship
shares and network size, while the average contact and closeness shares are quite
similar.
The Other Relatives or Friends networks have a similar average contact share for
the category daily or several times a week of 61% , while the Diverse network has
on average a contact share of 69% in these two categories. For the Friends and
Diverse network, on average 73% feel extremely or very close with the persons in
the support network, while the Other Relatives network has an average closeness
share of 81% in these two categories. The mean proximity share for each category
is rather similar over all network types.
We have shown that network size, as well as contact, proximity, and closeness
shares differ across network types on average (see Table 3.7). Fig. 3.2 presents the
full distribution of the contact index for each network type (for the corresponding
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graphical representations of the proximity and closeness indexes, see Fig. 3.7 and
3.8 in Section 3.5). Even network types which are rather similar with respect to
the average contact shares such as the children and family networks, are rather
different with respect to the individual network contact index. This means that
the actual composition of the different contact categories in the individual social
network is different for each network type, and we therefore include the contact,
closeness, and proximity indexes as controls.
Figure 3.2: Distribution of the contact index by network type. Each value
of the network contact index is represented by a line. The height of each line
represents the percentage of the index having the respective value for a network
type.
In Fig. 3.3 the distribution of the network types by gender is shown. The main dif-
ference between male and female subgroup regards the friends and family networks.
While 26% of male respondents and 11% of female respondents are associated with
a Friends network, 8% of male respondents and 15% of female respondents are as-
sociated with a Family network.
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Table 3.7: Network characteristics by social network types. 
 
All Partner Children Other relatives Family Friends Diverse 
 
(1) (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) 
Network size 2.60 1.00 1.93 2.88 3.21 2.95 3.53 
Relationship share 
       Partner 34% 100% 7% 18% 31% 14% 14% 
Children 33% 0% 93% 11% 55% 10% 27% 
Other Relatives 13% 0% 0% 58% 7% 8% 12% 
Friends 16% 0% 0% 11% 7% 64% 12% 
Others 6% 0% 0% 2% 1% 3% 34% 
Contact index (0-6) 5.13 5.99 5.18 4.67 5.21 4.64 4.83 
Contact share 
       Never 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Less than once a month 2% 0% 1% 3% 1% 3% 3% 
About once a month 4% 0% 3% 7% 3% 7% 6% 
About every two weeks 6% 0% 4% 9% 5% 10% 7% 
About once a week 13% 0% 14% 19% 13% 20% 15% 
Several times a week 19% 0% 25% 22% 21% 26% 26% 
Daily 56% 99% 53% 39% 58% 35% 43% 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.25 2.50 2.35 2.12 2.38 1.99 2.04 
Closeness share 
       Not very close 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 4% 
Somewhat close 14% 5% 9% 17% 9% 25% 24% 
Very close 42% 38% 44% 49% 41% 46% 37% 
Extremely close 42% 56% 46% 32% 49% 27% 36% 
Proximity index (0-5) 3.99 4.98 3.69 3.51 3.90 3.74 3.86 
Proximity share 
       more than 500km 3% 0% 3% 4% 3% 3% 2% 
100km - 500km 5% 0% 7% 9% 6% 5% 5% 
25km - 100 km 8% 0% 11% 12% 9% 9% 9% 
5km - 25km 15% 0% 19% 20% 15% 20% 19% 
1km - 5km 13% 0% 16% 16% 13% 21% 16% 
Less than 1km 56% 99% 44% 38% 54% 41% 48% 
# obs. 50869 9254 6208 6894 13432 8498 6583 
% obs.a 100% 18% 12% 14% 26% 17% 13% 
 Column (1) reports the percentages or means of respondents who have a so-
cial network and columns (C1)-(C6) for respondents associated with the re-
spective network type. Network size: number of persons mentioned by the re-
spondent. Relationship categories: Partner, Children, Other relatives, Friends,
Other. Contact categories: (0) Never, (1) Less than once a month, (2) About
once a month, (3) About every two weeks, (4) About once a week, (5) Several
times a week, and (6) Daily. Closeness categories: (0) Not very close (1) Some-
what close (2) Very close (3) Extremely close. Proximity categories: (0) More
than 500 km, (1) 100 km to 500 km, (2) 25 km to 100 km, (3) 5 km to 25 km, (4)
1 km to 5 km, and (5) Less than 1 km. Contact (closeness, proximity) index: it
is defined for each respondent and is the average of the respective measure over
all persons in his social support network. Relationship (contact, closeness, prox-
imity) share: it is defined for each category of the measure and each respondent
and is the sum of occurrence of each category divided by the size. Values from
the same dimension may not add to 100% due to rounding.
a 1644 respondents report that they do not have a social network (see Table 3.14
in Section 3.5.)
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of social support network types by gender.
Table 3.8 presents the means of gender, age and family status and the number
of observations for the different network types. There are 3% of the respondents
who report to have no network. The No network type and Children network
type are associated with the lowest share of respondents who are married. Most
respondents who have no children are associated with the Other Relatives, the
Friends, or the No network type. For the means of further demographic variables
see Table 3.20 in Section 3.5.
3.3.3 Social network types, well-being and mental health
We can now turn to the relationship between network characteristic and well-being
and mental health measures. Table 3.9 compares well-being and mental health for
respondents who have a social support network, and those who have no network
at all.
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Table 3.8: Family status by social network types.
Network types No  Network Partner Children 
Other 
relatives Family Friends Diverse 
  C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
Female 49% 35% 72% 61% 56% 61% 63% 
Age at interview 67 65 71 63 66 64 65 
Marital Status        Married/registered partnership 50% 94% 41% 62% 86% 59% 60% 
Divorced/living separated 15% 3% 12% 12% 6% 16% 14% 
Widowed 23% 1% 45% 12% 7% 15% 19% 
Parenthood        Number of children 1.97 2.24 2.55 1.76 2.39 1.82 2.06 
   Having children 82% 92% 99% 77% 100% 83% 91% 
   No children 18% 8% 1% 23% 0% 17% 9% 
   One child 18% 15% 18% 18% 18% 21% 22% 
   Two children 35% 43% 40% 35% 47% 38% 41% 
   Three or more children 29% 33% 41% 24% 35% 24% 28% 
Number of resident children 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.35 
   Having resident children 21% 24% 23% 23% 25% 22% 25% 
   No resident childa 75% 73% 77% 70% 75% 74% 72% 
   All children are residenta 8% 9% 5% 12% 7% 10% 10% 
Number of grandchildren 2.59 2.60 3.89 1.85 2.97 1.91 2.36 
   Having grandchildren 64% 69% 87% 53% 79% 57% 66% 
% obs.  3% 18% 12% 13% 26% 16% 13% 
 Columns (C0)-(C6) report the percentages or means of respondents associated
with the respective network type. There are in total 52513 observations. Values
from the same dimension may not add to 100% due to rounding.
We use the different network types as explanatory variable, and network size,
family status variables and socioeconomic variables as controls (as in Table 3.5).
We do not control for relational dynamics, because these measures are not defined
for those who have no social support network. For the detailed results see Table
3.21 to Table 3.23 (regression results) and Table 3.24 (raw means conditional on
network size) in Section 3.5.
We observe that, even after controlling for family status, all network types relate
positively to measures of well-being, for both males and females. The effect is
consistently observed for Life satisfaction and Network satisfaction. For CASP-12
the effect is observed for Partner and Friends network types for male respondents
and for Partner, Family and Friends network types for female respondents. Inter-
estingly, the positive relationship with Children network and Lack of depressive
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Table 3.9: Regressing well-being and mental health on social support network
types; controlling for network size and family status for all countries.
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Dependent Variable Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D)  
  N Mean   N Mean   N Mean   N Mean   
Panel I: All respondents 
Network type             
   No network 1624 6.93  1555 6.48  1644 6.49  1615 7.59  
   Partner 9209 7.71 ***A,B,+ 8944 7.05 ***A,B,+ 9254 8.98 ***A,B,+ 9145 8.21 ***A,B,+ 
   Children 6157 7.37 ***A,B,+ 5909 6.52  6208 9.10 ***A,B,+ 6116 7.49 ***B,+ 
   Other Relatives 6856 7.44 ***A,B,+ 6622 7.06 *B,+ 6894 8.77 ***A,B,+ 6805 7.76  
   Family 13381 7.77 ***A,B,+ 12989 7.05 *B,+ 13432 9.05 ***A,B,+ 13316 7.98 *A.***B,+ 
   Friends 8468 7.52 ***A,B,+ 8200 7.13 **B,+ 8498 8.73 ***A,B,+ 8423 7.82  
   Diverse 6553 7.5 ***B,+ 6293 6.92  6583 8.74 ***A,B,+ 6521 7.68 *A,- 
Network size     ***A,B,+     ***A,B,+     ***A,B,+     ***A,**B,+ 
Panel I: Male respondents 
Network type             
   No network 829 6.98  790 6.67  841 6.60  823 7.99  
   Partner 5996 7.70 ***A,B,+ 5820 7.06 *A,B,+ 6026 9.03 ***A,B,+ 5955 8.36 **A,B,+ 
   Children 1755 7.77 ***A,B,+ 1695 7.03  1765 9.06 ***A,B,+ 1745 8.17 *B,+ 
   Other Relatives 2656 7.47 ***A,B,+ 2576 7.15  2671 8.65 ***A,B,+ 2634 8.18  
   Family 5895 7.77 ***A,B,+ 5732 7.07  5922 9.00 ***A,B,+ 5870 8.31 **B,+ 
   Friends 3310 7.64 ***A,B,+ 3218 7.27 *A,B,+ 3322 8.58 ***A,B,+ 3286 8.25  
   Diverse 2406 7.65 **A,B,+ 2318 7.16  2415 8.54 ***A,B,+ 2392 8.23  
Network size     ***A,B,+     ***A,B,+     ***A,B,+     ***A,+ 
Panel II: Female respondents 
Network type             
   No network 795 6.88  765 6.29  803 6.38  792 7.18  
   Partner 3213 7.71 ***A,B,+ 3124 7.03 ***A,B,+ 3228 8.90 ***A,B,+ 3190 7.93 ***A,B,+ 
   Children 4402 7.21 **B,+ 4214 6.32  4443 9.12 ***A,B,+ 4371 7.22 **B,+ 
   Other Relatives 4200 7.43 **B,+ 4046 6.99  4223 8.84 ***A,B,+ 4171 7.49  
   Family 7486 7.77 **A,***B,+ 7257 7.04 *B,+ 7510 9.10 ***A,B,+ 7446 7.72 ***B,+ 
   Friends 5158 7.45 *B,+ 4982 7.05 *B,+ 5176 8.82 ***A,B,+ 5137 7.55  
   Diverse 4147 7.41 **B,+ 3975 6.79  4168 8.86 ***A,B,+ 4129 7.36  
Network size     ***A,B,+     ***A,B,+     ***A,B,+     ***A,*B,+ 
 ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, +(-) indicates positive (negative) significant
effect with the well-being measure; (I)-(IV) OLS Regression. Controls A: female,
age, age2, country dummy; Controls B: Controls A, divorced, widowed, edu-
cation, household size, urban character of residence, retired, self-employment,
health status, average monthly household income dummy for low, middle, upper
middle, and high income (based on country-specific 25th, 50th and 75th percentile
of the average monthly household income reported in wave 2). Children, resident
children, grandchildren and married included in both A and B. Network types:
the excluded category is having no network. N indicates number of observations
in each category for categorical variables.
symptoms mostly emerges only after inclusion of the full set of controls. Network
size is positively related to all measures of well-being (Tomini, Tomini, and Groot
2016).
Table 3.10 shows results confined to respondents who indicated the presence of
some social support network. For the detailed regression results see Table 3.25 to
Table 3.27 in Section 3.5. The excluded category of the network type is the Part-
ner network, which had consistently strong and significant associations in Table
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3.9, and is taken as a benchmark here. We find that for Life satisfaction, CASP-
12, and Lack of depressive symptoms, the more diverse networks have typically
weaker effects than the Partner network, with the exception of the Friends network
for CASP-12. In contrast, Network satisfaction is consistently higher for all other
networks, except for the Diverse network. We also include network size, contact,
closeness and proximity index. Fiori, Antonucci, and Cortina (2006) pointed out
that support quality is an important factor for depressive symptoms. We find
consistently that the closeness and contact measure is positively correlated with
mental health and well-being. However, we observe a negative relationship of mere
proximity with well-being and mental health. While for the associations with fam-
ily status no relevant gender difference were observed, we observe that associations
with network types differ for males and female respondents. For male respondents
in most cases the effects of the network types are not significantly different from
the Partner network. For the females, the above discussed associations show up
significantly.
3.4 Discussion
In contrast to negative associations reported in many studies (for an overview
see Hansen, Slagsvold, and Moum (2009), or the discussion in Nelson, Kushlev,
English, et al. (2013) and Herbst and Ifcher (2016)), we find that children are posi-
tively correlated with well-being and lack of depressive symptoms, when controlling
for residential status (resident children are negatively associated with well-being).
This result is consistent with age-dependence in the correlation of children with
well-being (Margolis and Myrskylä 2011; Mastekaasa 1994) and mental health
(Buber and Engelhardt 2008; Hank and Wagner 2013). The results suggest that
the finding of a negative link between children and well-being and mental health
may not generalize to older people whose children have often left home already.
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Table 3.10: Regressing well-being and mental health on social support net-
work types; controlling for network size, relational dynamic measures, and family
status for all countries.
 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Dependent Variable Life satisfaction Quality of life  (CASP-12) 
Network 
satisfaction 
Lack of depressive 
symptoms (EURO-D) 
Panel I: all respondents 
Network typea  
       Children ***A,B,- ***A,B,- ***A,B,+ ***A,*B,- 
   Other Relatives ***A,- 
 
***A,B,+ ***A,B,- 
   Family ***A,- ***A,- ***A,B,+ ***A,- 
   Friends 
 
***B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,- 
   Diverse ***A,- ***A,- 
 
***A,B,- 
Network size ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ 
Contact Index ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ **A,B,+ 
Closeness Index ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ 
Proximity Index ***A,- ***A,B,- ***A,B,- **A,- 
Panel II: male respondentsb 
Network type a         Children *A,- *A,- ***A,B,+ *A,- 
   Other Relatives  *B,+  *A,-    Family  *A,-      Friends  ***A,B,+      Diverse    *A,- Network size ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,*B,+ 
Contact Index **A,B,+ **A,***B,+ ***A,B,+  Closeness Index ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ 
Proximity Index **A,- ***A,- ***A,B,-  
Panel III: female respondentsb 
Network type a         Children ***A,B,- ***A,B,- ***A,B,+ ***A,B,- 
   Other Relatives ***A,*B,- ***A,- ***A,B,+ ***A,B,- 
   Family ***A,- ***A,**B,- ***A,B,+ ***A,**B,- 
   Friends ***A,*B,-  ***A,B,+ ***A,B,-    Diverse ***A,*B,- ***A,*B,- ***A,B,+ ***A,B,- 
Network size ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,**B,+ 
Contact Index ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ *A,B,+ 
Closeness Index ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ ***A,B,+ 
Proximity Index **A,- ***A,**B,- ***A,B,- **A,- 
 ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001, +(-) indicates positive (negative) significant
effect with the well-being measure; (I)-(IV) OLS Regression. Controls A: female,
age, age2, country dummy; Controls B: Controls A, divorced, widowed, edu-
cation, household size, urban character of residence, retired, self-employment,
health status, average monthly household income dummy for low, middle, upper
middle, and high income (based on country-specific 25th, 50th and 75th per-
centile of the average monthly household income reported in wave 2). Children,
resident children, grandchildren and married included in both A and B.
a Partner network is the excluded category
b Control female is excluded
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As stress associated with balancing the competing demands of childcare, work and
personal life decreases, once people get older and their children leave house, the
importance of children as caregivers and social contacts might prevail. Evidence
on grandchildren on the other hand is mixed: While they positively correlate with
life and network satisfaction, this is not the case for depressive symptoms and
perceived quality of life.
We observe that all types of networks have positive associations with our depen-
dent measures over and beyond the direct effects of the underlying family status.
Network characteristics such as size, closeness, contact frequency and proximity
are also relevant indicators of well-being and mental health. For male respondents
in most cases the effects of the network types are not significantly different from
the Partner network. For female respondents, on the other hand, we observe more
cases where associations of well-being and mental health with the Partner network
type are significantly different from those for the other network types. Overall we
find that especially the partner network is consistently positively correlated with
well-being and mental health, despite the small network size of 1. This is in con-
trast to Litwin and Stoeckel (2013) and Litwin and Stoeckel (2014), who found
that the Spouse network is not significantly related to well-being. However, be-
cause we control for network size separately, positive associations with size are
captured by this variable. A remarkable feature of the findings in Table 8 is that
network characteristics are positively associated with well-being and mental health
even after controlling for the above-shown associations with family status indica-
tors. That is, a healthy partner network captures more than just being married,
as do other types of networks. This fits previous results suggesting that it is not
being married per se, but being satisfied with the degree of reciprocity within the
relationship that is associated with less depressive symptoms (Hank and Wagner
2013).
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Taken together, our correlational results suggest that social networks may be im-
portant for well-being and mental health in old age. Spouses, partners and children
are often the basis of long-lasting social networks, which can provide social support
to elderly people. However, different forms of network may have similar effects,
as especially for male respondents in our data suggest. This might derive from
a level of trust and reciprocity implicit in all forms of networks. Networks may
exert an influence on the person’s life beyond the mere family status, for example
by moderating influences of the environment on well-being. The direct association
of family status with well-being and mental health may not capture such effects.
Importantly, the current insights need to guide further research, with the next
step the assessment of the causal direction of the reported associations. This will
allow moving towards making recommendations for public policy to maintain the
well-being and mental health of the elderly through social networks.
3.5 Supporting information
This section provides figures and tables with additional summary statistics and
data analyses referred to in the main text.
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3.5.1 Figures
Figure 3.4: Age distribution. Percent of male (female) respondents for each
age.
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Figure 3.5: Average well-being and mental health measure, by gender. Av-
erage well-being and mental health measure for all ages from 50 to 91 years for
male and female respondents. Male: black lines, Female: grey lines. After age
91 the number of available observations drops to less than 50
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Figure 3.6: Network size by network type. For each network type, the size of
the nth bar reflects the share of respondents having a network of size n, where
n = 1, . . . , 7.
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of the proximity index by network type. Each value
of the network contact index is represented by a line. For each network type, the
height of each line represents the percentage of the index having the respective
value.
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of the closeness index by network type. Each value
of the network contact index is represented by a line. For each network type, the
height of each line represents the percentage of the index having the respective
value.
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3.5.2 Tables
Table 3.11: Modules and Variables used from SHARE Release 6.0.0., Wave 4
S1 Table. Modules and Variables used from SHARE Release 6.0.0., Wave 4 
Variable Explanation 
mergeid  Person identifier 
coupleid Couple identifier 
country  Country of living 
Coverscreen on individual level 
age_in Age of respondent at the time of the interview 
hhsize Household size 
gender Gender of person living in the same household 
yrbirth Birth year of person living in the same household 
relrpers Relationship with person living in the household 
fam_resp Family respondent 
hou_resp Household respondent 
Activities module 
ac012  How satisfied with life 
Generated health variables module 
casp  CASP, quality of life (ac014-ac025) 
eurod EURO-D, depression scale (euro1-euro12, mh002-mh017) 
Children modulea,b 
ch001 Number of children 
ch005 Gender of children 
ch006 Year of birth of children 
ch021 Number of grandchildren 
Demographics module 
dn042  Male or female 
dn014b Marital Status 
dn044 Marital Status has changed 
Generated education variables moduleb 
isced1997_r  ISCED-97 coding of education 
Employment and pension module 
ep005  Current job situation 
ep009 Employed/Self-employed, current job 
Generated housing variables modulec,b 
areabldgi Area of Living 
Health module 
ph003 Health 
ph011 Current Drugs 
Household income modulec 
hh017e  Average monthly income, last year 
hh017v1  Average monthly income, low bracket 
hh017v2  Average monthly income, middle bracket 
hh017v3  Average monthly income, high bracket 
hh017ub  Unfolding brackets, if respondent refuses to answer hh017e 
Social network module 
sn005_1-sn005_7 Relationship with member of social network 
sn006_1-sn006_7 Network Proximity 
sn007_1-sn007_7 Network Contact 
sn009_1-sn009_7 Network Closeness 
sn012  How satisfied with network 
sn017  If not having a network, how satisfied with that 
aFor each couple identifier the family respondent answers the question on behalf of the family. 
bWe use SHARE dataset wave 1 and 2 (Börsch-Supan, 2017a, 2017b) which were administered between 2004 and 2005 and 
2006 and 2007, respectively, to update responses which are coded as missing in the dataset of wave 4 because they did not 
change since wave 1 or 2. 
cFor each couple identifier the household respondent answers the question on behalf of the household. 
Börsch-Supan, A. (2017a). Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) Wave 1. SHARE-ERIC. 
http://doi.org/10.6103/SHARE.w1.600 
Börsch-Supan, A. (2017b). Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) Wave 2. SHARE-ERIC. 
http://doi.org/10.6103/SHARE.w2.600 
 
a For each couple identifier the family resp dent answers the ques ion on behalf
of the family.
b We use SHARE dat from w ves 1 (Börsch-Supan 2017a) a d wave 2 (Börsch-
Supan 2017b) which were administered between 2004 and 2005 and 2006 and
2007, respectively, to update responses which are coded as missing in the dataset
of wave 4 because they did not change since wave 1 or 2.
c For each couple identifier the household respondent answers the question on
behalf of the household.
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Table 3.12: Number of observations and unfolding income brackets per coun-
try.
Unfolding brackets in € Percent of household income 
Country # obs. Percent Low Middle High [0,Low) [Low,Middle) [Middle,High) [High,) 
Austria 4808 9% 1500 2000 3000 30% 17% 24% 29% 
Belgium 4844 9% 1500 2000 3000 28% 20% 24% 28% 
Czech Republic 4898 9% 1629 2037 2851 84% 5% 2% 9% 
Denmark 2074 4% 1342 2013 2684 9% 15% 16% 60% 
Estonia 6330 12% 192 256 320 3% 4% 12% 81% 
France 5111 10% 1500 2000 3000 33% 17% 23% 28% 
Germany 1429 3% 1500 2000 3000 27% 21% 25% 27% 
Hungary 2901 6% 1444 2166 2888 91% 2% 1% 6% 
Italy 3317 6% 1500 2000 3000 45% 18% 18% 19% 
Netherlands 2498 5% 1500 2000 3000 19% 22% 29% 30% 
Poland 1486 3% 1418 1890 2363 82% 1% 1% 16% 
Portugal 1837 3% 1500 2000 3000 64% 10% 7% 19% 
Slovenia 2600 5% 1500 2000 3000 69% 12% 7% 11% 
Spain 3081 6% 1500 2000 3000 57% 12% 10% 21% 
Sweden 1816 3% 1108 2215 3323 7% 30% 30% 32% 
Switzerland 3483 7% 1620 2025 2430 10% 5% 6% 79% 
Total 52513 
Low, Middle, and High are the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the reported
household incomes from SHARE wave 2 (Field time 2006-2007). If a respondent
refuses to state the amount of the overall income, after tax that the entire
household had in an average month of the last year the interviewer asks the
following questions, starting with the lowest threshold: Do you earn a) more
than this amount, b) less than this amount or c) approximately this amount.
The boundaries of the intervals are the respective country-specific 25th, 50th, and
75th percentile of the reported household incomes from SHARE wave 2 which
are used as unfolding brackets in SHARE wave 4.
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Table 3.13: Summary statistics of demographic variables.
 
  
All 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
All 
(4) 
Female 56% 0% 100% 52513 
Age at interview 66 66 66 52513 
Parenthood 
    Number of children 2.15 2.16 2.15 52513 
   Having children 91% 90% 91% 52513 
   No children 9% 10% 9% 52513 
   One child 18% 17% 20% 52513 
   Two children 41% 42% 41% 52513 
   Three or more children 31% 31% 31% 52513 
Number of resident childrena 0.33 0.36 0.31 52513 
   Having resident children 24% 24% 23% 52513 
   No resident childb 74% 73% 75% 47731 
   All children are residentb 9% 10% 8% 47731 
Number of grandchildren 2.61 2.43 2.74 52513 
   Having grandchildren 69% 66% 71% 52513 
Marital Status 
    Married/registered partnership 70% 80% 63% 52513 
Divorced/living separated 10% 8% 11% 52513 
Widowed 14% 6% 21% 52513 
Housing 
    Household size 2.16 2.28 2.06 52513 
Big city 14% 14% 15% 50879 
Suburbs of big city 10% 11% 10% 50879 
Large town 16% 16% 17% 50879 
Small town 24% 24% 24% 50879 
Rural area/village 35% 36% 34% 50879 
Average monthly household income 
    Low income 38% 35% 41% 48736 
Middle income 13% 13% 12% 48736 
Upper middle income 15% 15% 15% 48736 
High income 34% 37% 32% 48736 
Employed 25% 26% 23% 52466 
Self-employed 6% 8% 4% 52466 
Education
c
 
    None 3% 2% 3% 52179 
Primary school 19% 17% 21% 52179 
Lower secondary school 19% 18% 21% 52179 
Upper secondary school 34% 37% 32% 52179 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 5% 5% 5% 52179 
First stage tertiary education 19% 21% 18% 52179 
Second stage tertiary education 1% 1% 1% 52179 
Health status 
    Poor 12% 11% 13% 52500 
Fair 30% 28% 31% 52500 
Good 35% 36% 35% 52500 
Very good 16% 18% 15% 52500 
Excellent 7% 7% 6% 52500 
Medication for depressive symptomsd 13% 8% 17% 52461 
 Columns (1)-(3) report the percentages or means of all respondents, and by gen-
der. Column (4) shows the total number of observations. Values from the same
dimension may not add to 100% due to rounding.
a Percentage conditional on having a child.
b The number of resident children is inferred from matching the age/gender in-
formation from the persons living with the family (Coverscreen module) and the
age/gender information from the children of the respondents (Children module).
c SHARE is using the international classification of education ISCED-97 with
which education can be classified according to internationally agreed set of def-
initions and concepts (Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik and Wolf 2003).
d Medication for depressive symptoms is equal to one if the respondent takes
drugs for sleeping problems, anxiety or depression.
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Table 3.14: Frequency of network size over all countries.
 
Network size # obs. Percent 
0 1644 3% 
1 14903 28% 
2 13186 25% 
3 10465 20% 
4 6189 12% 
5 3067 6% 
6 1692 3% 
7 1367 3% 
Total 52513 
The network size is derived from the following questions: (1) Please give me
the first name of the person with whom you most often discuss things that are
important to you. (2) Is there anyone (else) who is very important to you for
some other reason? Question (2) is repeated until the respondent answered that
there is no one else important to him or he has already mentioned seven people.
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Table 3.15: Average relationship share by network type for each country.
Partner Children 
Other 
Relatives Family Friends Diverse Partner Children 
Other 
Relatives Family Friends Diverse 
AUT BEL 
Network size 1.00 1.97 2.08 2.98 3.25 4.30 1.01 1.76 3.47 3.34 2.88 3.42 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 22% 38% 15% 11% 100% 0% 15% 25% 12% 12% 
   Children 0% 100% 0% 62% 8% 47% 0% 100% 6% 53% 4% 23% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 78% 0% 15% 14% 0% 0% 51% 12% 4% 4% 
   Friends 0% 0% 0% 0% 52% 21% 0% 0% 20% 10% 79% 11% 
   All others 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 6% 0% 0% 8% 0% 1% 49% 
Contact index (0-6) 5.98 5.13 4.91 5.42 4.70 4.81 5.98 4.98 4.38 5.00 4.23 4.55 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.84 2.73 2.51 2.84 2.39 2.61 2.64 2.41 2.10 2.36 1.98 1.92 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.98 3.84 3.74 4.09 3.74 3.56 4.95 3.53 3.53 3.83 3.55 3.89 
# obs. 870 411 240 932 1148 1138 532 365 1149 1295 770 583 
% obs. 18% 9% 5% 20% 24% 24% 11% 39% 8% 21% 16% 4% 
CHE CZE 
Network size 1.00 2.58 2.21 4.35 2.93 3.65 1.01 1.68 2.16 2.94 2.69 2.74 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 29% 29% 14% 21% 15% 100% 0% 19% 35% 12% 14% 
   Children 0% 71% 0% 41% 0% 2% 0% 100% 1% 57% 21% 19% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 69% 15% 15% 10% 0% 0% 70% 7% 4% 6% 
   Friends 0% 0% 0% 24% 64% 24% 0% 0% 10% 0% 63% 6% 
   All others 0% 0% 1% 6% 0% 49% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 55% 
Contact index (0-6) 5.99 4.99 4.60 4.44 4.30 4.22 5.99 5.12 4.71 5.21 4.76 4.85 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.25 2.08 1.88 1.84 1.72 1.52 2.53 2.51 2.21 2.54 1.98 1.94 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.96 3.77 3.47 3.40 3.54 3.58 4.98 3.83 3.81 4.05 3.95 4.12 
# obs. 481 594 270 903 821 307 1094 639 344 1376 801 452 
% obs. 14% 18% 8% 27% 24% 9% 23% 14% 7% 29% 17% 10% 
DEU DNK 
Network size 1.00 1.80 3.22 3.24 2.92 3.75 1.00 2.37 3.22 4.07 2.48 2.96 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 18% 30% 20% 14% 100% 30% 23% 14% 25% 26% 
   Children 0% 100% 7% 53% 3% 27% 0% 70% 0% 40% 0% 0% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 53% 9% 3% 5% 0% 0% 50% 14% 0% 11% 
   Friends 0% 0% 16% 8% 73% 13% 0% 0% 25% 24% 74% 12% 
   All others 0% 0% 6% 0% 1% 41% 0% 0% 3% 9% 1% 51% 
Contact index (0-6) 6.00 4.90 4.48 4.99 4.27 4.57 5.99 5.08 4.30 4.58 4.53 4.70 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.27 2.09 1.90 2.09 1.76 1.64 2.78 2.45 2.17 2.21 2.15 1.82 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.99 3.46 3.34 3.71 3.56 3.86 4.99 3.58 3.28 3.27 3.80 3.82 
# obs. 191 110 193 607 151 142 322 351 379 519 268 189 
% obs. 14% 8% 14% 44% 11% 10% 16% 17% 19% 26% 13% 9% 
ESP EST 
Network size 1.00 1.87 1.89 3.14 3.15 3.23 1.00 1.60 3.16 2.66 2.98 3.31 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 16% 33% 14% 11% 100% 0% 17% 41% 12% 11% 
   Children 0% 100% 0% 57% 17% 21% 0% 100% 30% 59% 20% 23% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 83% 10% 11% 9% 0% 0% 49% 0% 9% 9% 
   Friends 0% 0% 0% 0% 57% 9% 0% 0% 4% 0% 57% 9% 
   All others 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 48% 
Contact index (0-6) 6.00 5.66 5.40 5.63 5.24 5.26 5.99 5.05 4.77 5.37 4.66 4.71 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.62 2.55 2.42 2.55 2.23 2.14 2.14 2.05 1.92 2.07 1.71 1.60 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.99 4.19 4.24 4.33 4.26 4.22 4.99 3.32 3.33 3.83 3.62 3.78 
# obs. 559 335 241 1077 610 228 1233 742 1194 1099 1168 734 
% obs. 18% 11% 8% 35% 20% 7% 20% 12% 19% 18% 19% 12% 
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Partner Children 
Other 
Relatives Family Friends Diverse Partner Children 
Other  
Relatives Family Friends Diverse 
FRA HUN 
Network size 1.01 1.83 2.94 3.22 3.12 3.32 1.01 1.96 2.40 2.79 2.95 3.95 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 16% 29% 10% 11% 100% 0% 21% 40% 18% 15% 
   Children 0% 100% 19% 54% 5% 22% 0% 100% 0% 60% 28% 41% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 56% 1% 7% 13% 0% 0% 65% 0% 0% 23% 
   Friends 0% 0% 10% 15% 72% 4% 0% 0% 10% 0% 53% 5% 
   All others 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 50% 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 16% 
Contact index (0-6) 5.99 4.86 4.57 4.98 4.34 4.66 5.99 5.39 5.02 5.62 5.02 5.13 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.45 2.19 2.14 2.24 1.87 1.77 2.65 2.54 2.27 2.64 2.22 2.31 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.96 3.05 3.14 3.46 3.40 3.66 4.99 3.96 3.88 4.23 4.05 3.93 
# obs. 648 503 1169 1018 971 554 363 408 216 949 262 656 
% obs. 13% 10% 24% 21% 20% 11% 13% 14% 8% 33% 9% 23% 
ITA NLD 
Network size 1.01 1.61 2.33 2.89 2.55 3.61 1.00 1.74 3.12 3.34 2.88 3.48 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 19% 39% 4% 20% 100% 0% 22% 27% 20% 17% 
   Children 0% 100% 0% 60% 2% 33% 0% 100% 5% 50% 3% 17% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 69% 0% 4% 17% 0% 0% 55% 10% 5% 11% 
   Friends 0% 0% 12% 0% 86% 18% 0% 0% 18% 12% 71% 13% 
   All others 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 11% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 43% 
Contact index (0-6) 6.00 5.70 5.23 5.77 4.94 5.36 6.00 4.88 4.32 4.90 4.31 4.47 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.53 2.41 2.10 2.52 1.92 2.21 2.87 2.63 2.40 2.64 2.24 2.14 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.98 4.19 4.04 4.37 3.96 4.10 4.99 3.36 3.45 3.72 3.76 3.76 
# obs. 582 362 341 714 273 818 432 167 411 795 325 350 
% obs. 19% 12% 11% 23% 9% 26% 17% 7% 17% 32% 13% 14% 
POL PRT 
Network size 1.00 1.94 2.59 3.06 1.98 2.59 1.00 1.89 2.37 3.16 3.40 1.17 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 13% 31% 14% 12% 100% 0% 24% 32% 14% 0% 
   Children 0% 100% 5% 56% 0% 24% 0% 100% 4% 59% 19% 0% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 60% 8% 0% 4% 0% 0% 72% 7% 14% 0% 
   Friends 0% 0% 15% 5% 86% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 44% 0% 
   All others 0% 0% 7% 0% 0% 61% 0% 0% 0% 2% 8% 100% 
Contact index (0-6) 6.00 5.42 4.97 5.44 4.83 5.00 6.00 5.50 5.21 5.61 5.20 5.30 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.45 2.35 2.04 2.40 1.69 1.69 2.72 2.53 2.37 2.50 2.05 1.70 
Proximity index (0-5) 5.00 4.26 4.13 4.17 4.31 4.49 4.98 3.78 4.06 4.14 3.89 4.53 
# obs. 368 287 127 521 53 74 343 232 149 692 352 35 
% obs. 26% 20% 9% 36% 4% 5% 19% 13% 8% 38% 20% 2% 
SVN SWE 
Network size 1.00 1.50 2.60 2.72 2.68 2.77 1.01 2.49 2.67 3.96 2.17 2.67 
Relationship 
   Partner 100% 0% 17% 39% 14% 13% 100% 29% 20% 10% 26% 19% 
   Children 0% 100% 14% 59% 9% 15% 0% 71% 0% 44% 0% 0% 
   Other relatives 0% 0% 64% 2% 6% 9% 0% 0% 57% 16% 0% 11% 
   Friends 0% 0% 5% 1% 68% 3% 0% 0% 23% 24% 74% 14% 
   All others 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 60% 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 56% 
Contact index (0-6) 5.99 5.56 5.10 5.71 4.89 4.97 6.00 5.07 4.43 4.64 4.66 4.72 
Closeness index (0-3) 2.25 2.19 2.14 2.23 1.90 1.75 2.58 2.24 1.91 2.04 2.00 1.69 
Proximity index (0-5) 4.98 4.13 4.06 4.48 4.04 4.37 5.00 3.36 2.92 3.09 3.52 3.61 
# obs. 932 242 253 418 361 203 304 460 218 517 164 120 
% obs. 39% 10% 11% 17% 15% 8% 17% 26% 12% 29% 9% 7% 
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Table 3.16: Correlation of family status, social network characteristics, well-
being and mental health.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Number of children
2 Number of resident children 0.23
3 Married/registered partnership 0.14 0.11
4 Life satisfaction 0.03 -0.01 0.15
5 Quality of life (CASP-12) -0.03 0.11 0.57
6 Network satisfaction 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.18
7 Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 0.01 0.12 0.44 0.55 0.12
8 Network size 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.02
Relationship share
9 Partner 0.05 0.05 0.47 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.14 -0.44
10 Children 0.20 -0.01 -0.16 -0.04 -0.11 0.11 -0.08 0.19 -0.44
11 Other Relatives -0.17 -0.16 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.14 -0.30 -0.28
12 Friends -0.12 -0.03 -0.19 0.07 -0.09 -0.01 0.17 -0.36 -0.32 -0.10
13 Others -0.07 -0.03 -0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 0.06 -0.21 -0.18 -0.06 -0.08
14 Contact Index (0-6) 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.01 -0.05 0.18 0.02 -0.36 0.50 0.01 -0.25 -0.35 -0.15
15 Closeness Index (0-3) 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.35 0.08 -0.09 0.24 0.13 -0.10 -0.25 -0.25 0.35
16 Proximity Index (0-5) 0.04 0.16 0.22 -0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.34 0.51 -0.20 -0.24 -0.19 -0.02 0.58 0.16
Correlations with a p-value smaller than 0.05 are shown. Network size: num-
ber of persons mentioned by the respondent. Relationship categories: Partner,
Children, Other relatives, Friends, Other. Contact categories: (0) Never, (1)
Less than once a month, (2) About once a month, (3) About every two weeks,
(4) About once a week, (5) Several times a week, and (6) Daily. Closeness cat-
egories: (1) Not very close (2) Somewhat close (3) Very close (4) Extremely
close. Proximity categories: (0) More than 500 km, (1) 100 km to 500 km, (2)
25 km to 100 km, (3) 5 km to 25 km, (4) 1 km to 5 km, and (5) Less than 1 km.
Contact (closeness, proximity) index: it is defined for each respondent and is
the average of the respective measure over all persons in his social support net-
work. Relationship share: it is defined for each category of the measure and
each respondent and is the sum of occurrence of each category divided by the
size.
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Table 3.17: Regressing well-being and mental health on family status for all
countries, all respondents.
 
Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
Married/registered partnership 0.56*** 0.44*** 0.30*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.039 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.321) 
[1] Having 1 child 0.0046 -0.025 0.066* 0.028 0.22*** 0.17*** -0.043 -0.015 
 (0.891) (0.466) (0.035) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.206) (0.651) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.095** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.11** 0.057 0.13*** 0.051 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.021 0.019 
 (0.001) (0.113) (0.000) (0.123) (0.000) (0.000) (0.555) (0.588) 
Number of resident children -0.031* -0.054*** -0.097*** -0.12*** -0.016 -0.023* -0.020 -0.027* 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.130) (0.047) (0.152) (0.033) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0050 0.010** -0.022*** -0.00015 0.015*** 0.018*** -0.020*** -0.0022 
 (0.173) (0.003) (0.000) (0.961) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.521) 
Controls         Female -0.030 0.053*** -0.15*** -0.041** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.65*** -0.51*** 
 (0.056) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview 0.023* 0.043*** 0.12*** 0.13*** -0.013 -0.0099 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.136) (0.307) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared -0.00014 -0.00015 -0.0010*** -0.00098*** 0.000088 0.000078 -0.00100*** -0.00077*** 
 (0.068) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.265) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.53*** -0.45*** -0.78*** -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.65*** -0.49*** -0.29*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.094** -0.12*** 0.26*** 0.029 -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.011 -0.20*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.375) (0.000) (0.000) (0.758) (0.000) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.99*** -0.62*** -1.44*** -1.00*** -0.42*** -0.37*** -0.24*** 0.13*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.56*** -0.46*** -0.27*** -0.15*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.26*** -0.14** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.27*** 0.021 0.24*** -0.033 0.061 -0.00070 0.15*** -0.031 
 (0.000) (0.589) (0.000) (0.343) (0.052) (0.983) (0.000) (0.437) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.76*** -0.37*** -1.10*** -0.54*** -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.69*** -0.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.58*** -1.24*** -1.23*** -0.80*** -0.45*** -0.38*** -0.95*** -0.44*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -1.01*** -0.84*** -0.54*** -0.29*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.68*** -0.40*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.60*** -1.03*** -1.38*** -0.68*** -0.17*** -0.10* -0.95*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.74*** -0.51*** -1.68*** -1.37*** -0.39*** -0.36*** -0.62*** -0.37*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.29*** -0.35*** 0.24*** 0.19*** -0.62*** -0.65*** 0.076 0.069 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.069) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.93*** -0.36*** -1.20*** -0.53*** -0.25*** -0.17*** -1.03*** -0.45*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.31*** -0.64*** -2.16*** -1.32*** -0.095* 0.098* -1.17*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.89*** -0.60*** -0.17*** 0.22*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.12** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.031 -0.10* -0.20*** -0.31*** -0.086* -0.13*** 0.024 -0.017 
 (0.456) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.574) (0.682) 
Divorced/living separated  -0.10*  -0.050  
-0.0082 
 
-0.13** 
  (0.034)  (0.225)  
(0.849) 
 
(0.003) 
Widowed  0.067  0.10**  
0.13** 
 
-0.15*** 
  (0.151)  (0.010)  
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
[1] Suburbs of big city  0.0080  0.017  
0.033 
 
-0.079** 
  (0.793)  (0.528)  
(0.219) 
 
(0.010) 
[2] Large town  0.038  0.019  
0.077** 
 
-0.067* 
  (0.183)  (0.456)  
(0.002) 
 
(0.016) 
[3] Small town  0.11***  0.066**  
0.092*** 
 
0.024 
  (0.000)  (0.005)  
(0.000) 
 
(0.340) 
[4] Rural area/village  0.059*  0.045*  
0.034 
 
0.0038 
  (0.022)  (0.048)  
(0.116) 
 
(0.876) 
Employment, current job  0.18***  0.17***  
0.026 
 
0.093*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
(0.171) 
 
(0.000) 
         
72
Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
A B A B A B A B 
Self-employment, current job 0.15*** 0.16*** -0.018 0.066* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.543) (0.042) 
[1] Primary school 0.10 0.37*** 0.013 0.24*** 
(0.081) (0.000) (0.793) (0.000) 
[2] Lower secondary school 0.14* 0.46*** 0.011 0.32*** 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.828) (0.000) 
[3] Upper secondary school 0.18** 0.58*** 0.029 0.42*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.568) (0.000) [4] Post-secondary non-tertiary
education 0.25*** 0.69*** 0.053 0.49*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) 
[5] First stage tertiary education 0.26*** 0.64*** 0.0021 0.42*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.967) (0.000) [6] Second stage tertiary
education 0.43*** 0.77*** 0.016 0.42*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.856) (0.000) 
[1] Fair 1.03*** 1.12*** 0.15*** 1.24*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[2] Good 1.52*** 1.80*** 0.17*** 1.96*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[3] Very good 1.86*** 2.18*** 0.31*** 2.28*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[4] Excellent 2.18*** 2.50*** 0.45*** 2.40*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Drugs for depression -0.49*** -0.61*** -0.092*** -1.20***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[1] Middle income 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.018 0.082**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.429) (0.002)
[2] Upper middle income 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.028 0.067**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.206) (0.008)
[3] High income 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.018 0.059*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.402) (0.013)
_cons 6.95*** 3.91*** 4.41*** 0.86* 9.18*** 8.73*** 5.10*** 2.64***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 52248 46969 50512 45539 52513 47161 51941 46690 
R² 0.12 0.24 0.19 0.37 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.31 
adjusted R² 0.12 0.24 0.19 0.37 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.31 
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Table 3.18: Regressing well-being and mental health on family status for all
countries, male respondents.
 
Life satisfaction  CASP quality of life (0-10) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
Married/registered partnership 0.57*** 0.49*** 0.28*** 0.18** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.065 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.239) 
[1] Having 1 child 0.069 -0.010 0.14** 0.035 0.16*** 0.12* 0.035 0.016 
 
(0.167) (0.840) (0.004) (0.455) (0.000) (0.013) (0.469) (0.729) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.24*** 0.097* 0.29*** 0.13** 0.16*** 0.10* 0.16*** 0.094* 
 
(0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.032) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.18*** 0.029 0.24*** 0.056 0.13** 0.067 0.059 -0.010 
 
(0.000) (0.573) (0.000) (0.249) (0.004) (0.179) (0.235) (0.835) 
Number of resident children -0.0084 -0.027 -0.094*** -0.11*** -0.023 -0.027 -0.018 -0.032 
 
(0.648) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.107) (0.309) (0.059) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0030 0.015** -0.025*** -0.0018 0.015*** 0.018*** -0.015** -0.000094 
 
(0.566) (0.004) (0.000) (0.707) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.985) 
Controls 
    
    Age at interview 0.055*** 0.085*** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.031* -0.029 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared -0.00038** -0.00046*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** 0.00023* 0.00024* -0.0011*** -0.00088*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.46*** -0.45*** -0.73*** -0.68*** -0.59*** -0.61*** -0.34*** -0.26*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.12* -0.14** 0.23*** -0.041 -0.29*** -0.39*** 0.036 -0.19*** 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.000) (0.399) (0.000) (0.000) (0.476) (0.000) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.93*** -0.55*** -1.42*** -0.97*** -0.34*** -0.28*** -0.12* 0.23*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.55*** -0.46*** -0.30*** -0.20** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.13 -0.040 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.547) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.21*** -0.062 0.18** -0.12* 0.12* 0.020 0.19*** 0.0060 
 
(0.000) (0.263) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015) (0.704) (0.001) (0.910) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.62*** -0.32*** -0.89*** -0.42*** -0.29*** -0.21*** -0.23*** 0.053 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.378) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.68*** -1.35*** -1.36*** -0.91*** -0.47*** -0.43*** -0.89*** -0.44*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -0.96*** -0.82*** -0.46*** -0.28*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.51*** -0.32*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.55*** -1.02*** -1.32*** -0.65*** -0.16** -0.10 -0.71*** -0.21** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.115) (0.000) (0.001) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.64*** -0.51*** -1.52*** -1.30*** -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.40*** -0.29*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.24*** -0.36*** 0.26*** 0.15** -0.54*** -0.59*** 0.23*** 0.13* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.85*** -0.34*** -1.13*** -0.48*** -0.23** -0.15 -0.84*** -0.33*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.06*** -0.58*** -2.02*** -1.29*** -0.063 0.14* -0.76*** -0.23** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.286) (0.039) (0.000) (0.002) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.96*** -0.66*** -0.13* 0.25*** -0.40*** -0.37*** -0.31*** -0.072 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.224) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.026 -0.18** -0.29*** -0.45*** -0.050 -0.12 0.030 -0.064 
 
(0.670) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.392) (0.055) (0.623) (0.273) 
Divorced/living separated 
 
0.0044 
 
0.023 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.12 
  
(0.951) 
 
(0.715) 
 
(0.380) 
 
(0.063) 
Widowed 
 
0.085 
 
0.10 
 
0.0013 
 
-0.23** 
  
(0.281) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.987) 
 
(0.001) 
[1] Suburbs of big city 
 
0.0081 
 
0.022 
 
0.071 
 
-0.060 
  
(0.858) 
 
(0.595) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.152) 
[2] Large town 
 
0.042 
 
0.057 
 
0.12** 
 
-0.065 
  
(0.318) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.094) 
[3] Small town 
 
0.098* 
 
0.099** 
 
0.14*** 
 
0.049 
  
(0.013) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.165) 
[4] Rural area/village 
 
0.060 
 
0.085* 
 
0.13*** 
 
0.034 
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.315) 
Employment, current job 
 
0.29*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.047 
 
0.13*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.000) 
Self-employment, current job 
 
0.21*** 
 
0.22*** 
 
0.023 
 
0.074 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.574) 
 
(0.059) 
[1] Primary school 
 
0.23* 
 
0.40*** 
 
0.077 
 
0.18* 
  
(0.011) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.350) 
 
(0.034) 
[2] Lower secondary school 
 
0.24* 
 
0.50*** 
 
0.10 
 
0.26** 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.233) 
 
(0.003) 
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 Life satisfaction  CASP quality of life (0-10) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
[3] Upper secondary school 
 
0.27** 
 
0.62*** 
 
0.11 
 
0.29** 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.177) 
 
(0.001) 
[4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  
0.37*** 
 
0.66*** 
 
0.17 
 
0.28** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.005) 
[5] First stage tertiary education 
 
0.32*** 
 
0.67*** 
 
0.11 
 
0.26** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.210) 
 
(0.003) 
[6] Second stage tertiary 
education  
0.45*** 
 
0.77*** 
 
0.013 
 
0.22 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.922) 
 
(0.079) 
[1] Fair 
 
1.05*** 
 
1.12*** 
 
0.13** 
 
1.20*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
[2] Good 
 
1.49*** 
 
1.76*** 
 
0.15*** 
 
1.84*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
[3] Very good 
 
1.83*** 
 
2.14*** 
 
0.30*** 
 
2.12*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
[4] Excellent 
 
2.11*** 
 
2.45*** 
 
0.43*** 
 
2.22*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Drugs for depression 
 
-0.44*** 
 
-0.57*** 
 
-0.081* 
 
-1.22*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.000) 
[1] Middle income 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.26*** 
 
0.061 
 
0.13*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.000) 
[2] Upper middle income 
 
0.29*** 
 
0.31*** 
 
0.041 
 
0.16*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.253) 
 
(0.000) 
[3] High income 
 
0.26*** 
 
0.31*** 
 
0.076* 
 
0.11*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.001) 
_cons 5.79*** 2.29*** 3.65*** 0.081 9.66*** 9.11*** 4.40*** 2.41*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.876) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 22847 20648 22149 20067 22962 20735 22705 20518 
R² 0.12 0.25 0.18 0.36 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.27 
adjusted R² 0.12 0.25 0.18 0.36 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.27 
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Table 3.19: Regressing well-being and mental health on family status for all
countries, female respondents.
 
Life satisfaction  CASP quality of life (0-10) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
Married/registered partnership 0.55*** 0.39*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.034 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.531) 
[1] Having 1 child -0.052 -0.030 0.0058 0.027 0.24*** 0.20*** -0.11* -0.030 
 
(0.243) (0.521) (0.892) (0.512) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.518) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.12** 0.13** 0.11** 0.091* 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.059 0.11* 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.195) (0.018) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.062 0.082 0.044 0.049 0.29*** 0.25*** -0.013 0.058 
 
(0.201) (0.102) (0.334) (0.276) (0.000) (0.000) (0.807) (0.253) 
Number of resident children -0.056** -0.081*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.021 -0.027 -0.021 -0.028 
 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.150) (0.083) (0.310) (0.151) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0051 0.0077 -0.019*** 0.0012 0.013*** 0.016*** -0.023*** -0.0040 
 
(0.311) (0.117) (0.000) (0.774) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.400) 
Controls 
    
    Age at interview -0.00017 0.013 0.10*** 0.12*** -0.0033 -0.0031 0.11*** 0.099*** 
 
(0.991) (0.407) (0.000) (0.000) (0.760) (0.804) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared 0.000024 0.000065 -0.00095*** -0.00089*** 0.0000030 0.0000075 -0.00091*** -0.00067*** 
 
(0.819) (0.553) (0.000) (0.000) (0.971) (0.934) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.60*** -0.44*** -0.82*** -0.63*** -0.70*** -0.66*** -0.60*** -0.31*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.072 -0.11* 0.29*** 0.092* -0.41*** -0.39*** -0.034 -0.20*** 
 
(0.110) (0.019) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.496) (0.000) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -1.04*** -0.68*** -1.45*** -1.02*** -0.47*** -0.43*** -0.32*** 0.061 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.215) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.55*** -0.46*** -0.24*** -0.11 -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.35*** -0.22*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.32*** 0.093 0.30*** 0.039 0.027 -0.0022 0.14* -0.054 
 
(0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.414) (0.501) (0.959) (0.017) (0.350) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.87*** -0.42*** -1.27*** -0.65*** -0.31*** -0.26*** -1.06*** -0.42*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.52*** -1.15*** -1.14*** -0.71*** -0.43*** -0.34*** -1.00*** -0.45*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -1.06*** -0.86*** -0.60*** -0.30*** -0.60*** -0.55*** -0.81*** -0.46*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.64*** -1.03*** -1.43*** -0.69*** -0.17*** -0.086 -1.13*** -0.43*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.82*** -0.52*** -1.81*** -1.45*** -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.79*** -0.43*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.33*** -0.34*** 0.22*** 0.23*** -0.68*** -0.69*** -0.039 0.031 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.490) (0.569) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.99*** -0.38*** -1.25*** -0.57*** -0.25*** -0.17** -1.17*** -0.54*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.51*** -0.70*** -2.28*** -1.34*** -0.12* 0.076 -1.50*** -0.45*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.161) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.85*** -0.54*** -0.20*** 0.20*** -0.47*** -0.40*** -0.44*** -0.15* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.040 -0.035 -0.13* -0.20*** -0.10* -0.13** 0.036 0.026 
 
(0.495) (0.542) (0.017) (0.000) (0.025) (0.007) (0.556) (0.655) 
Divorced/living separated 
 
-0.18** 
 
-0.10 
 
0.0076 
 
-0.13* 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.890) 
 
(0.033) 
Widowed 
 
0.015 
 
0.099 
 
0.14* 
 
-0.13* 
  
(0.796) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.029) 
[1] Suburbs of big city 
 
0.0035 
 
0.011 
 
0.0056 
 
-0.098* 
  
(0.933) 
 
(0.774) 
 
(0.868) 
 
(0.022) 
[2] Large town 
 
0.032 
 
-0.012 
 
0.039 
 
-0.070 
  
(0.399) 
 
(0.727) 
 
(0.214) 
 
(0.069) 
[3] Small town 
 
0.11** 
 
0.036 
 
0.053 
 
0.00086 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.256) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.981) 
[4] Rural area/village 
 
0.056 
 
0.0087 
 
-0.034 
 
-0.021 
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.777) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.544) 
Employment, current job 
 
0.078* 
 
0.13*** 
 
0.00029 
 
0.055 
  
(0.013) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.991) 
 
(0.083) 
Self-employment, current job 
 
0.084 
 
0.087 
 
-0.086 
 
0.070 
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.215) 
[1] Primary school 
 
0.019 
 
0.34*** 
 
-0.018 
 
0.25*** 
  
(0.802) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.773) 
 
(0.001) 
[2] Lower secondary school 
 
0.060 
 
0.42*** 
 
-0.041 
 
0.33*** 
  
(0.433) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.518) 
 
(0.000) 
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 Life satisfaction  CASP quality of life (0-10) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
[3] Upper secondary school 
 
0.11 
 
0.53*** 
 
-0.020 
 
0.48*** 
  
(0.158) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.752) 
 
(0.000) 
[4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  
0.15 
 
0.69*** 
 
-0.016 
 
0.62*** 
  
(0.083) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.829) 
 
(0.000) 
[5] First stage tertiary education 
 
0.23** 
 
0.60*** 
 
-0.073 
 
0.51*** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.000) 
[6] Second stage tertiary education 
 
0.45** 
 
0.76*** 
 
0.097 
 
0.61*** 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.384) 
 
(0.000) 
[1] Fair 
 
1.01*** 
 
1.12*** 
 
0.17*** 
 
1.26*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
[2] Good 
 
1.54*** 
 
1.82*** 
 
0.19*** 
 
2.03*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
[3] Very good 
 
1.88*** 
 
2.21*** 
 
0.33*** 
 
2.41*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
[4] Excellent 
 
2.23*** 
 
2.53*** 
 
0.47*** 
 
2.55*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Drugs for depression 
 
-0.51*** 
 
-0.62*** 
 
-0.10*** 
 
-1.17*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Middle income 
 
0.10** 
 
0.14*** 
 
-0.0070 
 
0.054 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.816) 
 
(0.145) 
Upper middle income 
 
0.19*** 
 
0.13*** 
 
0.024 
 
0.0055 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.409) 
 
(0.877) 
High income 
 
0.23*** 
 
0.21*** 
 
-0.015 
 
0.037 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.583) 
 
(0.271) 
_cons 7.81*** 5.16*** 4.88*** 1.40** 9.12*** 8.85*** 5.02*** 2.37*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 29401 26321 28363 25472 29551 26426 29236 26172 
R² 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.38 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.29 
adjusted R² 0.12 0.24 0.20 0.38 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.29 
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Table 3.20: Demographic characteristics by network type.
Network types 
No  
Network 
Partner Children 
Other 
relatives 
Family Friends Diverse 
  C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
Housing 
       
Household size 1.90 2.43 1.86 2.10 2.31 2.00 2.07 
Big city 11% 12% 11% 14% 13% 21% 17% 
Suburbs of big city 7% 10% 10% 12% 11% 10% 10% 
Large town 16% 16% 19% 14% 17% 16% 15% 
Small town 24% 23% 23% 26% 25% 23% 23% 
Rural area/village 41% 39% 37% 33% 35% 30% 35% 
Average monthly household income 
       
Low income 52% 38% 47% 29% 39% 34% 40% 
Middle income 12% 12% 11% 14% 13% 12% 13% 
Upper middle income 12% 14% 12% 17% 15% 16% 16% 
High income 24% 36% 29% 40% 33% 37% 32% 
Employed 19% 25% 13% 31% 23% 28% 28% 
Self-employed 5% 6% 3% 5% 5% 7% 5% 
Education 
       
None 5% 2% 5% 2% 3% 2% 2% 
Primary school 25% 18% 30% 16% 20% 14% 17% 
Lower secondary school 21% 20% 22% 19% 19% 16% 20% 
Upper secondary school 31% 37% 28% 34% 34% 35% 34% 
Post-secondary non-tertiary education 3% 4% 4% 5% 4% 6% 5% 
First stage tertiary education 14% 17% 11% 23% 18% 25% 20% 
Second stage tertiary education 1% 1% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1% 
Health status 
 
      Poor 15% 12% 18% 10% 11% 10% 12% 
Fair 28% 28% 34% 30% 30% 28% 31% 
Good 38% 36% 30% 36% 36% 36% 34% 
Very good 13% 16% 13% 16% 16% 19% 16% 
Excellent 6% 7% 5% 8% 7% 8% 7% 
Medication for depression symptomsa 11% 8% 16% 14% 13% 15% 15% 
 Columns (C0)-(C6) report the report the percentages or means of respondents
associated with the respective network type.
a Medication for depression symptoms is equal to one if the respondent takes
drugs for sleeping problems, anxiety or depression.
78
Table 3.21: Regressing well-being and mental health on network types con-
trolling for network size and family status for all countries, all respondents.
 
Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
[1] Partner 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 2.37*** 2.47*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[2] Children 0.21*** 0.28*** -0.082 0.028 2.42*** 2.50*** 0.021 0.19*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.123) (0.572) (0.000) (0.000) (0.723) (0.001) 
[3] Other Relatives 0.21*** 0.26*** 0.066 0.12* 2.14*** 2.24*** 0.0040 0.098 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.219) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.946) (0.086) 
[4] Family 0.30*** 0.37*** 0.037 0.12* 2.30*** 2.40*** 0.12* 0.25*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.477) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) 
[5] Friends 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.10 0.15** 2.03*** 2.13*** 0.0013 0.095 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.982) (0.088) 
[6] Diverse 0.12 0.23*** -0.083 0.045 1.97*** 2.07*** -0.12* 0.045 
 (0.055) (0.000) (0.135) (0.385) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.440) 
Size of social network 0.097*** 0.065*** 0.11*** 0.069*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.017** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Married/registered partnership 0.48*** 0.38*** 0.24*** 0.17*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.20*** -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.576) 
[1] Having 1 child -0.018 -0.054 0.087** 0.035 0.10*** 0.074* -0.056 -0.047 
 (0.589) (0.125) (0.006) (0.260) (0.000) (0.014) (0.105) (0.172) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.13*** 0.062 0.19*** 0.097** 0.095*** 0.069* 0.075* 0.055 
 (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.023) (0.092) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.055 0.0015 0.12*** 0.036 0.077** 0.046 -0.018 -0.026 
 (0.124) (0.967) (0.000) (0.280) (0.008) (0.149) (0.619) (0.473) 
Number of resident children -0.027* -0.050*** -0.094*** -0.12*** -0.015 -0.021 -0.015 -0.024 
 (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.135) (0.057) (0.281) (0.058) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0054 0.0093** -0.021*** -0.00045 0.012*** 0.015*** -0.021*** -0.0032 
 (0.138) (0.009) (0.000) (0.884) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.349) 
Controls         Female -0.044** 0.041** -0.17*** -0.060*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.64*** -0.50*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview 0.020 0.041*** 0.11*** 0.13*** -0.013 -0.011 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.064) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.099) (0.219) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared -0.00011 -0.00013 -0.00099*** -0.00095*** 0.000088 0.000086 -0.00097*** -0.00076*** 
 (0.161) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.192) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.53*** -0.44*** -0.78*** -0.65*** -0.63*** -0.63*** -0.49*** -0.29*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.089** -0.12*** 0.26*** 0.026 -0.37*** -0.41*** -0.022 -0.22*** 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.424) (0.000) (0.000) (0.533) (0.000) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.94*** -0.60*** -1.38*** -0.97*** -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.24*** 0.12** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.56*** -0.47*** -0.26*** -0.15** -0.45*** -0.43*** -0.28*** -0.16*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.27*** 0.033 0.26*** -0.015 0.035 -0.014 0.15*** -0.038 
 (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) (0.660) (0.272) (0.685) (0.000) (0.335) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.75*** -0.38*** -1.07*** -0.54*** -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.70*** -0.23*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.55*** -1.21*** -1.19*** -0.77*** -0.42*** -0.36*** -0.94*** -0.44*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -0.98*** -0.82*** -0.52*** -0.29*** -0.51*** -0.50*** -0.67*** -0.38*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.58*** -1.03*** -1.34*** -0.67*** -0.18*** -0.12** -0.94*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.67*** -0.47*** -1.60*** -1.34*** -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.58*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.28*** -0.35*** 0.25*** 0.20*** -0.64*** -0.67*** 0.075 0.063 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.058) (0.095) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.89*** -0.35*** -1.13*** -0.50*** -0.25*** -0.18*** -1.04*** -0.49*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.30*** -0.66*** -2.13*** -1.32*** -0.13*** 0.036 -1.19*** -0.38*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.364) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.82*** -0.55*** -0.091* 0.27*** -0.31*** -0.26*** -0.39*** -0.13** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.045 -0.094* -0.17*** -0.29*** -0.14*** -0.18*** 0.019 -0.034 
 (0.288) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.667) (0.416) 
Divorced/living separated  -0.11*  -0.047  
-0.021 
 
-0.14** 
  (0.025)  (0.250)  
(0.600) 
 
(0.002) 
Widowed  0.072  0.13**  
0.091* 
 
-0.15*** 
  (0.123)  (0.002)  
(0.024) 
 
(0.001) 
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 Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
[1] Suburbs of big city  0.013  0.032  0.015  -0.087** 
  (0.681)  (0.248)  (0.546)  (0.004) [2] Large town  0.047  0.037  0.077**  -0.074** 
  (0.098)  (0.139)  (0.001)  (0.008) [3] Small town  0.11***  0.080***  0.089***  0.018 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.490) [4] Rural area/village  0.069**  0.066**  0.033  -0.0040 
  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.116)  (0.871) Employment, current job  0.17***  0.17***  0.025  0.097*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.180)  (0.000) Self-employment, current job  0.15***  0.16***  -0.021  0.072* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.475)  (0.026) [1] Primary school  0.087  0.35***  -0.034  0.23*** 
  (0.135)  (0.000)  (0.454)  (0.000) [2] Lower secondary school  0.12*  0.44***  -0.044  0.32*** 
  (0.048)  (0.000)  (0.340)  (0.000) [3] Upper secondary school  0.15*  0.54***  -0.041  0.41*** 
  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.380)  (0.000) [4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  0.21**  0.64***  -0.018  0.49*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.735)  (0.000) [5] First stage tertiary education  0.22***  0.58***  -0.070  0.42*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.139)  (0.000) [6] Second stage tertiary education  0.39***  0.71***  -0.050  0.42*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.545)  (0.000) [1] Fair  1.02***  1.11***  0.14***  1.24*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [2] Good  1.51***  1.78***  0.16***  1.95*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [3] Very good  1.84***  2.16***  0.30***  2.28*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [4] Excellent  2.17***  2.48***  0.44***  2.40*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) Drugs for depression  -0.50***  -0.61***  -0.094***  -1.19*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
[1] Middle income  0.15***  0.19***  -0.0028  0.080** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.898)  (0.002) [2] Upper middle income  0.23***  0.21***  0.016  0.070** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.469)  (0.006) [3] High income  0.24***  0.24***  0.00069  0.061* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.973)  (0.010) _cons 6.61*** 3.62*** 4.20*** 0.72* 7.13*** 6.70*** 5.04*** 2.55*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 52248 46969 50512 45539 52513 47161 51941 46690 
R² 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.31 
adjusted R² 0.13 0.25 0.20 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.31 
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Table 3.22: Regressing well-being and mental health on network types con-
trolling for network size and family status for all countries, male respondents.
 
Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
[1] Partner 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.16* 0.16* 2.28*** 2.39*** 0.19** 0.22** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) 
[2] Children 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.038 0.11 2.27*** 2.38*** 0.059 0.20* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.616) (0.141) (0.000) (0.000) (0.472) (0.011) 
[3] Other Relatives 0.26** 0.27*** 0.098 0.14 1.94*** 2.05*** 0.0095 0.094 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.191) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000) (0.905) (0.226) 
[4] Family 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.054 0.12 2.15*** 2.26*** 0.089 0.20** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.455) (0.086) (0.000) (0.000) (0.245) (0.006) 
[5] Friends 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.15* 0.17* 1.80*** 1.92*** 0.014 0.084 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.037) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.856) (0.271) 
[6] Diverse 0.23** 0.23** -0.0027 0.050 1.70*** 1.81*** -0.043 0.057 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.972) (0.511) (0.000) (0.000) (0.599) (0.474) 
Size of social network 0.076*** 0.052*** 0.089*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.041*** 0.016 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.081) 
Married/registered partnership 0.50*** 0.43*** 0.25*** 0.17** 0.22*** 0.15** 0.24*** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.739) 
[1] Having 1 child 0.040 -0.038 0.14** 0.035 0.056 0.041 0.019 -0.011 
 (0.427) (0.473) (0.003) (0.452) (0.175) (0.365) (0.699) (0.813) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.20*** 0.058 0.28*** 0.12** 0.029 0.014 0.13** 0.060 
 (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.008) (0.452) (0.753) (0.004) (0.179) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.12* -0.016 0.22*** 0.040 -0.0073 -0.035 0.025 -0.047 
 (0.019) (0.757) (0.000) (0.414) (0.866) (0.457) (0.617) (0.344) 
Number of resident children -0.0067 -0.025 -0.094*** -0.11*** -0.020 -0.024 -0.017 -0.030 
 (0.713) (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) (0.199) (0.129) (0.339) (0.072) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0033 0.014** -0.025*** -0.0020 0.013** 0.016*** -0.016** -0.00068 
 (0.528) (0.007) (0.000) (0.672) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.889) 
Controls         Age at interview 0.052** 0.083*** 0.14*** 0.15*** -0.031* -0.025 0.13*** 0.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared -0.00036** -0.00044*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** 0.00022* 0.00021* -0.0011*** -0.00087*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.71*** -0.68*** -0.54*** -0.56*** -0.32*** -0.25*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.13** -0.13* 0.23*** -0.048 -0.28*** -0.39*** 0.042 -0.19*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.000) (0.325) (0.000) (0.000) (0.419) (0.000) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.88*** -0.53*** -1.37*** -0.95*** -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.11* 0.23*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.54*** -0.46*** -0.28*** -0.19** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.13 -0.047 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.478) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.24*** -0.038 0.20*** -0.11* 0.11* 0.017 0.20*** 0.0077 
 (0.000) (0.500) (0.000) (0.030) (0.021) (0.751) (0.001) (0.886) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.61*** -0.33*** -0.87*** -0.42*** -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.23*** 0.045 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.65*** -1.33*** -1.32*** -0.90*** -0.46*** -0.43*** -0.88*** -0.44*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -0.91*** -0.79*** -0.44*** -0.28*** -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.31*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.53*** -1.02*** -1.29*** -0.65*** -0.17** -0.12* -0.70*** -0.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.045) (0.000) (0.001) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.58*** -0.46*** -1.46*** -1.27*** -0.21*** -0.19*** -0.37*** -0.27*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.22*** -0.35*** 0.28*** 0.16** -0.55*** -0.60*** 0.24*** 0.13** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.81*** -0.33*** -1.07*** -0.46*** -0.27*** -0.21** -0.84*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.05*** -0.59*** -2.00*** -1.30*** -0.083 0.080 -0.76*** -0.24** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.133) (0.208) (0.000) (0.001) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.89*** -0.63*** -0.052 0.29*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.068 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.393) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.253) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.059 -0.16* -0.25*** -0.43*** -0.11 -0.18** 0.041 -0.073 
 (0.336) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.004) (0.501) (0.222) 
Divorced/living separated  -0.0038  0.027  -0.094  -0.13* 
  (0.958)  (0.663)  (0.151)  (0.049) Widowed  0.085  0.11  -0.054  -0.25*** 
  (0.284)  (0.110)  (0.466)  (0.001)          
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Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
A B A B A B A B 
[1] Suburbs of big city 0.010 0.033 0.038 -0.066
(0.817) (0.420) (0.344) (0.114)
[2] Large town 0.049 0.072 0.11** -0.071
(0.252) (0.057) (0.003) (0.070)
[3] Small town 0.10** 0.11** 0.13*** 0.044
(0.010) (0.002) (0.000) (0.210)
[4] Rural area/village 0.068 0.10** 0.12*** 0.029
(0.073) (0.002) (0.000) (0.398)
Employment, current job 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.058* 0.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000)
Self-employment, current job 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.032 0.078*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.407) (0.045)
[1] Primary school 0.21* 0.39*** 0.019 0.18*
(0.019) (0.000) (0.798) (0.038)
[2] Lower secondary school 0.22* 0.48*** 0.037 0.26**
(0.019) (0.000) (0.634) (0.003)
[3] Upper secondary school 0.24** 0.59*** 0.037 0.28**
 (0.007) (0.000) (0.628) (0.001)[4] Post-secondary non-tertiary
education 0.34** 0.62*** 0.070 0.27** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.421) (0.005) 
[5] First stage tertiary education 0.29** 0.63*** 0.034 0.26** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.659) (0.003) 
[6] Second stage tertiary education 0.41** 0.72*** -0.064 0.23 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.605) (0.080) 
[1] Fair 1.05*** 1.12*** 0.11** 1.20*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
[2] Good 1.48*** 1.75*** 0.14*** 1.84*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[3] Very good 1.82*** 2.13*** 0.28*** 2.12*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[4] Excellent 2.10*** 2.44*** 0.41*** 2.22*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Drugs for depression -0.44*** -0.58*** -0.078* -1.22***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000)
[1] Middle income 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.037 0.13***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.289) (0.000)
[2] Upper middle income 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.022 0.16***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.522) (0.000)
[3] High income 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.057 0.11***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.001)
_cons 5.42*** 1.99** 3.37*** -0.14 7.81*** 7.14*** 4.35*** 2.33***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.786) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 22847 20648 22149 20067 22962 20735 22705 20518 
R² 0.13 0.25 0.18 0.36 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.27 
adjusted R² 0.13 0.25 0.18 0.36 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.27 
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Table 3.23: Regressing well-being and mental health on network types con-
trolling for network size and family status for all countries, female respondents.
 
Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
[1] Partner 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 2.38*** 2.48*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[2] Children 0.15 0.27** -0.11 0.022 2.57*** 2.65*** 0.041 0.22** 
 (0.087) (0.002) (0.136) (0.747) (0.000) (0.000) (0.641) (0.007) 
[3] Other Relatives 0.16 0.26** 0.061 0.13 2.34*** 2.43*** 0.020 0.12 
 (0.058) (0.003) (0.426) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.819) (0.135) 
[4] Family 0.25** 0.36*** 0.044 0.14* 2.47*** 2.55*** 0.16 0.30*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.559) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.000) 
[5] Friends 0.13 0.21* 0.082 0.17* 2.25*** 2.34*** 0.0080 0.12 
 (0.133) (0.013) (0.279) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.928) (0.128) 
[6] Diverse 0.041 0.23** -0.11 0.066 2.20*** 2.29*** -0.15 0.063 
 (0.647) (0.009) (0.157) (0.363) (0.000) (0.000) (0.095) (0.458) 
Size of social network 0.11*** 0.074*** 0.12*** 0.077*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.059*** 0.016* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) 
Married/registered partnership 0.47*** 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.17*** 0.054** 0.12* 0.16*** -0.034 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.000) (0.536) 
[1] Having 1 child -0.070 -0.060 0.039 0.040 0.11** 0.089* -0.12* -0.062 
 (0.124) (0.203) (0.372) (0.348) (0.004) (0.029) (0.015) (0.195) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.068 0.070 0.11** 0.085* 0.12*** 0.10** 0.027 0.065 
 (0.119) (0.131) (0.008) (0.040) (0.001) (0.010) (0.559) (0.163) 
[3] Having 3 or more children -0.0012 0.017 0.042 0.036 0.13** 0.11* -0.055 0.0093 
 (0.980) (0.742) (0.368) (0.435) (0.001) (0.015) (0.306) (0.859) 
Number of resident children -0.048* -0.075*** -0.095*** -0.13*** -0.020 -0.025 -0.010 -0.021 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.148) (0.084) (0.616) (0.276) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0056 0.0062 -0.018*** 0.00098 0.010** 0.012** -0.024*** -0.0052 
 (0.264) (0.203) (0.000) (0.812) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.276) 
Controls         Age at interview -0.0037 0.0096 0.097*** 0.11*** -0.0057 -0.0085 0.11*** 0.100*** 
 (0.792) (0.526) (0.000) (0.000) (0.586) (0.467) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared 0.000064 0.000092 -0.00088*** -0.00084*** 0.000024 0.000050 -0.00089*** -0.00068*** 
 (0.535) (0.401) (0.000) (0.000) (0.758) (0.554) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.61*** -0.45*** -0.84*** -0.63*** -0.70*** -0.67*** -0.62*** -0.31*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.045 -0.12* 0.27*** 0.088 -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.071 -0.23*** 
 (0.326) (0.011) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.000) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.99*** -0.65*** -1.39*** -0.99*** -0.41*** -0.39*** -0.34*** 0.036 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.467) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.57*** -0.47*** -0.24*** -0.10 -0.47*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.25*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.30*** 0.094 0.29*** 0.057 -0.023 -0.030 0.11 -0.076 
 (0.000) (0.082) (0.000) (0.243) (0.581) (0.492) (0.067) (0.193) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.86*** -0.42*** -1.24*** -0.65*** -0.35*** -0.31*** -1.08*** -0.45*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.49*** -1.13*** -1.11*** -0.68*** -0.41*** -0.30*** -1.00*** -0.46*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -1.03*** -0.84*** -0.59*** -0.30*** -0.55*** -0.52*** -0.80*** -0.45*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.62*** -1.02*** -1.37*** -0.67*** -0.20*** -0.11* -1.11*** -0.43*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.74*** -0.48*** -1.71*** -1.40*** -0.26*** -0.23*** -0.74*** -0.40*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.34*** -0.35*** 0.22*** 0.23*** -0.71*** -0.72*** -0.059 0.015 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.303) (0.777) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.95*** -0.37*** -1.18*** -0.53*** -0.23*** -0.15* -1.21*** -0.58*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.51*** -0.72*** -2.25*** -1.34*** -0.16*** 0.012 -1.54*** -0.50*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.819) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.77*** -0.49*** -0.13* 0.25*** -0.30*** -0.22*** -0.46*** -0.17** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.024 -0.038 -0.12* -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.18*** 0.0013 -0.0066 
 (0.678) (0.511) (0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.983) (0.911) 
Divorced/living separated  -0.18**  -0.10  0.014  -0.13* 
  (0.003)  (0.058)  (0.786)  (0.032) Widowed  0.023  0.12*  0.12*  -0.12* 
  (0.705)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.037)          
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 Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
[1] Suburbs of big city  0.010  0.028  0.00070  -0.11* 
  (0.802)  (0.443)  (0.983)  (0.013) [2] Large town  0.043  0.0086  0.048  -0.078* 
  (0.256)  (0.798)  (0.109)  (0.042) [3] Small town  0.11**  0.052  0.057*  -0.0069 
  (0.002)  (0.097)  (0.040)  (0.848) [4] Rural area/village  0.068  0.033  -0.029  -0.032 
  (0.053)  (0.275)  (0.279)  (0.359) Employment, current job  0.075*  0.13***  -0.0089  0.063* 
  (0.017)  (0.000)  (0.709)  (0.048) Self-employment, current job  0.084  0.082  -0.098*  0.077 
  (0.111)  (0.092)  (0.034)  (0.175) [1] Primary school  0.0061  0.32***  -0.061  0.25*** 
  (0.935)  (0.000)  (0.275)  (0.001) [2] Lower secondary school  0.039  0.39***  -0.097  0.33*** 
  (0.609)  (0.000)  (0.095)  (0.000) [3] Upper secondary school  0.076  0.49***  -0.091  0.48*** 
  (0.321)  (0.000)  (0.118)  (0.000) [4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  0.12  0.64***  -0.078  0.62*** 
  (0.189)  (0.000)  (0.260)  (0.000) [5] First stage tertiary education  0.17*  0.53***  -0.15*  0.51*** 
  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000) [6] Second stage tertiary education  0.42**  0.71***  0.065  0.61*** 
  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.558)  (0.000) [1] Fair  1.00***  1.10***  0.15***  1.27*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [2] Good  1.53***  1.80***  0.19***  2.03*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [3] Very good  1.86***  2.19***  0.31***  2.40*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [4] Excellent  2.22***  2.51***  0.47***  2.54*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) Drugs for depression  -0.51***  -0.63***  -0.11***  -1.16*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
[1] Middle income  0.095**  0.13***  -0.026  0.051 
  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.362)  (0.170) [2] Upper middle income  0.18***  0.13***  0.011  0.010 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.690)  (0.770) [3] High income  0.22***  0.20***  -0.036  0.041 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.174)  (0.225) _cons 7.46*** 4.85*** 4.65*** 1.25** 6.88*** 6.70*** 4.91*** 2.21*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 29401 26321 28363 25472 29551 26426 29236 26172 
R² 0.13 0.25 0.21 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.081 0.3 
adjusted R² 0.13 0.25 0.21 0.38 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.29 
 
Table 3.24: Well-being and mental health measures conditional on network
size over all country.
Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction  
Lack of  depressive
symptoms (EURO-D) 
Size All(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
All 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
All 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
All 
(1) 
Male 
(2) 
Female 
(3) 
0 6.93 6.98 6.88 6.48 6.67 6.29 6.49 6.60 6.38 7.59 7.99 7.18 
1 7.45 7.58 7.32 6.80 6.97 6.61 8.86 8.89 8.83 7.89 8.25 7.49 
2 7.48 7.61 7.38 6.84 7.03 6.69 8.90 8.83 8.95 7.81 8.26 7.46 
3 7.62 7.75 7.54 7.07 7.21 6.97 8.95 8.86 9.02 7.83 8.26 7.56 
4 7.76 7.83 7.72 7.18 7.27 7.12 8.95 8.82 9.03 7.90 8.34 7.63 
5 7.82 7.92 7.76 7.34 7.50 7.26 8.96 8.87 9.00 7.92 8.43 7.66 
6 7.99 8.06 7.96 7.45 7.55 7.39 8.96 8.82 9.03 8.01 8.46 7.80 
7 8.04 8.06 8.03 7.46 7.44 7.47 8.99 8.84 9.07 8.01 8.35 7.83 
For each well-being and mental health measure column (1)-(3) represent the
average conditional on the network size for all respondents and by gender.
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Table 3.25: Regressing well-being and mental health on network types con-
trolling for network size, relational dynamics and family status for all countries,
all respondents with social support network.
 Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
[2] Children -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.29*** -0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12*** -0.28*** -0.084* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
[3] Other Relatives -0.12*** -0.059 -0.053 0.025 0.097*** 0.092*** -0.25*** -0.14*** 
 (0.000) (0.072) (0.093) (0.400) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[4] Family -0.10*** -0.023 -0.14*** -0.039 0.076*** 0.068*** -0.16*** -0.022 
 (0.000) (0.403) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.422) 
[5] Friends -0.052 -0.029 0.057 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** -0.21*** -0.12*** 
 (0.101) (0.352) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[6] Diverse -0.15*** -0.055 -0.13*** -0.011 0.043 0.032 -0.34*** -0.18*** 
 (0.000) (0.109) (0.000) (0.713) (0.085) (0.220) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size of social network 0.099*** 0.074*** 0.11*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.052*** 0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average contact 0-6 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.066*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.032** 0.030** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) 
Average closeness 0-3 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.30*** 0.24*** 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average proximity 0-5 -0.041*** -0.0045 -0.076*** -0.030*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.033** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.657) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.063) 
Married/registered partnership 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.21*** 0.14*** -0.013 0.027 0.18*** -0.042 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.338) (0.385) (0.000) (0.290) 
[1] Having 1 child -0.050 -0.083* 0.056 0.0039 0.023 -0.00071 -0.069* -0.065 
 (0.140) (0.018) (0.082) (0.901) (0.332) (0.978) (0.049) (0.060) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.098** 0.035 0.15*** 0.064* 0.028 0.0041 0.058 0.037 
 (0.002) (0.291) (0.000) (0.036) (0.216) (0.872) (0.083) (0.264) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.028 -0.019 0.086* 0.0080 0.019 -0.0071 -0.034 -0.038 
 (0.438) (0.610) (0.013) (0.811) (0.439) (0.797) (0.368) (0.294) 
Number of resident children -0.030* -0.058*** -0.089*** -0.12*** -0.027** -0.030** -0.010 -0.030* 
 (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.459) (0.024) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0072 0.0064 -0.021*** -0.0016 0.0095*** 0.010*** -0.021*** -0.0046 
 (0.052) (0.077) (0.000) (0.600) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.188) 
Controls         Female -0.074*** 0.016 -0.19*** -0.083*** 0.055*** 0.051*** -0.65*** -0.51*** 
 (0.000) (0.319) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview 0.028* 0.047*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.0039 0.0032 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.583) (0.686) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared -0.00016* -0.00018* -0.0011*** -0.00100*** -0.000013 -0.0000018 -0.0010*** -0.00079*** 
 (0.047) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.806) (0.975) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.37*** -0.31*** -0.62*** -0.52*** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.40*** -0.23*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.35*** 0.10** 0.51*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.100** -0.12** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.001) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.80*** -0.50*** -1.25*** -0.88*** -0.044 -0.046 -0.16*** 0.17*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.121) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.33*** -0.27*** -0.036 0.038 0.067 0.067 -0.15** -0.076 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.464) (0.405) (0.076) (0.093) (0.003) (0.114) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.44*** 0.18*** 0.39*** 0.11** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.22*** 0.017 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.665) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.66*** -0.33*** -0.99*** -0.49*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.66*** -0.21*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.30*** -1.01*** -0.96*** -0.59*** 0.16*** 0.20*** -0.81*** -0.34*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -0.80*** -0.66*** -0.36*** -0.16*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.58*** -0.32*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.49*** -0.97*** -1.25*** -0.61*** 0.0041 0.026 -0.88*** -0.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.890) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.54*** -0.39*** -1.48*** -1.27*** 0.0061 -0.0024 -0.52*** -0.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.819) (0.931) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.21*** -0.28*** 0.32*** 0.26*** -0.45*** -0.49*** 0.12** 0.100** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.72*** -0.23*** -0.95*** -0.37*** 0.15*** 0.18*** -0.96*** -0.44*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.19*** -0.58*** -2.04*** -1.26*** 0.10** 0.23*** -1.14*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.67*** -0.43*** 0.066 0.38*** 0.064* 0.074* -0.30*** -0.069 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.000) (0.047) (0.034) (0.000) (0.120) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.24*** 0.079 0.012 -0.13** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.12** 0.055 
 (0.000) (0.065) (0.770) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.209) 
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 Life satisfaction Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
Divorced/living separated  -0.11*  -0.047  -0.014  -0.12** 
  (0.026)  (0.257)  (0.695)  (0.006) Widowed  0.075  0.13**  0.10**  -0.15*** 
  (0.112)  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.001) [1] Suburbs of big city  -0.0012  0.031  0.021  -0.090** 
  (0.968)  (0.256)  (0.365)  (0.003) [2] Large town  0.023  0.031  0.073***  -0.092*** 
  (0.413)  (0.223)  (0.001)  (0.001) [3] Small town  0.089***  0.068**  0.062**  0.0053 
  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.838) [4] Rural area/village  0.059*  0.072**  0.044*  -0.0075 
  (0.021)  (0.002)  (0.020)  (0.764) Employment, current job  0.17***  0.16***  0.011  0.099*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.514)  (0.000) Self-employment, current job  0.15***  0.16***  -0.033  0.077* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.224)  (0.018) [1] Primary school  0.10  0.37***  -0.051  0.24*** 
  (0.092)  (0.000)  (0.192)  (0.000) [2] Lower secondary school  0.14*  0.47***  -0.049  0.33*** 
  (0.022)  (0.000)  (0.223)  (0.000) [3] Upper secondary school  0.16**  0.56***  -0.067  0.43*** 
  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.094)  (0.000) [4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  0.23**  0.66***  -0.041  0.50*** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.386)  (0.000) [5] First stage tertiary education  0.23***  0.59***  -0.085*  0.43*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.000) [6] Second stage tertiary education  0.37***  0.70***  -0.091  0.41*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.197)  (0.000) [1] Fair  1.01***  1.11***  0.11***  1.24*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [2] Good  1.49***  1.77***  0.12***  1.95*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [3] Very good  1.81***  2.13***  0.20***  2.26*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [4] Excellent  2.12***  2.44***  0.32***  2.38*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) Drugs for depression  -0.49***  -0.61***  -0.090***  -1.19*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
[1] Middle income  0.15***  0.19***  0.0018  0.082** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.927)  (0.002) [2] Upper middle income  0.23***  0.21***  0.010  0.068** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.598)  (0.008) [3] High income  0.23***  0.23***  -0.022  0.059* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.215)  (0.016) _cons 5.71*** 2.78*** 3.19*** -0.26 6.12*** 6.05*** 4.62*** 2.12*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.457) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 50624 45591 48957 44214 50869 45770 50326 45316 
R² 0.14 0.25 0.21 0.38 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.31 
adjusted R² 0.14 0.25 0.21 0.38 0.16 0.17 0.11 0.31 
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Table 3.26: Regressing well-being and mental health on network types con-
trolling for network size, relational dynamics and family status for all countries,
male respondents with social support network.
 Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
[2] Children -0.11* -0.049 -0.12* -0.014 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.10* 0.041 
 (0.029) (0.330) (0.015) (0.762) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.399) 
[3] Other Relatives -0.083 -0.039 0.023 0.084* 0.044 0.048 -0.11* -0.040 
 (0.090) (0.405) (0.621) (0.049) (0.222) (0.207) (0.026) (0.370) 
[4] Family -0.055 0.013 -0.086* 0.0013 0.028 0.026 -0.074 0.030 
 (0.161) (0.734) (0.020) (0.969) (0.297) (0.356) (0.052) (0.400) 
[5] Friends 0.038 0.038 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.050 0.057 -0.063 -0.033 
 (0.411) (0.395) (0.000) (0.000) (0.158) (0.123) (0.164) (0.428) 
[6] Diverse -0.042 -0.033 0.0076 0.048 -0.045 -0.061 -0.12* -0.059 
 (0.406) (0.508) (0.876) (0.289) (0.249) (0.131) (0.023) (0.212) 
Size of social network 0.077*** 0.059*** 0.084*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.041*** 0.022* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) 
Average contact 0-6 0.055** 0.053** 0.052** 0.051*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.031 0.021 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.075) (0.196) 
Average closeness 0-3 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average proximity 0-5 -0.045** -0.0031 -0.076*** -0.028 -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.024 0.025 
 (0.006) (0.848) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.131) (0.102) 
Married/registered partnership 0.44*** 0.37*** 0.22*** 0.14* 0.063** 0.043 0.22*** 0.0011 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.009) (0.385) (0.000) (0.984) 
[1] Having 1 child 0.0044 -0.065 0.098* -0.0076 -0.018 -0.036 -0.0053 -0.042 
 (0.931) (0.210) (0.042) (0.872) (0.608) (0.357) (0.915) (0.388) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.16*** 0.030 0.22*** 0.068 -0.035 -0.049 0.10* 0.030 
 (0.001) (0.530) (0.000) (0.126) (0.296) (0.186) (0.025) (0.503) 
[3] Having 3 or more children 0.092 -0.033 0.17*** 0.0011 -0.046 -0.068 0.0093 -0.064 
 (0.076) (0.538) (0.001) (0.982) (0.218) (0.099) (0.856) (0.198) 
Number of resident children -0.010 -0.030 -0.090*** -0.11*** -0.033* -0.038** -0.014 -0.033 
 (0.577) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.007) (0.432) (0.055) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0056 0.011* -0.024*** -0.0025 0.0086* 0.010* -0.015** -0.0014 
 (0.304) (0.032) (0.000) (0.602) (0.023) (0.011) (0.003) (0.773) 
Controls         Age at interview 0.057*** 0.084*** 0.15*** 0.16*** -0.016 -0.015 0.14*** 0.12*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.165) (0.236) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared -0.00039** -0.00044*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 0.00013 0.00014 -0.0012*** -0.00090*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.119) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.29*** -0.32*** -0.58*** -0.57*** -0.23*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.20*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.35*** 0.055 0.46*** 0.14** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.15** -0.11* 
 (0.000) (0.310) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.041) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.77*** -0.45*** -1.26*** -0.89*** -0.023 -0.0063 -0.053 0.27*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.561) (0.891) (0.316) (0.000) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.34*** -0.29*** -0.076 -0.029 0.052 0.046 -0.0020 0.049 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.294) (0.666) (0.364) (0.442) (0.978) (0.460) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.36*** 0.074 0.31*** -0.013 0.36*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.047 
 (0.000) (0.189) (0.000) (0.793) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.378) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.52*** -0.27*** -0.78*** -0.37*** -0.14** -0.12* -0.18** 0.069 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.016) (0.003) (0.252) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.42*** -1.15*** -1.09*** -0.72*** 0.13** 0.13** -0.75*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -0.75*** -0.65*** -0.28*** -0.16** -0.089* -0.10* -0.41*** -0.26*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.027) (0.017) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.45*** -0.97*** -1.21*** -0.61*** -0.023 -0.0067 -0.66*** -0.18** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.621) (0.901) (0.000) (0.004) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.47*** -0.41*** -1.36*** -1.23*** 0.032 0.025 -0.34*** -0.27*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.419) (0.557) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.17*** -0.30*** 0.32*** 0.19*** -0.41*** -0.45*** 0.27*** 0.16** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.64*** -0.19* -0.90*** -0.34*** 0.15** 0.18** -0.75*** -0.29*** 
 (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -0.93*** -0.50*** -1.92*** -1.24*** 0.14** 0.28*** -0.73*** -0.21** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.75*** -0.51*** 0.081 0.39*** 0.070 0.063 -0.22*** -0.0019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.201) (0.000) (0.154) (0.252) (0.000) (0.975) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.22*** -0.012 -0.094 -0.29*** 0.32*** 0.26*** 0.13* 0.014 
 (0.000) (0.848) (0.132) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.814) 
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 Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
Divorced/living separated  -0.0057  0.033  -0.054  -0.100 
  (0.938)  (0.605)  (0.342)  (0.128) Widowed  0.094  0.12  0.020  -0.25** 
  (0.242)  (0.078)  (0.750)  (0.001) [1] Suburbs of big city  -0.00046  0.034  0.033  -0.069 
  (0.992)  (0.401)  (0.368)  (0.102) [2] Large town  0.025  0.060  0.086*  -0.096* 
  (0.553)  (0.115)  (0.011)  (0.015) [3] Small town  0.074  0.092**  0.085**  0.028 
  (0.060)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.430) [4] Rural area/village  0.049  0.11**  0.096**  0.022 
  (0.194)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.524) Employment, current job  0.29***  0.21***  0.027  0.12*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.297)  (0.000) Self-employment, current job  0.21***  0.22***  0.0031  0.073 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.929)  (0.063) [1] Primary school  0.24*  0.41***  -0.025  0.20* 
  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.721)  (0.026) [2] Lower secondary school  0.25**  0.53***  0.022  0.29** 
  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.751)  (0.001) [3] Upper secondary school  0.26**  0.61***  -0.0095  0.31*** 
  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.891)  (0.001) [4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  0.37***  0.65***  0.057  0.30** 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.472)  (0.003) [5] First stage tertiary education  0.30**  0.65***  -0.0024  0.29** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.973)  (0.002) [6] Second stage tertiary education  0.39**  0.72***  -0.089  0.23 
  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.393)  (0.079) [1] Fair  1.06***  1.13***  0.10**  1.22*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.000) [2] Good  1.49***  1.76***  0.098**  1.86*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000) [3] Very good  1.81***  2.11***  0.19***  2.13*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [4] Excellent  2.08***  2.42***  0.30***  2.22*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) Drugs for depression  -0.43***  -0.58***  -0.081*  -1.21*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.000) 
[1] Middle income  0.23***  0.25***  0.026  0.14*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.394)  (0.000) [2] Upper middle income  0.30***  0.31***  0.021  0.17*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.494)  (0.000) [3] High income  0.26***  0.29***  0.038  0.12*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.166)  (0.001) _cons 4.79*** 1.50* 2.37*** -1.00 6.84*** 6.61*** 3.71*** 1.85** 
  (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
N 22018 19941 21359 19390 22121 20021 21882 19815 
R² 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.37 0.17 0.17 0.066 0.28 
adjusted R² 0.13 0.25 0.19 0.37 0.17 0.17 0.065 0.28 
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Table 3.27: Regressing well-being and mental health on network types con-
trolling for network size, relational dynamics and family status for all countries,
female respondents with social support network.
 Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction 
Lack of depressive symptoms 
(EURO-D) 
  A B A B A B A B 
[2] Children -0.32*** -0.19*** -0.44*** -0.26*** 0.21*** 0.18*** -0.47*** -0.20*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[3] Other Relatives -0.20*** -0.11* -0.17*** -0.063 0.20*** 0.18*** -0.43*** -0.26*** 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.138) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[4] Family -0.17*** -0.082 -0.24*** -0.12** 0.18*** 0.16*** -0.32*** -0.12** 
 (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
[5] Friends -0.16*** -0.11* -0.069 0.028 0.25*** 0.23*** -0.41*** -0.24*** 
 (0.001) (0.020) (0.111) (0.502) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[6] Diverse -0.26*** -0.11* -0.28*** -0.093* 0.16*** 0.14*** -0.57*** -0.31*** 
 (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size of social network 0.11*** 0.085*** 0.12*** 0.084*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.060*** 0.024** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Average contact 0-6 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.036* 0.039* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.012) 
Average closeness 0-3 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Average proximity 0-5 -0.036** -0.0026 -0.074*** -0.031** -0.054*** -0.058*** -0.038** 0.017 
 (0.007) (0.847) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.204) 
Married/registered partnership 0.43*** 0.30*** 0.19*** 0.13** -0.045** 0.016 0.15*** -0.057 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.008) (0.704) (0.000) (0.314) 
[1] Having 1 child -0.091* -0.088 0.024 0.020 0.041 0.022 -0.12* -0.070 
 (0.045) (0.061) (0.582) (0.630) (0.197) (0.528) (0.016) (0.145) 
[2] Having 2 children 0.051 0.045 0.094* 0.067 0.065* 0.042 0.023 0.056 
 (0.239) (0.322) (0.025) (0.110) (0.034) (0.217) (0.629) (0.235) 
[3] Having 3 or more children -0.022 -0.0067 0.019 0.018 0.063 0.040 -0.064 0.00077 
 (0.659) (0.897) (0.694) (0.699) (0.064) (0.291) (0.232) (0.988) 
Number of resident children -0.050* -0.083*** -0.089*** -0.13*** -0.027* -0.027* -0.0047 -0.029 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.039) (0.824) (0.148) 
Number of grandchildren -0.0071 0.0032 -0.017*** -0.00072 0.0096** 0.0096** -0.024*** -0.0072 
 (0.157) (0.513) (0.000) (0.863) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.138) 
Controls         Age at interview 0.0066 0.022 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.015 0.011 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.643) (0.142) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109) (0.268) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age at interview, squared 0.0000036 0.0000092 -0.00093*** -0.00090*** -0.000095 -0.000070 -0.00092*** -0.00071*** 
 (0.972) (0.933) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) (0.345) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[2]BEL -0.43*** -0.29*** -0.66*** -0.48*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.52*** -0.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[3]CHE 0.33*** 0.14** 0.56*** 0.33*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.066 -0.12* 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.222) (0.027) 
sh_country==[4]CZE -0.83*** -0.52*** -1.24*** -0.87*** -0.062 -0.074 -0.25*** 0.093 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066) (0.053) (0.000) (0.065) 
sh_country==[5]DEU -0.31*** -0.25*** 0.0034 0.099 0.079 0.086 -0.26*** -0.16* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.958) (0.107) (0.119) (0.109) (0.000) (0.017) 
sh_country==[6]DNK 0.49*** 0.27*** 0.46*** 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.20** -0.0061 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.919) 
sh_country==[7]ESP -0.78*** -0.38*** -1.16*** -0.60*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -1.03*** -0.44*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[8]EST -1.22*** -0.90*** -0.87*** -0.49*** 0.16*** 0.24*** -0.85*** -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[9]FRA -0.84*** -0.67*** -0.43*** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.70*** -0.37*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[10]HUN -1.52*** -0.96*** -1.27*** -0.61*** 0.024 0.061 -1.05*** -0.41*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.525) (0.148) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[11]ITA -0.60*** -0.39*** -1.57*** -1.30*** -0.013 -0.021 -0.66*** -0.37*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.711) (0.570) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[12]NLD -0.25*** -0.26*** 0.32*** 0.32*** -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.0047 0.064 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.936) (0.244) 
sh_country==[13]POL -0.79*** -0.26*** -1.00*** -0.40*** 0.15** 0.19*** -1.12*** -0.54*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[14]PRT -1.39*** -0.64*** -2.14*** -1.27*** 0.075 0.19*** -1.47*** -0.47*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
sh_country==[15]SVN -0.61*** -0.37*** 0.050 0.38*** 0.061 0.092* -0.36*** -0.11 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.369) (0.000) (0.147) (0.038) (0.000) (0.081) 
sh_country==[16]SWE 0.24*** 0.15** 0.084 -0.0020 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.11 0.086 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.134) (0.970) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.159) 
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 Life satisfaction  Quality of life (CASP-12) Network satisfaction Lack of depressive symptoms (EURO-D) 
 A B A B A B A B 
Divorced/living separated  -0.17**  -0.10  -0.00083  -0.13* 
  (0.005)  (0.061)  (0.986)  (0.043) Widowed  0.035  0.12*  0.11*  -0.12* 
  (0.555)  (0.026)  (0.014)  (0.040) [1] Suburbs of big city  -0.0068  0.026  0.014  -0.11* 
  (0.870)  (0.478)  (0.629)  (0.010) [2] Large town  0.020  0.0073  0.062*  -0.092* 
  (0.592)  (0.829)  (0.022)  (0.018) [3] Small town  0.098**  0.044  0.047  -0.016 
  (0.006)  (0.159)  (0.065)  (0.654) [4] Rural area/village  0.065  0.039  0.0066  -0.033 
  (0.065)  (0.199)  (0.784)  (0.344) Employment, current job  0.085**  0.13***  -0.0057  0.071* 
  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.789)  (0.026) Self-employment, current job  0.10*  0.088  -0.091*  0.093 
  (0.044)  (0.072)  (0.034)  (0.102) [1] Primary school  0.013  0.34***  -0.068  0.25** 
  (0.869)  (0.000)  (0.155)  (0.001) [2] Lower secondary school  0.053  0.41***  -0.10*  0.33*** 
  (0.493)  (0.000)  (0.042)  (0.000) [3] Upper secondary school  0.084  0.50***  -0.11*  0.48*** 
  (0.281)  (0.000)  (0.030)  (0.000) [4] Post-secondary non-tertiary 
education  0.12  0.65***  -0.11  0.62*** 
  (0.176)  (0.000)  (0.059)  (0.000) [5] First stage tertiary education  0.19*  0.55***  -0.15**  0.53*** 
  (0.016)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000) [6] Second stage tertiary education  0.41**  0.68***  -0.039  0.58*** 
  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.696)  (0.000) [1] Fair  0.98***  1.09***  0.11***  1.25*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [2] Good  1.50***  1.78***  0.13***  2.01*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [3] Very good  1.81***  2.15***  0.21***  2.37*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) [4] Excellent  2.14***  2.45***  0.34***  2.50*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) Drugs for depression  -0.51***  -0.61***  -0.099***  -1.15*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
[1] Middle income  0.099**  0.14***  -0.011  0.051 
  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.656)  (0.172) [2] Upper middle income  0.17***  0.13***  0.0029  0.0057 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.905)  (0.874) [3] High income  0.21***  0.20***  -0.064**  0.035 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.302) _cons 6.32*** 3.68*** 3.57*** 0.12 5.75*** 5.85*** 4.65*** 1.81*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.795) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
N 28606 25650 27598 24824 28748 25749 28444 25501 
R² 0.14 0.25 0.22 0.39 0.16 0.17 0.083 0.29 
adjusted R² 0.14 0.25 0.22 0.39 0.16 0.16 0.082 0.29 
 

Chapter 4
Religion, moral attitudes and
economic behavior
Using data for a representative sample of the Dutch population with information
about participants’ religious background, we study the association between religion
and moral behavior and attitudes. We find that religious people are less accept-
ing of unethical economic behavior (e.g., tax evasion, bribery) and report more
volunteering. They are equally likely as non-religious people to betray trust in an
experimental game, where social behavior is unobservable and not directed to a
self-selected group of recipients. Religious people also report lower preference for
redistribution. Considering differences between denominations, Catholics betray
less than non-religious people, while Protestants betray more than Catholics and
are indistinguishable from the non-religious. We also explore the intergenerational
transmission and the potential causality of these associations1.
1The content of Chapter 4 has been published as Isadora Kirchmaier, Jens Prüfer, and Ste-
fan T. Trautmann (2018). “Religion, moral attitudes and economic behavior”. In: Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 148, pp. 282–300. We are grateful for helpful comments
by Johan Graafland, Gillian Hadfield, Laurence Iannaccone, Michael McBride, two anonymous
reviewers and the editor, as well as seminar audiences at the University of Southern California,
Tilburg University and the SIOE 2016 conference (Paris). In this paper use is made of data of the
LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social sciences) panel administered by CentERdata
(Tilburg University, The Netherlands). All errors are our own.
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4.1 Introduction
Thirty-nine percent of the participants in a representative panel of the Dutch pop-
ulation (used in this paper) have some religious affiliation. In contrast, sixty-five
percent of those participants’ parents were church members when our participants
were aged 15. This significant decline, which documents a trend in line with other
studies on the Netherlands,2 is exemplary for the development of church mem-
bership and attendance in Western Europe (Tracey 2012) but occurs despite an
increase in the importance of religiosity in much of the rest of the world (Berger
2001).
Our question is whether such a decline in the membership in religious organi-
sations might be associated with changes in the social cohesion of the economy.
More specifically, what is the relationship of religiosity with what we dub moral
attitudes and behaviors: social behavior; redistribution of income; charity; and
trustworthiness in economic interactions? Using a detailed data set on the gen-
eral Dutch population, we first document the correlation of moral attitudes with
religious affiliation and differences across denominations. We next assess whether
these associations are transmitted from parents to their children when these are
adults themselves. The observed associations may be caused by a pathway from
religiosity to attitudes (via indoctrination), from attitudes to church membership
(via self-selection, as the classical “religious communities as club goods” model of
Iannaccone (1998) suggests), or by unobserved factors driving both attitudes and
church membership. As a third step in the analysis, we therefore investigate the
potential causality of the associations.
Research in economics and finance has paid much attention to the role of religion,
and has uncovered some persistent relationships between religion and economic
2See e.g. Becker and De Hart (2006). Stoffels and P. (2005) report the following development
of church membership in the Netherlands: 1970 : 75%; 1980 : 69%; 1990 : 64%; 2000 : 50%;
2005 : 45%.
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behavior. Important areas of investigation concerned the link between religion
and risk taking and financial investment (Kumar, Page, and Spalt 2011; Noussair,
Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, et al. 2013); managerial decision making (Hilary and
Hui 2009; Filistrucchi and Prüfer 2018); education and human capital (Glaeser
and Sacerdote 2008; Becker and Woessmann 2009); innovation (Bénabou, Ticchi,
and Vindigni 2015); and with economic and financial development (Barro and
McCleary 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales
2006). Studying World Value Survey data, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003)
focused on the role of economic attitudes rather than outcomes.3 While their data
are fascinating as they cover a cross-section of 66 countries and many different
religions and demographic data, we complement the approach of Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2003) by studying religiosity and moral attitudes of a representative
sample of the population of one country, the Netherlands, and one main religion,
Christianity, with a highly detailed data set (see details in section 4.2). On top,
we combine survey data with the results of an experimental game played on the
panel with real monetary payoffs.
The association between religion and moral attitudes and behavior is widely dis-
cussed in academic and popular discourses (e.g., Armstrong (2015); Shariff, Pi-
azza, and Kramer (2014)). On the one hand, there is the potential effect of religion
on behavior through ethical standards imposed on the faithful by their religion’s
moral code. For example, charity is an important aspect in many religions. On the
other hand, there is the perception that much aggression and violence has been
justified in religious terms throughout human history (e.g., Dalai Lama (2015)).
3Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003, p.231) justify the focus on attitudes as follows:
“We reduce the effect of potentially spurious factors by looking at people’s attitudes
rather than at their economic outcome. Asking somebody his view on cheating on
taxes is different from asking him if he has cheated on his taxes. The first question,
however, is more appropriate for our purposes than the second. The decision of
whether to actually cheat is affected greatly by the probability of being caught.
This is a function of a country’s law enforcement, not of an individual’s attitude.
Therefore, looking at attitudes is a better way of identifying the effect of religious
beliefs on people’s preferences.”
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Empirically, there is indeed little agreement on whether adherence to a faith is
correlated with more or with less ethical behavior (e.g. Hermann (2001), Section
2, on crime; Sablosky (2014), on generosity). Empirical assessments are compli-
cated by the fact that morality differs for religious and non-religious people, and
across faiths (Shariff, Piazza, and Kramer 2014). Moreover, religious affiliation
may affect opportunity sets, which affects revealed behavior but not necessarily
attitudes. For example, Schneider, Linsbauer, and Heinemann (2015) report a
positive link between religion and the shadow economy. They argue that it is
not clear whether the effect is due to attitudes toward the state and taxation,
or rather due to close-knit religious communities proving more opportunities for
informal transactions. Clearly, the argument may also run in the other direction,
where religious communities may provide more opportunity for charitable work
and giving.
In the current paper, we aim to study a set of ethical judgements and behav-
ior relevant to economic interactions, using individual-level variation in religiosity
and ethical behavior. Using a demographically representative data set of Dutch
households, we study whether religious people hold stricter views regarding a set
of moral judgements (e.g., tax evasion, bribery), whether they favor income redis-
tribution more or less, and whether they spend more or less time on charity and
care than non-religious people. We also study whether they behave more trust-
worthy in an abstract experimental game with real monetary payoffs, as well as
their self-reported trustworthiness. These dependent measures provide insight into
moral attitudes, and have direct relevance to the effectiveness of economic institu-
tions.4 For instance, to which degree can other members of a society be expected
to behave opportunistically; or which type of citizens may be more prone to help
others when the help is organised by a socially visible organisation or a less visible
4Alesina and Giuliano (2015) provide a recent survey on the literature studying culture,
institutions, and the associated economic effects. A consistently occurring determinant of culture
in that article is religion. Keefer and Knack (2008) refer to these attitudes as norms of civic
cooperation, and stress their importance for economic interactions by reducing enforcement costs.
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informal network, as opposed to the state? We observe various dimensions of re-
ligiousness: church membership, frequency of attendance, frequency of prayer, as
well as two measures of belief in God and theological concepts. In our data, there
are two significant religious subgroups, Catholics and Protestants, and we study
whether there are differences between adherents of these Christian denominations.
Importantly, the variation in a person’s religious background as observed in the
current Dutch data set has shown to be related to attitudes toward financial risk
(Noussair, Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, et al. 2013). That is, in the sample that
we study, religion is an attribute of people’s identity that is linked to economically
relevant behavior. The novel question concerns whether associations with ethical
judgement and behavior can be observed.
Our results can be summarised as follows. We find that religious people report
more moral judgements (less accepting of ethical lapses), and report more hours of
volunteering and informal care. However, in an abstract experimental game with
an anonymous partner, religious people are equally likely to betray the other per-
son’s trust as the non-religious. At the same time, they are also less favorable to-
wards increasing income redistribution than the non-religious. Importantly, these
results are robust across the different dimensions of religiosity (participation vs.
beliefs) that we observe. This is remarkable given that previous research suggests
that social aspects of participation and private religious believes may have differ-
ent associations with economic behavior and attitudes (e.g., McCleary and Barro
(2006) and Noussair, Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, et al. (2013)). We find modest
differences between Christian denominations. Protestants are more likely to spend
time volunteering. In contrast, for the behavior in the experimental game, we
find that Catholics betray less than non-religious people, while Protestants betray
more than Catholics and are indistinguishable from the non-religious. We show
that these results are mostly due to the very ‘orthodox’ Protestants (Graafland
2017), defined by high frequency of church attendance.
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Using data on the participants’ parents’ church membership and frequency of at-
tendance when the participant was aged 15, we study the intergenerational trans-
mission of the observed associations. We find evidence that religious upbringing
is linked to moral attitudes and behavior when our participants are adults. We
discuss possible pathways for this correlation across generations. Probing the en-
dogeneity of religiosity in the association with moral attitudes, we find that the
association persists if we control for non-religious organisational membership and
participants’ politics, both of which may proxy general social attitudes and be-
havior transmitted from parents to children. Using parental religious indicators
as instruments, i.e. explicitly assuming a unique pathway from parental religion
to children’s religion, we find no evidence for a direct selection story in the spirit
of club good models underlying the link between moral attitudes and religion.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In the next section we de-
scribe the data and define our variables of interest. Section 4.3 gives results for
religiosity in general, and Section 4.4 gives results on denomination differences.
Section 4.5 considers the intergenerational transmission, and Section 4.6 probes
the endogeneity of religiosity. Section 4.7 provides a concluding discussion.
4.2 Data and methodology
4.2.1 Participants
We use data from the LISS panel, managed by CentERdata, a research center
affiliated with Tilburg University. The LISS panel consists of approximately 7000
individuals from about 4500 households, who complete a questionnaire over the
internet each month. Respondents are reimbursed for the costs of completing the
questionnaires four times a year. Additionally, incentivized economic experiments
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are conducted routinely on the LISS panel. A payment infrastructure is available
to pay participants according to their decisions in experimental tasks.
In terms of observable background characteristics, the LISS panel is a represen-
tative sample of the Dutch population.5 A large number of background variables
are available, including data from a survey on religious beliefs and participation.
We make use of various modules of the LISS data that were administered between
2008 and 2012. Sample sizes for the different analyses vary according to the num-
ber of panel members who participated in each of the relevant modules. Exact
samples sizes for each part of the analysis, and a list of all LISS modules that we
have used for the current study, are provided in the Online Appendix.6
4.2.2 Measurement of religiosity and religious participation
The survey on religion that LISS participants have completed contains data on the
religious activities and beliefs of the survey participants at the date of the survey.
The Netherlands are diverse in terms of faiths, with similar shares of Protestants
and Catholics, and a large share of non-members (Table 4.1 for details). Within
the group of church members, there is much variation in the level of activity and
belief. Attendance ranges from irregular visits to attending service multiple times
a week; some groups hold beliefs in a literal interpretation of the Bible. In terms of
organisation, in the Netherlands the faithful are members of the local congregation
of their church, for which they pay regular voluntary contributions (through bank
transfers), additionally to offerings collected during services. Through a registry
that is connected to the municipality registration, churches can keep track of their
members when they move to another parish. Our data are based on self-reports
of membership.
5See https://www.lissdata.nl/lissdata/about-panel for details on the panel structure and rep-
resentativeness.
6Available in the online supplementary material of Kirchmaier, Prüfer, and Trautmann (2018)
and at https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/dataverse/awiexeco.
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Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of responses in five dimensions of religious
activity that we employ as explanatory variables in our analyses. We show these
summary statistics for different (sub)groups of the panel. In column (1) we report
the means for each variable over all observations. In columns (2), (3) and (4)
we report the mean for the subsample of church members, Roman Catholics and
Protestants, respectively. For example, the second row of the table indicates that
19% of all panel members are Catholic, while 48% of all church members on the
panel are Catholic.
The first dimension we consider is church membership. We define a dummy vari-
able for being a church member of any religious group, as well as dummy variables
for Roman Catholic, Protestant and Other faiths.7 While these variables are mea-
sured with little noise, they are uninformative on the strength of religious beliefs or
activities. We thus define as the second dimension the frequency of church atten-
dance. Attendance is measured on a six-point scale ranging from “never” through
“only on special religious days” to “every day”. As shown in Table 4.1, some of the
categories apply to only a small share of the population. We aggregate these di-
mensions to obtain a 3-category measure Church Attendance ranging from never,
through less than once a week (i.e., irregularly), to at least once a week (i.e., reg-
ularly). We also create the respective dummy variables for each category. We also
differentiate between non-orthodox and orthodox church members (see Graafland
(2017), for a discussion of strictly protestant groups in the Netherlands), to be
able to detect characteristics that correlate with strong religious affiliation. For
Catholics and Protestants, we define church members as orthodox if they attend
church at least once a week, and as non-orthodox if they attend church less than
once a week or never. The next dimension concerns private religious activity, in
the form of praying. Private Prayer is less socially visible than church attendance
and may thus have different underlying goals and determinants. As with church
7Summary statistics separated by orthodox and non-orthodox subgroups are shown in Table
4.12 in the Appendix.
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Table 1 
Summary statistics: religion. 
# Obs. All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Religious status 
Church membership 5581 39% 
Roman Catholic 5561 19% 48% 
Protestant 5561 15% 40% 
Other faiths 5561 5% 13% 
Orthodox Roman Catholic a 1024 10% 
Orthodox Protestants a 857 44% 
Church attendance 
More than once a week 5599 4% 10% 3% 13% 
Once a week 5599 7% 18% 8% 31% 
At least once a month 5599 6% 15% 16% 16% 
Only at special days 5599 12% 22% 31% 12% 
Rarely 5599 13% 17% 21% 15% 
Never 5599 57% 17% 21% 12% 
Private prayer 
More than once a week 5587 25% 55% 37% 73% 
Once a week 5587 3% 6% 8% 4% 
At least once a month 5587 4% 6% 8% 4% 
Only at special days 5587 3% 5% 7% 2% 
Rarely 5587 16% 17% 24% 11% 
Never 5587 49% 11% 16% 6% 
Belief in God 
Degree of belief in God (0–5) 5656 2.36 3.78 3.30 4.19 
Strong belief in God b 5656 43% 78% 69% 88% 
Belief in theological concepts 
Believe in life after death 3724 50% 75% 63% 85% 
Believe in existence of heaven 4024 37% 72% 49% 88% 
Believe in existence of hell 4796 13% 28% 8% 39% 
Believe in existence devil 4784 16% 34% 10% 51% 
Believe that Adam and Eve existed 3704 38% 65% 40% 82% 
Believe in Bible as the word of God 4454 37% 76% 60% 91% 
Believe that prayer makes sense 4235 49% 91% 85% 96% 
Belief in theological concepts (0–7) 1866 2.50 5.29 3.29 6.09 
Strong belief in theological concepts b 1866 45% 90% 75% 97% 
Notes: Percentages or means of all (1), church members (2), Roman Catholics (3) and Protestants (4) are 
reported. The ﬁrst column shows the number of observations for sample (1) except for Orthodox Roman 
Catholic and Protestant. There the number of observations for sample (3) and (4) are reported, respectively. 
a Deﬁned as those Catholic/Protestant participants who visit church at least once a week. 
b Indicator for degree of belief in God [resp. belief in theological concepts]: 0 ( ≤median), 1 ( > median). Values 
from the same dimension may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
a discussion of strictly protestant groups in the Netherlands), to be able to detect characteristics that correlate with strong 
religious aﬃliation. For Catholics and Protestants, we deﬁne church members as orthodox if they attend church at least once 
a week, and as non-orthodox if they attend church less than once a week or never. 7 The next dimension concerns private 
religious activity, in the form of praying. Private Prayer is less socially visible than church attendance and may thus have dif- 
ferent underlying goals and determinants. As with church attendance, we deﬁne a 3-category measure ranging from never , 
through less than once a week , to at least once a week , and create the respective dummy variables for each category. 
The next two categories concern the internal aspects of religion, that is, religious beliefs. We deﬁne two categories. First, 
Belief in God is reported on a six-point scale ranging from 0: “I do not believe in God” to 5: “I believe without any doubt in 
God.” We also deﬁne the dummy variables of strong belief and weak belief in God , based on the median split of the answers 
to the Belief in God variable. Second, we measure the strength of beliefs in theological concepts by a count of the number of 
aﬃrmative answers on a set of seven questions asking the participants whether they believe in speciﬁc Christian theological 
concepts. These are (i) life after death , (ii) existence of heaven , (iii) the Bible as the word of God , (iv) existence of hell , and (v) 
the devil , (vi) that Adam and Eve existed , and (vii) that it makes sense to pray . 8 We also deﬁne the dummy variables of strong 
belief in theological concepts and weak belief in theological concepts based on the median split of the aggregated answers 
to the strength of religious belief variable. Information on the correlation among the different measures of religiosity is 
provided in the Online Appendix. 
7 Summary statistics separated by orthodox and non-orthodox subgroups are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix . 
8 Cronbach’s alpha for the seven questions about belief in theological concepts equals 0.94, indicating a unique factor driving the answer to these 
questions. Sample sizes are reduced here because respondents who answered questions with “maybe” or “I don’t know” were treated as missing values. 
Percentages or means of all (1), church members (2), Roman Catholics (3) and
Protestants (4) are repor ed. Th first column h ws the number of observations
for sample (1) except for Orthodox Roman Catholic and Protestant. There the
number of observations for sample (3) and (4) are reported, respectively.
a Defin d as those Catholic/Protestant participants who visit church at least
once a week.
b Indicator for degree of belief in God [resp. belief in theological concepts]: 0
( ≤ median), 1 ( > median). Values from the same dimension may not add to
100% due to rounding.
attendance, we define a 3-category measure ranging from never, through less than
once a week, to at least once a week, and create the respective dummy variables
for each category.
The next two categories concern the internal aspects of religion, that is, religious
beliefs. We define two categories. First, Belief in God is reported on a six-point
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scale ranging from 0: “I do not believe in God” to 5: “I believe without any doubt
in God”. We also define the dummy variables of strong belief and weak belief
in God, based on the median split of the answers to the Belief in God variable.
Second, we measure the strength of beliefs in theological concepts by a count of the
number of affirmative answers on a set of seven questions asking the participants
whether they believe in specific Christian theological concepts. These are (i) life
after death, (ii) existence of heaven, (iii) the Bible as the word of God, (iv) existence
of hell, and (v) the devil, (vi) that Adam and Eve existed, and (vii) that it makes
sense to pray.8 We also define the dummy variables of strong belief in theological
concepts and weak belief in theological concepts based on the median split of the
aggregated answers to the strength of religious belief variable. Information on the
correlation among the different measures of religiosity is provided in the Online
Appendix.
Taken together, our data allow us to distinguish between the theological dimension
(“believing”) and the social dimension (“belonging”) of religion and thereby to relate
our findings to the literature (e.g., Barro and McCleary (2003) and Noussair,
Trautmann, Van de Kuilen, et al. (2013)). In this context, Belief in God, belief
in theological concepts, and private praying relate to “believing”, whereas church
membership and church attendance relate to “belonging”.
4.2.3 Ethical judgements and behavior
We consider six dependent measures of ethics, shown in Table 4.2 (dependent vari-
ables shown in italics; information on the correlation among the different measures
are provided in the Online Appendix).
8Cronbach’s alpha for the seven questions about belief in theological concepts equals 0.94,
indicating a unique factor driving the answer to these questions. Sample sizes are reduced here
because respondents who answered questions with “maybe” or “I don’t know” were treated as
missing values.
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Table 2 
Summary statistics: ethical judgment and behavior. 
# Obs. All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Moral judgment a 
Social beneﬁt fraud 565 8.53 8.62 8.56 8.67 
Cheating on tax 565 7.64 7.76 7.65 7.96 
Stealing someone else’s car for a joyride 564 8.66 8.73 8.77 8.74 
Lying out of self-interest 565 6.78 7.10 7.05 7.25 
Adultery 565 7.55 8.02 7.89 8.28 
Accepting a bribe 564 8.23 8.53 8.59 8.56 
Fare evasion in public transport 564 7.38 7.62 7.61 7.60 
Moral judgment b 562 7.82 8.05 8.00 8.15 
Preferences for redistribution 
Prefer lower income differences in society c 5022 2.80 2.79 2.84 2.76 
Public charity 
Hours spent on voluntary work per week d 5638 3.10 3.85 3.93 3.94 
Private charity 
Hours spent on informal care per week 5638 1.95 2.21 2.14 2.33 
Unobservable charity: trust game 
Responder honors the trust 470 51% 56% 62% 48% 
Self-perceived trustwortiness 
People can trust me 3161 5.06 5.16 5.19 5.17 
Notes: Percentages or means of all (1), church members (2), Roman Catholics (3) and Protestants (4) are reported. The ﬁrst column 
shows the number of observations for sample (1). 
a Individual questions were asking whether activity can be justiﬁed, individual statements scored on a scale of 0 (always) to 9 (never). 
b Aggregate measure normalized such that zero indicates low and 9 indicates high moral judgement. 
c On a scale from 0 (prefer an increase in income differences) to 4 (prefer a decrease in income differences). 
d Includes hours spent on informal care. For one individual the time spent on voluntary work was 24 h per day. Since this is not 
plausible, we excluded this observation. 
Taken together, our data allow us to distinguish between the theological dimension (“believing”) and the social dimension 
(“belonging”) of religion and thereby to relate our ﬁndings to the literature (e.g., Barro and McCleary, 2003, Noussair et al., 
2013 ). In this context, Belief in God, belief in theological concepts , and private praying relate to “believing,” whereas church 
membership and church attendance relate to “belonging.”
2.3. Ethical judgments and behavior 
We consider six dependent measures of ethics, shown in Table 2 (dependent variables shown in italics; information on 
the correlation among the different measures are provided in the Online Appendix). The ﬁrst measure is an aggregate index 
of moral judgments. Participants indicated for seven unethical behaviors whether they thought that these were justiﬁed on 
a scale from 0 (always justiﬁed) to 9 (never justiﬁed). The seven questions concern a wide range of ethical behaviors: (i) 
claiming state beneﬁts which you are not entitled to; (ii) cheating on tax; (iii) stealing someone else’s car for a joyride; (iv) 
lying out of self-interest; (v) having an affair despite being married; (vi) accepting a bribe; and (vii) not paying the fare for 
public transport. 9 Taking the average of the seven questions and renormalizing low ethics to zero we obtain our aggregate 
indicator Moral Judgment , ranging from 0 (low ethics) to 9 (high ethics). Information on the correlation among the different 
moral judgments is provided in the Online Appendix. 
Our second measure concerns the stated preference for redistribution . Participants indicated their views on income differ- 
ences on a scale from 0 (differences should be larger) to 4 (differences should be smaller). Norms of sharing and generosity 
exist in all religions, and may thus potentially affect attitudes towards inequality and redistribution. 
The next three measures focus on actual behavior rather than on stated judgments and preferences. The third measure 
indicates the participant’s reported number of hours of voluntary work that he or she performs on average per week. The 
reported hours of voluntary work could be due to work in one or possibly more than one of the following categories: 
volunteering in organizations, informal care , or other types of volunteering . Table A3 in the Appendix gives an overview of the 
distribution of volunteers over different categories. 
The fourth measure indicates the participant’s reported number of hours of informal care that he or she performs on 
average per week. Informal care was mostly provided through personal support and housekeeping. While volunteering in 
organizations might have a strong social visibility component, especially if performed within a close-knit community, in- 
formal care is less visible and potentially less socially rewarding. We may thus consider it a stronger test of charity and 
brotherly love. For 28% of those who do some volunteering, their activity consists of only informal care. In analyses of vol- 
unteering we include a dummy variable for these participants because informal care might be different in its nature from 
other types of volunteering. 
9 Cronbach’s alpha for the seven questions about moral judgment is 0.68. From a factor analysis we observe only one factor with eigenvalue greater than 
1, suggesting that answers to the questions are driven by a unique source. 
P centages or means of all (1), church members (2), Roman Catholics (3) and
Protestants (4) are reported. The first column shows the number of observations
for sample (1).
a Individual questions were asking w ether activity can be justified, individual
statements scored on a scale of 0 (always) to 9 (never).
b Aggreg e measure normalized such that zero indicates low and 9 indicates
high moral judgement.
c On a scale from 0 (prefer an increase in income differences) to 4 (prefer a
decrease in income differences).
d Includes hours spent on informal care. For one individual the time spent on
voluntary work was 24 h per day. Since this is not plausible, we excluded this
observation.
The first measure is a ggregat index of moral judgements. Part cipants indi-
cated for seven unethical behaviors whether they thought that these were justified
on a scale from 0 (always justified) to 9 (never justified). The seven questions
concern a wid range of ethical behaviors: (i) claiming state ben fits which you
are not entitled t ; (ii) cheating on tax; (iii) stealing someo e else’s car for a
joyride; (iv) lying out of self-interest; (v) having an affair despite being married;
(vi) accepting a bribe; and (vii) not paying the fare for public transport.9 Taking
the average he seven questi ns and renormalizing low ethics to zero we obtain
our aggregate indicator Moral judgement, ranging from 0 (low ethics) to 9 (high
9Cronbach’s alpha for the seven questions about mor l judgm nt is 0.68. From a factor
analysis e observe only one factor with eigenvalue greater than 1, suggesting that answers to
the questions are driven by a unique source.
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ethics). Information on the correlation among the different moral judgements is
provided in the Online Appendix.
Our second measure concerns the stated preference for redistribution. Participants
indicated their views on income differences on a scale from 0 (differences should
be larger) to 4 (differences should be smaller). Norms of sharing and generosity
exist in all religions, and may thus potentially affect attitudes towards inequality
and redistribution.
The next three measures focus on actual behavior rather than on stated judgements
and preferences. The third measure indicates the participant’s reported number
of hours of voluntary work that he or she performs on average per week. The
reported hours of voluntary work could be due to work in one or possibly more
than one of the following categories: volunteering in organisations, informal care,
or other types of volunteering. Table 4.13 in the Appendix gives an overview of
the distribution of volunteers over different categories.
The fourth measure indicates the participant’s reported number of hours of infor-
mal care that he or she performs on average per week. Informal care was mostly
provided through personal support and housekeeping. While volunteering in or-
ganisations might have a strong social visibility component, especially if performed
within a close-knit community, informal care is less visible and potentially less so-
cially rewarding. We may thus consider it a stronger test of charity and brotherly
love. For 28% of those who do some volunteering, their activity consists of only
informal care. In analyses of volunteering we include a dummy variable for these
participants because informal care might be different in its nature from other types
of volunteering.
The fifth measure derives from an experimental game performed on the LISS panel
with real monetary payments (see Trautmann, Kuilen, and Zeckhauser (2013)),
which is depicted in Fig. 4.1.
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First mover (F)
Second mover (S)
(F=100, S=100)
(F=150, S=150) (F=80, S=220)
do not 
trust
trust
honor
trust betray
Fig. 1. Unobservable charity: the trust game. 
The ﬁfth measure derives from an experimental game performed on the LISS panel with real monetary payments (see 
Trautmann et al., 2013 ), which is depicted in Fig. 1 . In particular, for N = 470 panel participants, we observe their decision 
to honor trust as a second mover in a trust game played with another (real) panel participant for monetary payments. 10 The 
trust game is deﬁned as follows. The ﬁrst mover chooses between two actions: not trust, which directly yields 100 points 
for each player, and trust, which increases the total payoff for the two players to 300, but turns responsibility for dividing it 
over to the second mover, the trustee. After the ﬁrst mover’s choice of trust, the second mover then has to decide between 
honoring trust , which yields 150 points for each player, and the betraying trust , which yields 80 points for the ﬁrst mover 
and 220 points for the second mover (i.e., herself or himself). Each point is worth 5 eurocents, roughly 7 American cents at 
the time of the experiment (in October 2011). In the experiment, second movers have to indicate what they will do if given 
responsibility, without knowing yet whether or not the ﬁrst mover acts trustfully. Actions are neutrally labeled as actions 
A and B for the ﬁrst mover and as 1 and 2 for the second mover. Terms such as trust or honoring trust are never used. 
The game is one-shot, non-repeated, and anonymous; therefore, the second mover has no strategic incentive to honor the 
ﬁrst mover’s trust. However, participants may think it is unethical to betray (i.e., to cut the payoff to) a ﬁrst mover who has 
expanded the pie in the hope that the second mover will reward trust, thus leading to greater payoffs for both. Participants 
are matched at random and paid, according to the two participants’ choices. 
The results of this game are particularly interesting from the perspective of economic governance institutions because 
they capture an extreme situation: The players have a strong incentive to betray trust (and thereby earn EUR 11 instead 
of EUR 7.50, with a mouse click) without fearing any legal or social repercussion. If they resist the temptation to betray 
the anonymous trustor in this extreme situation, where only their own ethical standards may prevent them from simple 
proﬁt-maximization, they can be expected to cooperate even more in other social dilemma situations, where reputational 
losses, shame, or social exclusion await them. 
Finally we consider a measure of stated self-perceived Trustworthiness. Participants indicate to what extent they agree 
with the statement that people can trust them, on a scale from 0 (disagree entirely) to 6 (agree entirely). The measure allows 
us to observe possibly biased self-perceptions of trustworthiness when compared to the experimental betrayal measurement. 
2.4. Control variables 
We control for various demographic attributes in our analyses. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the control vari- 
ables. The set Controls A consist of the unambiguously exogenous variables of gender and age . The set Controls B additionally 
includes a set of socioeconomic background variables. These consist of marital status, number of children living in the house- 
hold, personal net monthly income (median split), urban vs . rural character of residence, health status , as well as educational 
and occupational status ( self-employed or not). 
3. Results: church membership, religious activities and beliefs 
We present results in an aggregated way that illustrates the relevant patterns and the robustness of the results. All 
detailed results are given in the accompanying Online Appendix. In Table 4 we show the correlation of the ﬁve dimensions 
of religiosity with our six measures of ethics. For each religious explanatory variable, the table shows the marginal effects 
and signiﬁcance levels for both sets of controls A and B, demonstrating the observed patterns in an accessible way. 11 The 
10 We focus on the second mover’s choice as it directly relates to ethical behavior, which is not the case for trust. Guiso et al. (2003) and Renneboog and 
Spaenjers (2011) report that religious people are more trusting than non-religious people, while Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) ﬁnd no effect of religion on 
trust. 
11 Additional analyses in Tables B5 and B6 in the online appendix demonstrate the robustness of the results with respect to wealth differences. 
Figure 4.1: Unobservable charity: the trust game.
In particular, for N = 470 panel participants, we observe their decision to honor
trust as a second mover in a trust game played with another (real) panel participant
for monetary payments.10 The trust game is defined as follows. The first mover
choos s b tw en two actions: not trust, which irectly yi lds 100 points for each
player, and trust, which increases the total payoff for the two players to 300, but
turns responsibility for dividing it over to the second mover, the trustee. After the
fir t m ver’s choic of r st, th second over th n has to decide b tween honoring
trust, which yields 150 points for each player, and the betraying trust, which yields
80 points for the first mover and 220 points for the second mover (i.e., herself or
himself). Each oint is worth 5 eurocents, roughly 7 American cents at the time
of the experiment (in October 2011). In the experiment, second movers have to
indicate what they will do if given responsibility, without knowing yet whether
or not the first mover acts trustfully. Actions are neutrally labeled as actions
A and B for the first mover and as 1 and 2 for the second mover. Terms such
as trust or honor ng trust re n ver used. The game is one-shot, non-repeated,
and anonymous; therefore, the second mover has no strategic incentive to honor
the first mover’s trust. However, participants may think it is unethical to betray
(i.e., to cut the payoff to) a first mover who has expanded the pie in the hope
that the second mover will reward trust, thus leading to greater payoffs for both.
10We focus on the second mover’s choice as it directly relates to ethical behavior, which is not
the case for trust. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) and Renneboog and Spaenjers (2012)
report that religious people are more trusting than non-religious people, while Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002) find no effect of religion on trust.
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Participants are matched at random and paid, according to the two participants’
choices.
The results of this game are particularly interesting from the perspective of eco-
nomic governance institutions because they capture an extreme situation: The
players have a strong incentive to betray trust (and thereby earn EUR 11 instead
of EUR 7.50, with a mouse click) without fearing any legal or social repercussion.
If they resist the temptation to betray the anonymous trustor in this extreme
situation, where only their own ethical standards may prevent them from simple
profit-maximization, they can be expected to cooperate even more in other social
dilemma situations, where reputational losses, shame, or social exclusion await
them.
Finally we consider a measure of stated self-perceived Trustworthiness. Partic-
ipants indicate to what extent they agree with the statement that people can
trust them, on a scale from 0 (disagree entirely) to 6 (agree entirely). The mea-
sure allows us to observe possibly biased self-perceptions of trustworthiness when
compared to the experimental betrayal measurement.
4.2.4 Control variables
We control for various demographic attributes in our analyses. Table 4.3 provides
summary statistics of the control variables. The set Controls A consist of the
unambiguously exogenous variables of gender and age . The set Controls B ad-
ditionally includes a set of socioeconomic background variables. These consist of
marital status, number of children living in the household, personal net monthly
income (median split), urban vs. rural character of residence, health status, as well
as educational and occupational status (self-employed or not).
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Table 3 
Summary statistics: control variables. 
# Obs. All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Demographics 
Age 11422 39.82 53.82 56.32 53.98 
Male 11422 49% 43% 44% 43% 
Number of at home living children 11422 1.25 0.85 0.71 0.85 
Having a partner 11422 81% 78% 79% 80% 
Divorced 11422 6% 7% 8% 6% 
Married 11422 46% 68% 68% 70% 
Housing 
Urban character of residence (0–4) a 11360 1.96 1.83 1.84 1.65 
Education 
Higher education 11422 24% 31% 31% 31% 
Employment 
Self-employed 6362 5% 4% 4% 6% 
Personal net monthly income ( €) 10801 1186 1529 1502 1546 
Health 
Health status (0–4) b 5718 2.10 2.07 2.03 2.12 
Membership in organization 
Being a member c 5647 51% 54% 55% 58% 
Cultural 5647 13% 17% 17% 18% 
Environmental, peace, animal rights 5647 10% 8% 8% 10% 
Humanitarian aid, human rights 5647 6% 6% 5% 6% 
Political party 5647 4% 7% 4% 10% 
Sports, outdoor 5647 35% 33% 37% 32% 
Social society 5647 7% 10% 10% 12% 
Political orientation 
Political orientation (0–10) d 4624 5.39 5.75 5.74 5.97 
Right leaning indicator e 4624 37% 41% 39% 46% 
Notes: Percentages or means of all (1), church members (2), Roman Catholics (3) and Protestants (4) are reported. 
Controls A: age, male; Controls B: Control A and number of at home living children, having a partner, divorced, married, 
urban character of residence, personal net monthly income, education, health status, self-employment. 
a From 0 (least urban) to 4 (most urban). 
b From 0 (poor health) to 4 (excellent health). 
c Dummy variable indicating the membership in at least one of the following types of organizations: cultural, environ- 
mental, peace, or animal rights, humanitarian aid or human rights, political party, sports or outdoor, and social society. 
d From 0 (most left wing) to 10 (most right wing). 
e Indicator for Political orientation variable being strictly above median (i.e., right wing). 
excluded category in the regression analyses is indicated in italics in the table. For each set of analyses we also indicate the 
sample size of the group comparisons, which vary across analyses because of the variation in the number of participants in 
the different modules of the LISS surveys. 
The following patterns emerge from the analyses. First, we observe positive associations of the religious indicators with 
moral judgments, on volunteering, and on informal care. These associations are consistent across the ﬁve dimensions of 
religiosity. That is, although the correlations vary in size and signiﬁcance across different measures, there is little indication 
of a systematic qualitative difference between participation and belief measures for these outcome measures. Comparison of 
the general volunteering measure with the informal care measure shows the correlations for the latter are less pronounced, 
and most strongly show up for private prayer. Both praying and informal care are activities conducted in private, where the 
social dimension of the activity is weaker than for other activities such as church membership and attendance. Although 
private prayer and church attendance are positively correlated, there seems to be a group of religious people spending 
more time than others both on privately exercising their religion and on informal care. In contrast, church membership and 
attendance per se seem to be less strongly related to the more private domains of charity. We also observe that the size of 
the associations is economically relevant. For example, for volunteering we ﬁnd that church members volunteer about 1.3 h 
more per week than non-members, a difference of about 40%. Differences are even more pronounced for attendance and 
prayer. Differences in informal care are somewhat less substantial in economic terms, falling in the range of 10% to 15%. 
Consistent with the view that observability is important, we ﬁnd no association of religion with trustworthiness in the 
anonymous experimental game. Indeed, simple mean comparisons across categories show that there are no systematic dif- 
ferences across the percentages of trustworthy choices across groups in the trust game. Thus, the lack of a signiﬁcant corre- 
lation is not merely due to a lack of statistical power. Similar results were obtained by Benjamin et al. (2016) , who ﬁnd that 
making people’s religious identity more salient has no signiﬁcant effect on generosity in dictator games (while they do ﬁnd 
various other effects). The absence of link between prayer or beliefs and behavior in the anonymous game puts the above 
discussed charitable behavior of those who pray in private into perspective. Presumably, informal care, while less observable 
than other types of charity, is special in the sense that it is directed to those close to the person who volunteers for the 
activity. Interestingly, self-reported trustworthiness is largely consistent with the absence of differences in the experimental 
Per tages or means of all (1), church members (2), Roman Catholics (3) and
Protestants (4) are reported. Controls A: age, male; Controls B: Control A and
number of at home living children, having a partner, divorced, married, urban
character of resid nce, personal net monthly income, education, health status,
self-employment.
a From 0 (least urban) to 4 (most urban).
b From 0 (poor health) to 4 (excellent health).
c Dummy variable indicating the membership in at least one of the following
types of organizations: cultural, environmental, peace, or animal rights, human-
itarian aid or human rights, political p rty, sports or outdoor, and social society.
d From 0 (mo t left wing) to 10 (most right wing).
e Indicator for Political orientation varia le being strictly above median (i.e.,
right wing).
4.3 Results: church membe ship, religious activi-
ties and beliefs
W present results in an aggregated way hat illustrates the relevant patterns and
the robustness of the results. All detailed result are iv n in the accompanying
Online Appendix. In Table 4.4 we show the corr latio of the five dimensions of
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religiosity with our six measures of ethics. For each religious explanatory variable,
the table shows the marginal effects and significance levels for both sets of controls
A and B, demonstrating the observed patterns in an accessible way.11 The excluded
category in the regression analyses is indicated in italics in the table. For each
set of analyses we also indicate the sample size of the group comparisons, which
vary across analyses because of the variation in the number of participants in the
different modules of the LISS surveys.
The following patterns emerge from the analyses. First, we observe positive as-
sociations of the religious indicators with moral judgements, on volunteering, and
on informal care. These associations are consistent across the five dimensions of
religiosity. That is, although the correlations vary in size and significance across
different measures, there is little indication of a systematic qualitative difference
between participation and belief measures for these outcome measures. Compar-
ison of the general volunteering measure with the informal care measure shows
the correlations for the latter are less pronounced, and most strongly show up for
private prayer. Both praying and informal care are activities conducted in pri-
vate, where the social dimension of the activity is weaker than for other activities
such as church membership and attendance. Although private prayer and church
attendance are positively correlated, there seems to be a group of religious people
spending more time than others both on privately exercising their religion and
on informal care. In contrast, church membership and attendance per se seem to
be less strongly related to the more private domains of charity. We also observe
that the size of the associations is economically relevant. For example, for volun-
teering we find that church members volunteer about 1.3 h more per week than
non-members, a difference of about 40%. Differences are even more pronounced for
attendance and prayer. Differences in informal care are somewhat less substantial
in economic terms, falling in the range of 10% to 15%.
11Additional analyses in Tables B5 and B6 in the online appendix demonstrate the robustness
of the results with respect to wealth differences.
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Consistent with the view that observability is important, we find no association of
religion with trustworthiness in the anonymous experimental game. Indeed, simple
mean comparisons across categories show that there are no systematic differences
across the percentages of trustworthy choices across groups in the trust game.
Thus, the lack of a significant correlation is not merely due to a lack of statistical
power. Similar results were obtained by Benjamin, Choi, and Fisher (2016), who
find that making people’s religious identity more salient has no significant effect
on generosity in dictator games (while they do find various other effects). The
absence of link between prayer or beliefs and behavior in the anonymous game
puts the above discussed charitable behavior of those who pray in private into
perspective. Presumably, informal care, while less observable than other types of
charity, is special in the sense that it is directed to those close to the person who
volunteers for the activity. Interestingly, self-reported trustworthiness is largely
consistent with the absence of differences in the experimental game. Although
church members perceive themselves as more trustworthy than non-members do,
no significant differences are found for the other indicators of religiosity.
Finally, we observe a negative association of religiosity with preference for redis-
tribution. The result replicates findings for the US reported in Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2006), as well as experimental results by Neustadt (2011), who finds
that religious people have a negative willingness to pay for redistribution. The
result is also consistent with evidence from cross-country studies (Elgin, Goksel,
Gurdal, et al. 2013), and suggests that the reported cross-country results are in-
deed related to religiosity rather than other, unobserved institutional differences.
Theoretically, these differences are sometimes explained in terms of membership
in religious groups as an insurance against adverse life events: religious individuals
prefer less income redistribution by the state because the church provides some
degree of insurance (Scheve, Stasavage, et al. 2006). This explanation is roughly
consistent with our data because the correlation with redistribution seems weaker
109
for the measures of belief and private prayer. More generally, the distinction
between indicators of religious belief and indicators of participation has been em-
phasized in previous work (Keely 2003; Noussair, Trautmann, Van de Kuilen,
et al. 2013). In our current study, such a distinction is thus only suggested for
redistribution preferences.
The overall picture that emerges from the analyses shows that religious people
seem to hold stronger moral values and show more pro-social activity in the form
of volunteering. Presumably, volunteering will be observable by others, and di-
rected towards certain goals and groups that match well with a person’s religious
identity. In contrast, there seems to be no generally stronger tendency towards
social behavior or generosity among religious people. In an anonymous setting
where the participant could either share an amount of money with another person
who trusted her, or keep the money for herself, religious people are just as likely
as non-religious (or less religious) people to not reciprocate trust.12
To get more insights into the mechanisms underlying our results on religious affil-
iation in general, we will next provide analyses that look at the roles of different
Christian denominations. Moreover, the category-predictions for multi-category
variables shown in Table 4.4 suggest that the affiliations may not just relate to
the religious vs. non-religious comparison, but also to the strength of the religious
affiliation. We will thus also consider how strongly people are involved in religious
activities. As a benchmark for the economic significance of the associations with
religion in our data, we also consider the role of people’s political attitudes (as a
dependent variable) on moral judgements and behavior.
12Participants with “other faiths” may be culturally different from the Christian or non-member
majority, and may hold different norms in their communities. Excluding participants with other
faiths from the analyses in Table 4.4 to control for such effects does not affect the reported results
(results available in the Online Appendix).
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4.4 Results: catholics and protestants
Table 4.5 present results on the role of denominations, in particular regarding
the differences between the significant subgroups in our sample, Catholics and
Protestants.
The setup of the table is identical to the setup described for Table 4.4.13 We
consider three types of comparisons. First, we compare Catholics, Protestants, and
others to the non-religious. Then we directly compare Catholics to Protestants.
Third, we additionally distinguish between orthodox and non-orthodox members
of these denominations, where orthodox refers to believers with very regular church
attendance (at least once per week) and non-orthodox attend church less than once
per week.
Panel Denomination I in Table 4.5 basically replicates results shown in Table
4.4. Although not all coefficients are significant, the patterns of Table 4.4 emerge
here for all denominations, with one exception. For Catholics, we observe a posi-
tive association with trustworthiness in the experimental game, compared to the
non-religious. Interestingly, the finding holds also true for the self-reported trust-
worthiness measure. Panel Denomination II refines these results. It shows that
Protestants spend more time on volunteering than Catholics do, but that they are
less likely to share equally with the first-mover in the trust game. Table Denomina-
tion III demonstrates the role of orthodox adherents of each denomination for these
results. Compared to the group of non-orthodox Catholics, orthodox Protestants
hold the strictest moral judgements of the four groups. Both orthodox Catholics
and Protestants spend more time on volunteering than the non-orthodox. The neg-
ative attitude towards redistribution among the religious is strongest for orthodox
Protestants, who are also least likely to honor trust in the trust game.
13Additional analyses in Tables B5 and B7 in the online appendix demonstrate the robustness
of the results with respect to wealth differences.
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Thus, we do observe clear variation between denominations, consistent with previ-
ous empirical work on differences between Catholics and Protestants, for instance
in terms of management style, which is closely related to the current social atti-
tudes (Filistrucchi and Prüfer 2018). However, for our results on trustworthiness,
there is little evidence yet in the literature. For example, Fehr, Fischbacher, Von
Rosenbladt, et al. (2002) implement a sequential prisoners’ dilemma in a survey of
a representative sample of the German population. They show that denomination
has no influence on the trustworthiness of the second-mover, i.e. on how much
money they transfer to the first mover.
Given the reported associations in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 , we can ask how these dif-
ferences across denominations, as well as those between religious and non-religious
participants in general, compare to other benchmarks associated with differences
in moral attitudes. To this end we report the variation of our moral behaviors
across the political spectrum: political attitudes directly relate to many ethical
and social issues, and we would expect them to have substantial associations with
our ethics measures. We use a median split indicator based on a question that asks
participants to place themselves on a 10-point scale of the political spectrum, from
0 meaning “left” to 10 meaning “right.” Using self-reported political party prefer-
ences, Trautmann, Kuilen, and Zeckhauser (2013) show that the indicator maps
exactly on the spectrum of Dutch political parties, as it is typically perceived.
Except for preferences for redistribution, we do not find any significant associations
with political orientation (panel Political orientation in Table 4.5). That shows
that a person’s moral attitudes and behavior is closely linked to her religion, and
more so than to her politics. This is consistent with views that people sometimes
vote for parties that do not represent their interest in economic policy terms (Frank
2004).
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We obtain a set of more nuanced results by studying the correlation between po-
litical orientations across religious subgroups. This is motivated by recent findings
in the United States, that religion and political attitudes appear to be closely
intertwined. Based on Pew Research Center (2014), Catholics are more likely
to vote Democrats than Protestants and Protestants are more likely to vote Re-
publicans than Catholics. In our Dutch sample, a different picture arises. Table
4.6 shows that there is no significant difference in political orientation between
(non-)orthodox Catholics and Protestants in the Netherlands.
Table 4.6: Denomination and politics.
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Table 6 
Denomination and politics. 
Denomination N Mean political orientation a 
Non-orthodox Catholic 758 5.68 b 
Orthodox Catholic 90 6.20 c 
Non-orthodox Protestant 383 5.77 b 
Orthodox Protestant 307 6.21 c 
a Mean of political orientation conditional on belonging into the respective 
group; 0 (most left wing) to 10 (most right wing). 
b, c Entries that do not share the same letter differ signiﬁcantly from each other 
at at least 10% signiﬁcance level, Wilcoxon tests. 
Table 7 
Participants’ vs. participants’ parents’ church membership. 
Parents 
Participant Church member No church member 
Church member 2021 (37%) 137 (2%) 
No church member 1535 (28%) 1812 (33%) 
Notes: There are in total 5505 observations with information on both: church 
membership of the participant and the church membership of the parents of 
the participant at age 15. Spearman’s rho is 0.49 with p -value < 0.001. 
preferences, Trautmann et al. (2013) show that the indicator maps exactly on the spectrum of Dutch political parties, as it 
is typically perceived. 
Except for preferences for redistribution, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant associations with political orientation (panel 
Political orientation in Table 5 ). That shows that a person’s moral attitudes and behavior is closely linked to her religion, 
and more so than to her politics. This is consistent with views that people sometimes vote for parties that do not represent 
their interest in economic policy terms ( Frank, 2004 ). 
We obtain a set of more nuanced results by studying the correlation between political orientations across religious sub- 
groups. This is motivated by recent ﬁndings in the United States, that religion and political attitudes appear to be closely 
intertwined. Based on Pew Research Center (2014) , Catholics are more likely to vote Democrats than Protestants and Protes- 
tants are more likely to vote Republicans than Catholics. In our Dutch sample, a different picture arises. Table 6 shows that 
there is no signiﬁcant difference in political orientation between (non-)orthodox Catholics and Protestants in the Nether- 
lands. However, we ﬁnd that frequent churchgoers have signiﬁcantly more right-wing attitudes than those who attend 
church less than once per week. We will come back to the potential role of political attitudes in Section 6 when inves- 
tigating potential channels underlying the observed correlations. 
5. Intergenerational transmission of moral attitudes 
Expecting that both religious aﬃliation and moral norms are typically transmitted across generations, we next examine 
whether the observed associations between religiosity and ethics hold when we extend the analysis to indicators of the par- 
ticipants’ parent’s religiosity. We use the church membership of the participant’s parents and their frequency of attending 
church when the participant was aged 15 (summary statistics in Table A4 in the Appendix), to test if religious upbring- 
ing correlates with ethical judgment/behavior of the participant today. Table 7 shows the pattern of the parents’ and the 
participants’ church membership. Parental membership status is strongly correlated with participants’ membership status 
( ρ = 0.49, p < 0.001). If membership status differs between the parents and the participant, this is almost exclusively in the 
direction of a participant not being a church member whose parents were church members. 
Table 8 shows results for the association of parental membership and church attendance, respectively, when the partic- 
ipant was aged 15 with our six measures of ethics, replicating the analyses in the ﬁrst two panels of Table 4 . We ﬁnd that 
for both membership and church attendance the pattern of relationships found for the participants’ own religious indicators 
above is replicated. This constitutes evidence for an intergenerational transmission of the association between religion and 
moral attitudes. 
6. Investigating causality 
The associations identiﬁed in the previous sections provide important insights regarding the different moral contexts 
in more or less religious environments. An additional important step is the identiﬁcation of the underlying mechanisms 
leading to these associations. For example, coming back to the question posed in the Introduction, does a decline in church 
membership have an effect on moral behavior and attitudes? Or is it that different types of people select in or out of 
religious groups ( Iannaccone, 1998 ; Keely, 2003 )? While an unambiguous identiﬁcation of the causal mechanism will not 
a Mean of political orientation conditional on belonging into the respective group;
0 (most left wing) to 10 (most right wing).
b,c Entries that do not share the sa l tter differ significantly from each other
at at le st 10% significance level, ilcoxon te ts.
However, we find that frequent churchgoers have significantly more right-wing
attitudes than those who attend church less than once per week. We will come
back to the potential role of political attitudes in Section 4.6 when investigating
potential channels underlying the observed correlations.
4.5 Intergenera ional t ansmissio of moral at i-
tudes
Expecting that both religious affiliation and moral norms are typically transmitted
across generations, we next examine whether the observed associations between
religiosity and ethics hold w en we extend the an lysis to indicators of th par-
ticipants’ parent’s religiosity. We use the church membership of the participant’s
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parents and their frequency of attending church when the participant was aged 15
(summary statistics in Table 4.14 in the Appendix), to test if religious upbringing
correlates with ethical judgement/behavior of the participant today. Table 4.7
shows the pattern of the parents’ and the participants’ church membership.
Table 4.7: Participants’ vs. participants’ parents’ church membership.
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Table 6 
Denomination and politics. 
Denomination N Mean political orientation a 
Non-orthodox Catholic 758 5.68 b 
Orthodox Catholic 90 6.20 c 
Non-orthodox Protestant 383 5.77 b 
Orthodox Protestant 307 6.21 c 
a Mean of political orientation conditional on belonging into the respective 
group; 0 (most left wing) to 10 (most right wing). 
b, c Entries that do not share the same letter differ signiﬁcantly from each other 
at at least 10% signiﬁcance level, Wilcoxon tests. 
Table 7 
Participants’ vs. participants’ parents’ church membership. 
Parents 
Participant Church member No church member 
Church member 2021 (37%) 137 (2%) 
No church member 1535 (28%) 1812 (33%) 
Notes: There are in total 5505 observations with information on both: church 
membership of the participant and the church membership of the parents of 
the participant at age 15. Spearman’s rho is 0.49 with p -value < 0.001. 
preferences, Trautmann et al. (2013) show that the indicator maps exactly on the spectrum of Dutch political parties, as it 
is typically perceived. 
Except for preferences for redistribution, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant associations with political orientation (panel 
Political orientation in Table 5 ). That shows that a person’s moral attitudes and behavior is closely linked to her religion, 
and more so than to her politics. This is consistent with views that people sometimes vote for parties that do not represent 
their interest in economic policy terms ( Frank, 2004 ). 
We obtain a set of more nuanced results by studying the correlation between political orientations across religious sub- 
groups. This is motivated by recent ﬁndings in the United States, that religion and political attitudes appear to be closely 
intertwined. Based on Pew Research Center (2014) , Catholics are more likely to vote Democrats than Protestants and Protes- 
tants are more likely to vote Republicans than Catholics. In our Dutch sample, a different picture arises. Table 6 shows that 
there is no signiﬁcant difference in political orientation between (non-)orthodox Catholics and Protestants in the Nether- 
lands. However, we ﬁnd that frequent churchgoers have signiﬁcantly more right-wing attitudes than those who attend 
church less than once per week. We will come back to the potential role of political attitudes in Section 6 when inves- 
tigating potential channels underlying the observed correlations. 
5. Intergenerational transmission of moral attitudes 
Expecting that both religious aﬃliation and moral norms are typically transmitted across generations, we next examine 
whether the observed associations between religiosity and ethics hold when we extend the analysis to indicators of the par- 
ticipants’ parent’s religiosity. We use the church membership of the participant’s parents and their frequency of attending 
church when the participant was aged 15 (summary statistics in Table A4 in the Appendix), to test if religious upbring- 
ing correlates with ethical judgment/behavior of the participant today. Table 7 shows the pattern of the parents’ and the 
participants’ church membership. Parental membership status is strongly correlated with participants’ membership status 
( ρ = 0.49, p < 0.001). If membership status differs between the parents and the participant, this is almost exclusively in the 
direction of a participant not being a church member whose parents were church members. 
Table 8 shows results for the association of parental membership and church attendance, respectively, when the partic- 
ipant was aged 15 with our six measures of ethics, replicating the analyses in the ﬁrst two panels of Table 4 . We ﬁnd that 
for both membership and church attendance the pattern of relationships found for the participants’ own religious indicators 
above is replicated. This constitutes evidence for an intergenerational transmission of the association between religion and 
moral attitudes. 
6. Investigating causality 
The associations identiﬁed in the previous sections provide important insights regarding the different moral contexts 
in more or less religious environments. An additional important step is the identiﬁcation of the underlying mechanisms 
leading to these associations. For example, coming back to the question posed in the Introduction, does a decline in church 
membership have an effect on moral behavior and attitudes? Or is it that different types of people select in or out of 
religious groups ( Iannaccone, 1998 ; Keely, 2003 )? While an unambiguous identiﬁcation of the causal mechanism will not 
There are in total 5505 observations with information on both: church mem-
bership of the participan and the c ur me bership of the s of the
participant at age 15. Spearman’s rho is 0.49 with p-value 0. 01.
Parental membership status is strongly correlated with participants’ membership
status (ρ = 0.49, p < 0.001). If membership status differs between the parents and
the articipant, this is almost exclusively in the direction of a participant not being
a church member whose parents were church members.
Table 4.8 shows results for the association of parental membership and church
attendance, res ectively, when the participant was aged 15 with our six measures
of ethics, replicating the analyses in the first two panels of Table 4.4.
We find that for both membership and church attendance the pattern of rela-
tionships found for the participants’ own religious indicators above is replicated.
This constitutes evidence for an intergenerational transmission of the association
between religion and moral attitudes.
4.6 Investigating causality
The associations identified in the previous sections provide important insights re-
garding the different moral contexts in more or less religious environments. An
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additional important step is the identification of the underlying mechanisms lead-
ing to these associations. For example, coming back to the question posed in the
Introduction, does a decline in church membership have an effect on moral behav-
ior and attitudes? Or is it that different types of people select in or out of religious
groups (Keely 2003; Iannaccone 1998)? While an unambiguous identification of
the causal mechanism will not be feasible given the available data, in this section
we make an attempt to probe the potential pathway from religious indoctrination
by parents to moral behavior of their children years later.
In Section 4.5 we observed that parental religion, and not just the participants’
current religion, correlates with participants’ moral behavior. This suggests that a
direct self-selection channel, according to which believers with lower moral judge-
ment and volunteering levels leave the church, cannot fully explain the relationship.
To further explore this mechanism, we conduct a 2-stage instrumental variable re-
gression for each dependent variable with each religious dimension, using the two
sets of control variables. We instrument the respondent’s religious indicators by
the parents’ membership and their degree of activity (church attendance) when
the participant was aged 15. The model is given by the two-stage structure
xˆi = αˆ1 + ziβˆ1 + ciγˆ1 (4.1)
E (y∗i |xˆi, ci) = α + xˆiβ + xiγ (4.2)
where zi is a vector of dummy variables for parents’ membership and degree of
activity (church attendance) of the parents, xi is the participant’s measure of
religiosity considered, and ci is the vector of the control variables A or B. xˆi , αˆ1,
βˆ1, and γˆ1 are the fitted values of the first stage regression. yi denotes the ethics
measure under consideration. The approach thus assumes that the parents’ religion
is a strong determinant of the participant’s religion, and that any influence of
117
parental religion on moral behavior participant runs only through the participant’s
religion. That is a strong assumption given the multitude of potential social and
genetic transmission channels fur cultural traits, such as religion, and moral and
social behavior. However, if endogeneity is driven by self-selection at the level
of the participant, we may identify it in this setup if the correlations observed
in Table 4.4 vanish if participants’ religiosity is instrumented by their parents’
religiosity. Below we will come back to alternative channels for the association
of parental religion and participants’ ethics. Table 4.9 shows the results for the
instrumented variable in the second stage regressions for each of our dependent
variables.14
The results do not support the self-selection explanation. We find that the results
for the instrumented variables replicate the previously observed pattern of associ-
ations. An interesting difference with the previously observed pattern is that for
preference for redistribution and for informal care, the instrumental variable re-
gressions indicate a more consistent relevance across the dimensions of religiosity.
The above discussed distinction between social participation and internal beliefs
may thus not be substantial, but potentially be related to larger measurement er-
ror in some dimensions. Indeed, marginal effects are somewhat larger than those
found in the regression analyses in Section 4.3. Attenuation due to measurement
bias is a likely candidate for this effect, given the self-reported and self-perception
nature of our religious indicators. However, unobserved factors may also be at
play, which we consider next.
While a pathway from moral attitudes to religious affiliation and practice is not
directly supported by our analyses, there may be unobserved factors that influence
14Table 4.15 reports the test statistics for under-identification and weak identification. Overall
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) tests indicate the clear relevance of the instruments for the five
different dimensions of religiosity of the participant. We can reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are not correlated with the different dimensions of religiosity of the participant in all
cases (p-value < 0.01). We can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak except
for the combination of moral judgment with belief in theological concepts.
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both. In particular, the correlation between parental religion and participants’
moral attitudes might be driven by some predisposition of the parents, leading to
selection into the church for more moral individuals, and which is then transmitted
to the children through genetic and cultural channels other than religiosity. While
we find no evidence for selection at the participants’ level, it is conceivable that
for the parents’ generation, where church membership was far more common and
important, leaving the church was much stronger related to attitudes and behavior
(rather than a general lack of interest).
We consider two variables that are closely linked to these unobserved aspects that
may result in a correlation between religion and moral attitudes at the parents’
level, absent a causal effect from religion to ethics. First, a general level of sociabil-
ity may positively influence church attendance and time spent on voluntary work
and care. Second, political attitudes correlate with religious attitudes, but clearly
also with the moral attitudes and behavior we observe. To control whether the
partial correlations of religious activities and beliefs with our ethics measures are
possibly driven by the unobserved degree of sociability and political preferences,
we include controls for both aspects in the basic framework presented in Section
4.3. For political preferences we use the political orientation indicator introduced
in Section 4.4. Sociability we measure through information on the participant’s
membership in other, non-religious organisations, available from the Social Inte-
gration and Leisure module of the LISS panel. Indeed, we find that children of
church members are relatively more likely to be members in other, non-religious or-
ganisations than are children of parents who were no church members. Summary
statistics on these variables are given at the bottom of Table 4.3. We include
dummy variables for each type of organisation.
Results for the associations between religious measures and ethics in the specifica-
tions where we control for these alternative pathways (additionally to the full set
of Controls B) are shown in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10: Controlling for membership in organizations and political orien-
tation.
296 I. Kirchmaier et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 148 (2018) 282–300 
Table 10 
Controlling for membership in organizations and political orientation. 
Dimension of religiosity Moral judgment 
(0–9) 
Preference for 
redistribution 
(0–4) 
Hours spent on 
voluntary work per 
week a 
Hours spent on 
informal care per 
week 
Honor trust in 
trust game 
Self-perceived 
trustworthiness 
(0–6) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Church membership 
Not a church member 7.72 2.88 3.41 2.49 49% 5.05 
Church member 7.94# 2.80 ∗ 4.75 ∗∗∗ 2.43 58% 5.14# 
Church attendance 
Never 7.75 2.89 3.30 2.30 54% 5.10 
Less than once a week 7.77 2.83 4.37 ∗∗∗ 2.65 52% 5.08 
Once a week or more 8.33 ∗∗∗ 2.72 ∗∗ 5.81 ∗∗∗ 2.59 49% 5.04 
Praying 
Never 7.77 2.87 3.33 2.21 54% 5.05 
Less than once a week 7.63 2.82 4.21 ∗∗ 2.90 ∗ 50% 5.13 
Once a week or more 8.07 ∗ 2.85 4.74 ∗∗∗ 2.49 53% 5.11 
Belief in God 
Belief ≤Median 7.72 2.86 3.64 2.41 51% 5.04 
Belief > Median 7.99 ∗ 2.84 4.39 ∗∗∗ 2.52 56% 5.15 ∗
Belief in theological concepts 
Belief ≤Median 7.69 2.80 3.10 2.40 46% 4.95 
Belief > Median 8.02 2.78 4.93 ∗∗∗ 2.46 56% 5.03 
Notes : We present the adjusted predictions for each ethical measure for the regression including Controls B and controlling for political orientation and 
membership in organizations. The average marginal effect is the difference between the average adjusted prediction of the category and the excluded 
category. The excluded category is indicated in italics. The signiﬁcance of each comparison is based on regression analyses of the ethical measure on 
the dimensions of religiosity including dummy variables indicating the membership in following types of organizations: cultural, environmental, peace, or 
animal rights, humanitarian aid or human rights, political party, sports or outdoor, and social society and an indicator for political orientation variable being 
strictly above median (i.e., right wing) and Controls B. # p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Regression type: (1)–(4), and (6): Tobit regression; (5): 
Probit regression. Controls B: age, male, number of children, partner, divorced, married, urban character of residence, median split indicator of personal net 
monthly income, education, health status, self-employment. 
a We include additionally a dummy variable taking the value 1 if no voluntary work other than informal care is done. Throughout all regressions this 
dummy variable is signiﬁcant. 
does not allow us to reject the pathway from indoctrination to ethics. Moreover, the observed consistency of our results 
across the different dimensions of religiosity (except for preference for redistribution) also suggests that a simple selection 
process does not fully explain the observed associations: if social types select into social activities in churches, this may not 
necessarily lead them to hold stronger religious beliefs. However, because we cannot eliminate the possibility that other, 
unobserved factors affect both religiosity and ethics, we abstain from strong conclusions regarding causal effects. 
7. Conclusion 
We started with the observation that church membership and religiosity is much less prevalent in the generation of re- 
spondents in our sample of the Dutch population, compared to the generation of their parents. Our question was whether a 
religious environment differs from a less religious one in terms of moral attitudes and behaviors that are a key ingredient to 
economic interaction. Our results suggest that this is the case. We ﬁnd that religious people differ from non-religious people 
by holding stricter moral attitudes, and by spending more time on volunteering and informal care. Moreover, the religious 
have lower preferences for redistribution. However, we do not ﬁnd differences in trustworthiness between the religious and 
the non-religious in an anonymous experimental game, and that church membership alone (rather than indicators of poten- 
tially private, religious activities) is not a strong predictor for the time someone spends on informal care. This suggests that 
observability of charitable deeds and the fact that the recipient of charity is typically selected from the participant’s social 
network, both of which relate to the “belonging” aspect of religious activities, play an important role for these activities. 
Our observations thus indicate that a religious society might be quite different in terms of social fabric, both its formal and 
its informal institutions, compared to a non-religious society. Our ﬁndings on parents’ religion show that such differences 
may be persistent. 
Zooming in on different Christian denominations, we ﬁnd several differences. Catholics are more generous in the anony- 
mous trust game returns. Protestants have a lower preference for redistribution, but spend more time on volunteering. These 
effects are especially pronounced for orthodox Protestants, who also hold stricter moral attitudes. The content and structure 
of a religious denomination, over and beyond the distinction between the religious and non-religious, seems associated with 
attitudes and behaviors relevant to economic institutions ( Filistrucchi and Prüfer, 2018 ). 
The interpretation of the observed associations in terms of causal pathways is not trivial though. Religious aﬃliation 
affecting moral attitudes, and moral attitudes leading to selection into church, are both conceivable. Unobserved factors 
may affect both church membership and moral attitudes. With the current data, we cannot unambiguously identify causal 
effects. However, we probe whether we can reject the interpretation in terms of a causal effect from religion to moral 
behavior. We ﬁnd no evidence suggesting self-selection of moral individuals into churches. Unobservable factors may matter, 
e present the adjusted predictions for each ethical measure for the regression
including Controls B a d controll ng f r political orientation a d m mb rs ip in
organiza io s. The average m rginal effect is the differe ce between th ver ge
adjusted prediction of the category and the excluded category. The excluded
category is indicated in italics. The significance of each comparison is based
on r gression analyses of the ethical measure on the dimensions of religiosity
including dummy variables indicating the membership in following types of or-
ganizations: cultural, environmental, peace, or animal rights, humanitarian aid
or human rights, political p rty, sport or outdoor, and social society and an in-
dicator for political orientation variable being strictly above median (i.e., right
wing) and Controls B. #p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 Regres-
sion type: (1)–(4), and (6): Tobit regression; (5): Probit regression. Controls
B: age, mal , number of children, partner, divorced, married, urban character
of residence, median split indicator of personal net monthly income, education,
health s atus, s lf-employment.
a We include additionally a dummy variable taking the value 1 if no voluntary
work other tha informal care is do e. Throughout all regressions this dummy
variable is significant.
The previously observed pattern replicates. Some associations become smaller
and less significa t, notable those for preference for redistribution. Organisational
membership and political orientation are linked to the moral attitudes considered
here, and may contribute to the ssociation with religious variables shown in Table
4.4. However, overall the findings in Table 4.4 persist when controlling for these
variables.
In sum, the robustness of our basic results when instrumenting with parental re-
ligion (given the discussed caveats) or when controlling for alternative pathways
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for the link between religious affiliation and moral attitudes and activities, does
not allow us to reject the pathway from indoctrination to ethics. Moreover, the
observed consistency of our results across the different dimensions of religiosity
(except for preference for redistribution) also suggests that a simple selection pro-
cess does not fully explain the observed associations: if social types select into
social activities in churches, this may not necessarily lead them to hold stronger
religious beliefs. However, because we cannot eliminate the possibility that other,
unobserved factors affect both religiosity and ethics, we abstain from strong con-
clusions regarding causal effects.
4.7 Conclusion
We started with the observation that church membership and religiosity is much
less prevalent in the generation of respondents in our sample of the Dutch popu-
lation, compared to the generation of their parents. Our question was whether a
religious environment differs from a less religious one in terms of moral attitudes
and behaviors that are a key ingredient to economic interaction. Our results sug-
gest that this is the case. We find that religious people differ from non-religious
people by holding stricter moral attitudes, and by spending more time on vol-
unteering and informal care. Moreover, the religious have lower preferences for
redistribution. However, we do not find differences in trustworthiness between
the religious and the non-religious in an anonymous experimental game, and that
church membership alone (rather than indicators of potentially private, religious
activities) is not a strong predictor for the time someone spends on informal care.
This suggests that observability of charitable deeds and the fact that the recipient
of charity is typically selected from the participant’s social network, both of which
relate to the “belonging” aspect of religious activities, play an important role for
these activities. Our observations thus indicate that a religious society might be
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quite different in terms of social fabric, both its formal and its informal institu-
tions, compared to a non-religious society. Our findings on parents’ religion show
that such differences may be persistent.
Zooming in on different Christian denominations, we find several differences. Catholics
are more generous in the anonymous trust game returns. Protestants have a lower
preference for redistribution, but spend more time on volunteering. These effects
are especially pronounced for orthodox Protestants, who also hold stricter moral
attitudes. The content and structure of a religious denomination, over and beyond
the distinction between the religious and non-religious, seems associated with at-
titudes and behaviors relevant to economic institutions (Filistrucchi and Prüfer
2018).
The interpretation of the observed associations in terms of causal pathways is
not trivial though. Religious affiliation affecting moral attitudes, and moral atti-
tudes leading to selection into church, are both conceivable. Unobserved factors
may affect both church membership and moral attitudes. With the current data,
we cannot unambiguously identify causal effects. However, we probe whether we
can reject the interpretation in terms of a causal effect from religion to moral
behavior. We find no evidence suggesting self-selection of moral individuals into
churches. Unobservable factors may matter,but controlling for political orienta-
tion and membership in organisations to proxy for social attitudes and the general
level of sociability does not reduce the associations substantially. While our data
thus do not reject the pathway from religiosity to behavior, we abstain from strong
conclusions regarding causality. Future research may make progress in this dimen-
sion by using events that externally affect church membership, such as scandals
affecting some congregations or parishes more strongly than others. Moreover,
even if a causal effect from religion to moral behavior could be clearly established,
it were unclear whether such an effect would work through indoctrination, social
pressure, or opportunities (e.g. in the case where church organisations offer more
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opportunities to participate in volunteering; or where they offer social insurance).
Given the associations established in the current paper, these are important ques-
tions to approach next, to provide insights into the underlying mechanisms in the
relationship between religion and moral attitudes and behavior.
4.8 Appendix
This appendix provides Tables with additional summary statistics and data anal-
yses referred to in the main text.
Table 4.11: Denominations of Other Faiths.
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but controlling for political orientation and membership in organizations to proxy for social attitudes and the general level 
of sociability does not reduce the associations substantially. While our data thus do not reject the pathway from religiosity 
to behavior, we abstain from strong conclusions regarding causality. Future research may make progress in this dimension 
by using events that exte nally affect church membership, such as scandals affecting some congregations or parishes more 
strongly than others. Moreover, even if a causal effect from religion to moral behavior could be clearly established, it were 
unclear whether such an effect would work through indoctrination, social pressure, or opportunities (e.g. in the case where 
church organizations offer more opportunities to participate in volunteering; or where they offer social insurance). Given 
the associations established in the current paper, these are important questions to approach next, to provide insights into 
the underlying mechanisms in the relationship between religion an  moral attitudes and behavior. 
Appendix 
This appendix provides Tables A1–A5 with additional summary statistics and data analyses referred to in the main text. 
Table A1 
Denominations of other faiths. 
Denomination % of Other faiths 
Eastern Orthodox Christian Church 3% 
Other Christian church community 43% 
Hinduism 5% 
Buddhism 3% 
Judaism 1% 
Islam 39% 
Other non-Christian religion 6% 
Notes : There are in total 272 observations of Other faiths. 
Table A2 
Summary statistics: religion, by religious subgroup. 
Non-orthodox Catholics Orthodox Catholics Non-orthodox Protestants Orthodox Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Church attendance 
More than once a week 25% 30% 
Once a week 75% 70% 
At least once a month 18% 29% 
Only at special days 35% 22% 
Rarely 24% 27% 
Never 23% 22% 
Private Prayer 
More than once a week 31% 87% 54% 97% 
Once a week 8% 6% 5% 3% 
At least once a month 9% 2% 8% 
Only at special days 8% 2% 4% 
Rarely 27% 2% 19% 
Never 17% 2% 11% 
Belief in God 
Degree of belief in God (0–5) 3.18 4.28 3.81 4.68 
Strong belief in God a 66% 92% 81% 97% 
Belief in theological concepts 
Believe in life after death 62% 75% 74% 95% 
Believe in existence of heaven 45% 82% 79% 97% 
Believe in existence of hell 6% 21% 16% 67% 
Believe in existence devil 8% 23% 24% 81% 
Believe that Adam and Eve existed 37% 63% 74% 90% 
Believe in Bible as the word of God 56% 88% 84% 98% 
Believe that prayer makes sense 84% 95% 92% 100% 
Belief in theological concepts (0–7) 3.05 5.09 4.99 6.60 
Strong belief in theological concepts a 74% 87% 90% 100% 
Notes : Percentages or means of non-orthodox Roman Catholics (1), Orthodox Roman Catholics (2), Non-orthodox Protestants (3) and Orthodox 
Protestants (4) are reported. Orthodox is deﬁned as those Catholic/Protestant participants who visit church at least once a week. 
a Indicator for degree of belief in God [resp. belief in theological concepts]: 0 ( ≤median), 1 ( > median). Values from the same dimension may not 
add to 100% due to rounding. 
There are in total 272 observati ns of Oth faiths.
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Table 4.12: Summary statistics: religion, by religious subgroup.
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but controlling for political orientation and membership in organizations to proxy for social attitudes and the general level 
of sociability does not reduce the associations substantially. While our data thus do not reject the pathway from religiosity 
to behavior, we abstain from strong conclusions regarding causality. Future research may make progress in this dimension 
by using events that externally affect church membership, such as scandals affecting some congregations or parishes more 
strongly than others. Moreover, even if a causal effect from religion to moral behavior could be clearly established, it were 
unclear whether such an effect would work through indoctrination, social pressure, or opportunities (e.g. in the case where 
church organizations offer more opportunities to participate in volunteering; or where they offer social insurance). Given 
the associations established in the current paper, these are important questions to approach next, to provide insights into 
the underlying mechanisms in the relationship between religion and moral attitudes and behavior. 
Appendix 
This appendix provides Tables A1–A5 with additional summary statistics and data analyses referred to in the main text. 
Table A1 
Denominations of other faiths. 
Denomination % of Other faiths 
Eastern Orthodox Christian Church 3% 
Other Christian church community 43% 
Hinduism 5% 
Buddhism 3% 
Judaism 1% 
Islam 39% 
Other non-Christian religion 6% 
Notes : There are in total 272 observations of Other faiths. 
Table A2 
Summary statistics: religion, by religious subgroup. 
Non-orthodox Catholics Orthodox Catholics Non-orthodox Protestants Orthodox Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Church attendance 
More than once a week 25% 30% 
Once a week 75% 70% 
At least once a month 18% 29% 
Only at special days 35% 22% 
Rarely 24% 27% 
Never 23% 22% 
Private Prayer 
More than once a week 31% 87% 54% 97% 
Once a week 8% 6% 5% 3% 
At least once a month 9% 2% 8% 
Only at special days 8% 2% 4% 
Rarely 27% 2% 19% 
Never 17% 2% 11% 
Belief in God 
Degree of belief in God (0–5) 3.18 4.28 3.81 4.68 
Strong belief in God a 66% 92% 81% 97% 
Belief in theological concepts 
Believe in life after death 62% 75% 74% 95% 
Believe in existence of heaven 45% 82% 79% 97% 
Believe in existence of hell 6% 21% 16% 67% 
Believe in existence devil 8% 23% 24% 81% 
Believe that Adam and Eve existed 37% 63% 74% 90% 
Believe in Bible as the word of God 56% 88% 84% 98% 
Believe that prayer makes sense 84% 95% 92% 100% 
Belief in theological concepts (0–7) 3.05 5.09 4.99 6.60 
Strong belief in theological concepts a 74% 87% 90% 100% 
Notes : Percentages or means of non-orthodox Roman Catholics (1), Orthodox Roman Catholics (2), Non-orthodox Protestants (3) and Orthodox 
Protestants (4) are reported. Orthodox is deﬁned as those Catholic/Protestant participants who visit church at least once a week. 
a Indicator for degree of belief in God [resp. belief in theological concepts]: 0 ( ≤median), 1 ( > median). Values from the same dimension may not 
add to 100% due to rounding. 
P rcentages or means f non-orthodox Roman C holics (1), Orth dox Roman
Catholics (2), Non-orthodox Protestants (3) and Orthodox Protestants (4) are
reported. Orthodox is defined as those Catholic/Protestant participants who
visit church at least once a week. Values from the same dimension may not add
to 100% due to rounding.
a Indicator for degree of belief in God [resp. belief in theological concepts]: 0 (
≤ median), 1 ( > median).
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Table 4.13: Summary statistics: reported hours of volunteering > 0.
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Table A3 
Summary statistics: reported hours of volunteering > 0. 
All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reported hours of …
Volunteering a 7.36 7.31 7.73 6.97 
Volunteering w/o informal care only b 6.40 6.73 7.52 6.07 
Informal care c 4.58 4.18 4.20 4.08 
Informal care only d 9.88 9.44 8.31 12.00 
Informal care 
Do informal care c 49% 48% 53% 40% 
Do informal care only d 28% 21% 25% 15% 
Volunteering in organizations 
Do volunteering in organizations 52% 55% 50% 61% 
Sports or outdoor 19% 16% 18% 16% 
Cultural 9% 9% 10% 9% 
Trade Union 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Business, agrarian 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Consumers’ organization, automobile club 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Humanitarian aid or human rights 6% 6% 4% 8% 
Environmental, peace or animal rights 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Religious 13% 25% 13% 34% 
Political party 2% 2% 1% 3% 
Science, education, teachers’ 5% 6% 6% 7% 
Social society 6% 7% 8% 6% 
Other organization, free to join 11% 12% 13% 11% 
Other volunteering 
Not in organization and not informal care 41% 47% 48% 48% 
Notes : Sample of participants who reported hours of volunteering greater than zero. Percentages or 
means of all (1) ( N = 2375), church members (2) ( N = 1090), Roman Catholics (3) ( N = 500) and Protes- 
tants (4) ( N = 463) are reported. 
a Hours of voluntary work can be due to work in one or more of three different categories: informal 
care, volunteering in organizations, or other types of volunteering. 
b Participants who do only informal care are excluded. 
c Participants who do informal care and possible other types of volunteering. 
d Participants who only do informal care. 
Table A4 
Summary statistics: religion of parents when participant was aged 15. 
# Obs. All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Religious status 
Church membership 5574 65% 
Roman Catholic 5556 34% 53% 
Protestant 5556 24% 38% 
Other faiths 5556 6% 9% 
Orthodox Roman Catholic a 1897 65% 
Orthodox Protestants a 1350 64% 
Church attendance 
More than once a week 5602 11% 17% 12% 19% 
Once a week 5602 31% 47% 52% 45% 
At least once a month 5602 6% 10% 9% 11% 
Only at special days 5602 12% 14% 16% 10% 
Rarely 5602 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Never 5602 33% 6% 4% 9% 
Notes : Percentages or means of parents when participant was aged 15 of all (1), church members 
(2), Roman Catholics (3) and Protestants (4) are reported. The number of observations for sample 
(1) is reported in the ﬁrst column. 
a For Orthodox Catholic and Protestant the number of observations for sample (3) and (4) are 
reported, respectively. 
Sample of participants who reported hours of volunteering greater than zero.
Percentages or means of all (1) (N = 2375), church members (2) (N = 1090),
Roman Catholics (3) (N = 500) and Protestants (4) (N = 463) are reported.
a Hours of voluntary work can be due to work in one or more of three different
categories: informal care, volunteering in organizations, or other types of volun-
teering.
b Participants who do only informal care are excluded.
c Participants who do informal care and possible other types of volunteering.
d Participants who only do informal care.
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Table 4.14: Summary statistics: religion of parents when participant was
aged 15.
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Table A3 
Summary statistics: reported hours of volunteering > 0. 
All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reported hours of …
Volunteering a 7.36 7.31 7.73 6.97 
Volunteering w/o informal care only b 6.40 6.73 7.52 6.07 
Informal care c 4.58 4.18 4.20 4.08 
Informal care only d 9.88 9.44 8.31 12.00 
Informal care 
Do informal care c 49% 48% 53% 40% 
Do informal care only d 28% 21% 25% 15% 
Volunteering in organizations 
Do volunteering in organizations 52% 55% 50% 61% 
Sports or outdoor 19% 16% 18% 16% 
Cultural 9% 9% 10% 9% 
Trade Union 1% 1% 1% 1% 
Business, agrarian 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Consumers’ organization, automobile club 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Humanitarian aid or human rights 6% 6% 4% 8% 
Environmental, peace or animal rights 2% 2% 2% 2% 
Religious 13% 25% 13% 34% 
Political party 2% 2% 1% 3% 
Science, education, teachers’ 5% 6% 6% 7% 
Social society 6% 7% 8% 6% 
Other organization, free to join 11% 12% 13% 11% 
Other volunteering 
Not in organization and not informal care 41% 47% 48% 48% 
Notes : Sample of participants who reported hours of volunteering greater than zero. Percentages or 
means of all (1) ( N = 2375), church members (2) ( N = 1090), Roman Catholics (3) ( N = 500) and Protes- 
tants (4) ( N = 463) are reported. 
a Hours of voluntary work can be due to work in one or more of three different categories: informal 
care, volunteering in organizations, or other types of volunteering. 
b Participants who do only informal care are excluded. 
c Participants who do informal care and possible other types of volunteering. 
d Participants who only do informal care. 
Table A4 
Summary statistics: religion of parents when participant was aged 15. 
# Obs. All Church members Catholics Protestants 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Religious status 
Church membership 5574 65% 
Roman Catholic 5556 34% 53% 
Protestant 5556 24% 38% 
Other faiths 5556 6% 9% 
Orthodox Roman Catholic a 1897 65% 
Orthodox Protestants a 1350 64% 
Church attendance 
More than once a week 5602 11% 17% 12% 19% 
Once a week 5602 31% 47% 52% 45% 
At least once a month 5602 6% 10% 9% 11% 
Only at special days 5602 12% 14% 16% 10% 
Rarely 5602 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Never 5602 33% 6% 4% 9% 
Notes : Percentages or means of parents when participant was aged 15 of all (1), church members 
(2), Roman Catholics (3) and Protestants (4) are reported. The number of observations for sample 
(1) is reported in the ﬁrst column. 
a For Orthodox Catholic and Protestant the number of observations for sample (3) and (4) are 
reported, respectively. 
Percentages or means of parents when participant was aged 15 of all (1), church
me bers (2), Roman Catholics (3) and Protestants (4) are reported. The num-
be of observation for sample (1) is reported in the first column.
a For Orthodox Catholic and Protestant the number of obse vations for sample
(3) and (4) are reported, respectively.
4.9 Supplementary materials
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found in the online ver-
sion of Kirchmaier, Prüfer, and Trautmann (2018) at doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.022,
and at https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/dataverse/awiexeco.
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